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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to explore how basic law market demand and supply forces (or
underlying exit and voice rights), interplaying under international jurisdictional competition
among global legal centers, shape regulations laid down by such a democratically-constrained
onshore jurisdiction as Taiwan. The thesis in this dissertation is that jurisdictional competition
brought about by physical mobility would provoke a change in local laws. In general, the case
study of Taiwan’s regulatory evolution on outward investment in Mainland China 
(“China-Investment”) from 1997 to 2008 further examines the extent to which jurisdictional 
competition fuelled by physical mobility may drive local legal changes. In particular, this case
study is to test the process by which constraints on excessive regulation would be imposed by
international jurisdictional competition stimulated by business demands and fuelled by physical
mobility. To begin with, after incorporating basic theories involving the law market and so forth,
I draw lessons from corporate charter competitions in the 19-century U.S. and contemporary
Europe as well as the negative effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on foreign issuers, that
jurisdictional competition constrains regulating jurisdictions from disregarding business demands
and from imposing excessive regulation, and that jurisdictional competition brought about by
mobility or exit would push for legal flexibility. Subsequently, this case study first displays a
stage-by-stage liberalization of the regulation on China-Investment, generally from strictly
mandatory to much more flexible legal regimes. This phenomenon could demonstrate the output
of market interactions between demand and supply sides of the international law market among
global legal centers. Specifically, this dissertation gives a causal interpretation that business
demands of Taiwanese firms, via their exit and voice rights, galvanize the relaxation transitions
of Taiwan’s Capital Controls,while arriving at a positive conclusion that the usual demand and
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supply forces operating in this international jurisdictional competition, which was stimulated by
Taiwan-invested firms’ business demands and fueled by concomitant physical mobility, may
have the effect of nudging the Taiwanese government in the direction of relaxing the regulation
on China-Investment. Although Taiwan’s government struggled to regulate China-Investment as
effectively as possible, it failed after all due to the impacts of globalization in general and the
denationalization of financial capital in particular. This, on the other hand, suggests that the fact
that the international jurisdictional competition provoked by the heightened physical mobility
under economic globalization turned the regulation all but ineffective has much to do with the
stage-by-stage liberalization. Finally, even though proving a causal relationship is a challenge,
this dissertation could, at the very least after ruling out major alternative theories, find a strong
correlation between international jurisdictional competition and the stage-by-stage liberalization.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As stock markets in China (hereinafter also referred to as the “PRC,”1 “Mainland 
China” or the “Mainland”)and Hong Kong performed well in recent years, Taiwan
becomes attractive because it could be the last place to seek relatively cheap shares in
companies which are extensively based in China. Until 2007,Taiwan’s “weighting in the
widely used MSCI Emerging index was second only to South Korea’s.”2 Nevertheless,
preoccupied with national identity—including the extent of political independence from
the PRC—and national security against threats from the Mainland, Taiwan’sgovernment
took measures to obstruct economic integration of the private sector with China, until
Taiwan began turning to large-scale deregulation since President Ma of the Nationalists
(“Kuomintang”or “KMT,”which is the current ruling party in Taiwan whereas the
Democratic Progressive Party (“DPP”) was the former ruling party before the 2008 
presidential election) won the presidential election in March 2008. Therefore, although
many Taiwanese companies were believed to already earn hefty profits on their Mainland
operations, they kept their successes a secret to avoid the Taiwanese government’s 
stringent restrictions on outward investment in Mainland China.
As a matter of fact, with Taiwan’sgovernment attempting unsuccessfully to hinder
further investment across the Taiwan Strait (the “Strait”), many Taiwanese corporations
have weaved their ways through these bans so as to hand over needed funds to their
affiliates or subsidiaries in Mainland China. Alternatively, in order to exit from
1 The People’s Republic of China is commonly known as China.
2 Keith Bradsher, Investors Look to Taiwan in Hopes of Cashing In on China Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/business/worldbusiness/20exchange.html?fta=y.
2Taiwanese stock markets burdened with stringent regulation and to raise capital which
the parent company in Taiwan could freely invest in Mainland China, many Taiwanese
companies would also incorporate a company in a third area such as the Cayman Islands
while owning a controlling interest of that company, or delegate investment in China to a
company in the aforementioned third area. Then those offshore companies established or
delegated would set up another company in Mainland China and in turn have that
Chinese company locally listed on the Mainland; or more typically, those offshore
companies would list shares in neighboring stock markets in the Greater Chinese
Economy,3 especially the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKSE”).
Inspired by corporate charter competitions in the 19-century U.S. and contemporary
Europe as well as the negative impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) on the 
U.S. cross-listing market, this dissertation would first draw a positive lesson from the
above stories that law market forces underlying jurisdictional competition would
constrain jurisdictions from disregarding business demands and from imposing excessive
regulation, and then apply this implication to prove my positive thesis that the output of
these market interactions underlying international jurisdictional competition among
global legal centers is that Taiwan’s excessive regulation on outward investment in
3 Kevin Zhang points out:
In the two decades since 1979, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have become one integrated economic
region, driving the dramatic growth of investment, production, and trade in East Asia. Often referred
to as “the Greater Chinese Economy,” this region represents in certain respects the triumph of 
economics over politics, in the sense that the three very different political entities have today become
an economic trading, investing, and producing region, despite political and military conflict and
long-standing, deep-seated suspicion and mistrust. FDI has been the engine driving these three
entities into an increasingly intimate relationship.
Kevin H. Zhang,China’s Inward FDI Boom and the Greater Chinese Economy, in FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA 165, 165 (Hung-gay Fung & Kevin H. Zhang eds.,
2002) (citation omitted).
3Mainland China is nudged in the direction of relaxation stage by stage from 1997 to
2008.
Specifically, Taiwanese firms’physical exit and threats of exit from Taiwan
demonstrate the demand side of the law market in seeking legal flexibility, which first
provokes the supply side in the international context. Further, where multiple suppliers
such as Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands, by providing regulatory products of legal
flexibility, participate in the international jurisdictional competition for these fleeing
corporations’corporate charters, listings and other local economic transactions, the
international supply force subsequently sparks the supply side in the domestic
environment. That is, torrential economic exits in turn send signals to the political
marketplace within Taiwan. Fugitive Taiwanese firms and those negatively affected by
their exits voiced the petition for legal flexibility in the ensuing interest group
competitions, which finally pressured Taiwan’sgovernment to meet business demands,
or to loosen the excessive regulation.
As for the structure of this dissertation, in Chapter 2, Part A introduces general
theories regarding jurisdictional competition and draws lessons from them to later test
jurisdictional competition in Taiwan’s phenomenon. First of al, the genesis of the
jurisdictional competition theory can trace back toCharles Tiebout’s 1956 article,4 which,
as Esty and Geradin compress, suggests that“decentralized governance, with horizontally
arrayed jurisdictions competing to attract residents on the basis of differing tax and
benefits structures, would generate increased social welfare and produce a
4 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
4Pareto-superior outcome.”5 Subsequently, I come to the law market theory. Incorporating
Albert Hirschman’s theory regarding options of exit and voice, interactions between 
forces driving the law market connote the demand side of law market generated by “exit,” 
the supply side in regulating jurisdictions where interest groups competeto “voice” their
respective preferences, and regulatory responses from local political forces to the above
exit signals.
Then when it comes to the international dimension,“with globalization—intensified
trade and greater factor mobility—there is more immediate feedback to high-cost
institutional systems and, with it, the need to adjust those systems to cost-effectiveness,
not only passively but possibly even pro-actively.”6 Hence, regarding underlying factors
spurring the law market in a global setting, the increase of international factor mobility
brought about by globalization lowers firms’ exit costs and then intensifies the
international jurisdictional competition for mobile resources. Out-flowing capital and
emigrating labor would then compel regulatory jurisdictions to improve on the quality of
their regulations. In other words, the international movement of production factors,
delivered through domestic interest groups to political policy makers within a regulating
jurisdiction, could galvanize the liberalization of excessive regulation.
Part B of Chapter 2 researches further into specific law markets in corporate charters
and securities regulation. To begin with, from the nineteenth century jurisdictional
competition of corporate law in the U.S., it is not difficult to infer not only that in a
5 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES at xxiii (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
6 WOLFGANG KASPER & MANFRED E. STREIT, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: SOCIAL ORDER AND PUBLIC
POLICY 403 (1998).
5jurisdictional competition of repeated games, being a leader requires continuous respect
for business demands, but also that if regulatory jurisdictions refuse to recognize business
demands, firms have incentives to seek out more cost-effective or flexible laws in other
jurisdictions, and this firm mobility would finally resign governments to lift
overburdensome bans. Furthermore, the rise and fall of New Jersey in this competition
for corporate charters illustrates the usual supply and demand forces at work in this
corporate law market.
In turn, Centros and other descendent cases adjudicated by the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) have provoked not only some European competition in the form of
“tramp” UK incorporations7 by companies based elsewhere in Europe, but also responses
by other European countries, particularly by revising their minimum capitalization
requirements and simplifying incorporation requirements. In other words, in the wake of
Centros, all Member States are required essentially to adhere to business demands
especially with respect to corporate law for small firms. In a word, law market forces
interplaying in both corporate law markets of the 19-century U.S. and contemporary
Europe push regulatory transitions from mandatory to more flexible regimes. Although
the breeding grounds of these two jurisdictional competitions seem in appearance to be
disparate, underlying competitive dynamics is likely to be the same, in the sense that
jurisdictional competition prompted by firms’ mobility could push relaxation of excessive
regulation.
7 A pseudo-foreign corporation is also known as a migratory or “tramp” corporation. Gries Sports 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ohio. 1943); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 141 P.2d
571, 573 (Okla. 1943).
6In Part B.2., theoretically, the advantages of state competition in the U.S. might be
extended to the international scene, with international jurisdictional competition in
securities regulation such as disclosure and anti-fraud rules. Notwithstanding the debate
between proponents and opponents of issuer choice, foreign firms already can choose to
“bond” their integrity by cross-listing in the United States or other improved markets,
thereby subjecting themselves to these legal regimes added to those in their home
countries. Much evidence supports this bonding explanation of cross-listing. Nonetheless,
full-fledged international competition used to be much more hobbled by the fact that the
United States at the earliest insisted on regulating all trading within its borders regardless
of where the firms are based exactly after the enactment of SOX. In fact, SOX impacted
non-U.S. firms so negatively that many foreign issuers were driven to list shares
elsewhere. Foreign firms’ mobility fed the demand side of this law market, which 
subsequently spurred the supply side within the United States. Therefore, the U.S.
responded to criticisms from German and other foreign companies by issuing rules that
partially exempt foreign firms from some SOX requirements. The SOX case not only
implies that constraints on over-stringent SOX to foreign issuers would be imposed by
jurisdictional competition among global cross-listing markets fuelled by capital mobility,
but also that international jurisdictional competition would provoke a change in
over-burdensome regulation to a more flexible regime.
To conclude Chapter 2.B., international securities regulation seems quite different
from the two corporate law markets mentioned above in that the former is at work on the
national level rather than within federal systems of the United States or Europe, but the
SOX case implies that law market forces similar to those working as to corporate law
7within federal systems also work as to international securities regulation. As Ribstein and
O’Hara stress, “[a]lthough federal securities laws arguably circumvent the [Internal
Afairs Doctrine (the “IAD”)] by displacing state law, there is a market in international
securities regulation that displays some of the same competitive processes as the market
for state corporate law.”8 In other words, forces that operate in the law market generally
apply in the international context as well.9
In Chapter 3, I apply lessons from Chapter 2 to the Taiwan case. In light of this
Taiwanese phenomenon I try to illustrate international jurisdictional competition among
global legal centers, principally indicating Hong Kong and other offshore financial
centers (“OFC”) in British Central America. This competition might lead to the
stage-by-stage lightening of capital limits on investment in the PRC laid down by
Taiwan’sgovernment.
In the first place, Chapter 3.A in a more micro level of analysis exemplifies this
jurisdictional competition where HKSE acted as a dominant competitor against Taiwan in
the market forTaiwanese firms’ listings in the Greater Chinese Economy. Part A.1.“The
Demand Side of the Law Market” introduces the historical background and legal
structures of the upper limits on outward investment in Mainland China (the “Capital 
Controls”) and related constraints on use of capital raised in Taiwanese stock markets
towards investment in China (the “Constraints”) (the above two restrictions altogether
hereinafter also refered to as the “Restrictions”). TheRestrictions, on the one hand,
ignore trends of economic globalization and concomitant business demands for
8 Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661,
710 (2008).
9 Id. at 711-12.
8increasing investments in Mainland China. On the other hand, the predicament of
enforcing the Restrictions brings to light the core problem of the Restrictions—even if a
jurisdiction acts with strong intentions to regulate economic transactions beyond its
borders, it would be restrained from doing so as globalization weakens its regulatory
capacity. In order to raise capital allowed to be used for investments in China, fugitive
Taiwanese firms cannot but circumvent the Restrictions through common evasive tactics
to list shares overseas.
This fact is further corroborated in Part A.2. “The Supply Side of the Law Market” 
that these Taiwanese firms spurn exchanges at home and choose to go public in other
stock markets in the Greater Chinese Economy, not least Hong Kong, not primarily in
order to opt into the laws thereof and to bond their insiders given the “bonding” efect, 
but rather mainly to “avoid” the Restrictions. In turn these Taiwanese firms’ physical 
exits and threats of exit motivate anti-regulatory and exit-affected interest groups in
Taiwan to action. Subsequent to political competition with pro-regulatory interest groups,
anti-regulatory interest groups combined with exit-affected ones successfully voiced their
petition for legal flexibility especially through a critical political process in 2008—the
presidential election in March. KMT’s presidential candidate, President Ma (advocating
the pro-China and anti-regulatory policy), won the presidential election. Subsequently,
the Restrictions have been largely relaxed in a timely manner.
In Part B of Chapter 3, we might find from a macro-narrative how the international
jurisdictional competition among global legal centers plays a role in causing the
relaxation of the Capital Controls: although the Capital Controls have turned much more
9moderate by now, the Capital Controls’transitions can appropriately illustrate how law
market forces underlying international jurisdictional competition would shape evolutional
changes of a democratically-constrained jurisdiction’s regulations. I would argue that
owing to globalization law market forces underlying international jurisdictional
competition among global legal centers push Taiwan’sgovernment to relax its excessive
regulation and create a more flexible regime. This positive thesis may be corroborated by
my trend study as shown in Figure 2. To begin with, the amount of outward investment in
Mainland China (“China-Investment”) has been increasing significantly over time. The
Capital Controls had been designed to stem the tide of China-Investment, so that
Taiwan’sgovernment should have maintained or lowered the caps of China-Investment
while enforcing the Capital Controls more and more stringently, which in my definition
meansthat “Investment Alowance” should have been maintained or decreased over time. 
Nonetheless, after I study the regulatory transition of the Capital Controls—from the
policy of "jie ji yong ren" (no haste, be patient) in 1997, to "ji ji kai fang you xiao guan
li" (proactive liberalization with effective management) in 2001, to the policy of "ji ji
guan li you xiao kai fang" (proactive management with effective liberalization) in 2006,
and to the wide-scope relaxation of the Restrictions in 2008—the development is in the
opposite direction: the Capital Controls are generally relaxed stage by stage and the range
of relaxation in 2008 after President Ma of KMT took power is distinctly wider—the
investment cap of a Taiwanese corporation maintaining its headquarters in Taiwan or of a
multinational enterprise’s Taiwanese subsidiary is wholy lifted. 
Accordingly, I attempt to give a causal explanation to the paradox between the surge
of China-Investment and the progressive increase of Investment Allowance. In short, we
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can generalize a descriptive conclusion that jurisdictional competition played an
important role in causing the lightening of the Capital Controls, or rather that business
demands via exit and voice rights (or law market forces) nudge the Capital Controls in
the direction of the stage-by-stage relaxation. To be concrete, the Capital Controls are so
against business demands that China-based Taiwanese firms, by way of exit rights, seek
out other regulatory jurisdictions to satisfy their demands for legal flexibility. For them,
the law market of corporate charters, listings, and other economic activity among global
legal centers emerges thanks to globalization which brings about higher firms’ mobility 
and lower costs of exit, as well as to the WTO entry of both China and Taiwan which
largely drives the removal of cross-Strait trade and investment barriers. These factors
enhance their demands for a regulatory product without being subject to the Capital
Controls, so as to facilitate their reducing manufacturing costs and grabbing more
consumer markets in Mainland China. Since there are other jurisdictions, such as the
Cayman Islands and Hong Kong, supplying alternative regulatory products of legal
flexibility (the former mainly for corporate charters and the latter primarily for listing
services), these Taiwanese firms would attempt regulatory arbitrage. Although Taiwan’s 
administrative agencies, knowing the futility of acting unilaterally, intend to look for
regulatory cooperation to enforce the Capital Controls, other offshore jurisdictions, given
their own markets for these firms’ local economic activity as well as the fact that Taiwan,
unlike the U.S., has few bargaining chips for collaboration, have no incentive to help out
the Taiwanese government.
Finally, since Taiwanese firms’ continuous exits and accompanying outflows of
capital and talent from local markets, these cross-border economic signals of physical exit
11
are sent to Taiwan’s political marketplace. Therefore, Taiwan experienced radical
changes of political power in 2001 and 2008 when anti-regulatory and exit-affected
interest groups eventually dominate the interest group competition. Taiwanese firms’ 
voice rights, strengthened by their exits in the first place, were successfully exercised to
push for legal flexibility. Obviously, the feedback mechanisms, the demand and supply
forces (or exit and voice rights), were translated into the regulatory evolution, or the
stage-by-stage liberalization of the Capital Controls from 1997 to 2008. Furthermore, the
regulatory transition of Taiwan’s Capital Controls substantiates positive postulates that
the international law market among global legal centers responds to the same general
supply and demand forces as in corporate law markets and cross-listing markets
discussed in Chapter 2.B., and that law market forces underlying international
jurisdictional competition would push such a democratically-constrained onshore country
as Taiwan to relax its excessive regulation towards a more cost-effective or flexible
regime, even though Taiwan’sgovernment struggled to regulate investment in Mainland
China as effectively as possible but failed after all due to the impacts of globalization in
general and the denationalization of financial capital in particular. In other words, the
stage-by-stage liberalization at issue could be attributed not just to the surge of Taiwanese
outward investment in China under economic globalization, but to the fact that the
international jurisdictional competition (chiefly spurred by the denationalization of
financial capital) rendered the Capital Controls ineffective as explicated below in Chapter
3.B.2.1. Chapter 3.B.3 responds to major competing explanations. Chapter 4 is
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2: JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN GENERAL
A. Basic Theories
1. Voting with Feet and Jurisdictional Competition
The view of the law as a tradable good in a market comes from a broader theory
originating in public economics with the publication of the Tiebout model in 1956,
applicable to all public goods in general.10 In brief, this theory suggests that different
state governments compete with each other in the supply of public goods to consumers
who on their side can choose between the public goods offered according to their
preferences.11 Under this view, this market approach will most efficiently allocate public
goods between the consumers according to their preferences, on the following conditions:
(1) “people and resources are mobile”between jurisdictions; (2) “the number of
jurisdictions is large;”(3)“jurisdictions are free to select any set of laws they desire;”and
(4) “there are no spillovers,”positive or negative externalities, among jurisdictions.12
Furthermore, Coffee adds another condition: “individuals or firms make the choice
among jurisdictions . . . based simply on which jurisdiction . . . offers the most efficient
10 H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with Their Feet? An Empirical Test of
Environmental Gentrification 1 (RFF Discussion Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=901657(“Tiebout’s(1956) suggestion that people‘vote with their feet’to find the
community that provides their optimal bundle of taxes and public goods has played a central role in the
theory of local public finance over the past 50 years”). The basic structure underlying the Tiebout model is
that“households do appear to vote with their feet in response to changes in public goods.”Id at 4.
11 Tiebout, supra note 4, at 424.
12 Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 3 (University of Illinois Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE06-001, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875626.
13
and least costly regulatory regime.”13 To sum up, the more fully these conditions are
fulfilled, the more likely jurisdictional competition would be effective.14
The above perspective is the regulatory competition or jurisdictional competition. As
Geradin and McCahery note,
Regulatory competition is an economic theory of government organization that
equates decentralization with efficient results. The theory makes an analogy between
law and commodities, and then asserts that lower level governments—local, state, or
national, as opposed to federal or supranational—should compete for citizens and
factors of production when they regulate. It predicts that such competitively
determined regulation will satisfy citizen preferences. The prediction has a
normative implication for legal and political theory: just as price competition
disciplines producers of private goods for the benefit of consumers, so regulatory
competition promises to discipline government for the benefit of taxpaying citizens.
Regulatory competition has been brought to bear on the entire range of federalism
discussions, usually to support a devolutionary initiative or to oppose a proposal for
federal intervention.15
There was theoretical arbitrage to legal contexts early in the field of law and economics.
Lawyers, economists and political scientists in the U.S. have applied it to a wide range of
subjects, from corporate law, to banking, to environment law, to intellectual property, and
to trade law.16
13 John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in
Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 453-54 (1995).
14 For further discussion, see DENIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 186-206 (2003).
15 Damien Geradin & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory
Competition Debate 1 (Amsterdam Center for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 2005-06, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=821087 (citation omitted).
16 See generally REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
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Easterbrook argues that competition among states for corporate charters is a good
example of regulatory competition:
Although there has been a hubbub about the consequences of competition among the
states for corporate charters, the data indicate that the competition has been
beneficial to investors. Firms that announce plans to move their incorporation to
Delaware realize significant gains. Because of the mobility of investment capital, it
could hardly be otherwise. Delaware has no monopoly of investment opportunities,
and if its corporate code did not offer features valuable to investors, they would
place their money with firms incorporated elsewhere. Although it is hard to name
other things as mobile as corporate charters and investment capital, it is also hard to
find resources—save for land—that are immobile in the long run.17
To summarize advantages derived from jurisdictional competition, as Romano
argues,
[t]he learning of the empirical research is altogether consistent with the
understanding of the workings of regulatory competition, that competing regulators
have superior incentives to a single regulator regarding the adoption of requirements
of no efficacy, or whose efficacy is not worth their cost. Competing regulators have
superior incentives because, when firms can choose their regulatory regime, they
will not opt for a regime that imposes increased costs unless the accompanying
benefits are worth the additional expense. Firms will exit [from] the regime that is
not cost-justified for one that is, and regulators will learn from the pattern of inflows
and outflows of firms which rules meet a cost-benefit test. Under the plausible
assumption that regulators seek to maximize the number of regulated firms within
their jurisdiction, regulators in a competitive environment will, accordingly, not only
react more quickly to regulatory mistakes, but also select a different set of rules from
monopoly regulators, from whose regulatory authority firms cannot exit.18
17 Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & ECON., 23, 35 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
18 Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 215-16 (2005) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
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More importantly, “while some view the normative aspect of [Tiebout’s] model (i.e.,
jurisdictional competition is efficient) as controversial, few would contest its positive
aspect (i.e., competitive incentives drive local policies).”19 This dissertation is just
focused on a purely descriptive perspective that demonstrates the causal effect between
jurisdictional/regulatory competition and the relaxing of Taiwan’s Capital Controls.
2. Exit, Voice, and Interest Group Competition
Albert Hirschman argues that as members of a society such as a corporation or a
country find that the quality of or the benefit provided by the human group is going down,
they are fundamentally armed with two ways to respond: they might exit (break off the
relation); or, they might voice (make an effort to mend or restore the relation by lodging
their complaints or proposing some change).20 As Mueller discusses,
Albert Hirschman develops the useful distinction between processes in which
individuals express their preferences via entry or exit decisions, and those in which
some form of written, verbal, or voice communication is employed. An example of
the first would be a market for a private good in which buyers indicate their attitudes
toward the price-quality characteristics of a good by increasing or decreasing (entry
or exit) their purchases. An example of the exercise of voice to influence a price-cost
nexus would be a complaint or commendation of the product delivered to the
manufacturer.21
Under federalism, the private individuals and firms that “are subject to state
regulation need not be content with a‘voice’right in the political process but can protect
19 Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional
Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1837 (2005) (alteration in original).
20 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
21 MUELLER, supra note 14, at 182.
16
their interests through the right of ‘exit,’that is, through the ability to avoid the
difficulties of further association by picking up stock and going elsewhere.”22 Put simply,
exit and voice rights can alternately and interactively check the monopoly power of local
governments. 23 In particular, exit rights and mobility underlying jurisdictional
competition produce various benefits; leting a voter supplement his “voice” with an 
option to “exit” from the jurisdiction could strongly restrict localgovernments’ powers to 
tax and regulate. Exit rights powerfully transmit market forces to influence political or
regulatory structures.24
In regard to interest group competition, “the legislature is itself a marketplace and
interest groups compete with one another in that marketplace for legislature benefits.”25
O’Hara further explains:
In this competitive process, as with all others, groups that are more successful at
creating benefits for themselves at low cost are more likely to obtain the benefits
that they seek. Laws therefore tend to benefit those groups that are able to (1)
organize cheaply and effectively; (2) prevent others from entering the group to usurp
a share of the benefits; and (3) minimize intra-group competition that threatens to
dissipate the proceeds obtained.26
Moreover, substantive regulations are often the product of three different types of interest
groups: (1) groups that derive advantages from regulation (“pro-regulatory” interest 
groups); (2) groups that assume the direct cost of regulation (“anti-regulatory” interest 
22 Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (1992).
23 Id.
24 Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 12, at 4.
25 Erin A. O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of Law, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2000). See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983) (arguing that competition for political favors
facilitates checking deadweight costs connected with legislation).
26 O’Hara, supra note 25, at 1577.
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groups); and (3) “exit-affected”interest groups made up of those who are hurt if state
regulations cause businesses or people to either leave the state or not come to the state in
the first place.27 Generally speaking, “competition among organized interest groups may
(but will not always) constrain the enactment of bad laws.”28
Last but not least, exit by some can add voice to others who benefit by the presence
of those who have exited. Specifically, exit rights have a bearing on laws and institutions
in the sense that they promote “exit-afected” interest groups, those powerful local
interests that derive benefit from discouraging exit or bringing in new members. While
“[t]he exit option motivates anti-regulatory interest groups that ‘stand in’for the people
and businesses that are directly hurt by a proposed law but are too weak by themselves to
prevent its adoption,”29 it is necessary that legislators and regulators weigh the demands
of both anti-regulatory and exit-affected groups against those of pro-regulatory interest
groups. In a word, “[m]obility therefore provides an indirect voice to outsiders and a
stronger voice to insiders who will be burdened by a proposed law.”30
3. The Law Market Dynamics
Building onTiebout’s theoryand Hirschman’s typology,O’Hara and Ribstein bring
up the theory of the law market:
A market for law may have significant implications for political theory. Under the
traditional view of politics, people who do not like their leaders elect new ones. In
27 ERIN A.O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 133 (2009).
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id. at 28
30 Id. at 29.
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other words, they exercise what Albert O. Hirschman has referred to as “voice.”
However, coordinating the electorate is cumbersome and costly. Moreover, the
political marketplace is often dominated by interest groups that can influence
politicians with money and votes to act in ways that might not serve the public
interest. Voting is not the only source of political power. People can choose the
applicable law by deciding where to live—part of what Hirschman caled “exit.”. . .
Tiebout explicitly recognized a kind of consumer market in governments. There is
no reason in principle this market would not embrace laws which, after all, are an
important type of government-provided goods.31
As O’Hara and Ribstein further argue, the law market is referred to as the
competitive mechanism through which “governing laws can be chosen by people and
firms rather than mandated by states. This choice is created by the mobility of at least
some people, firms, and assets and the incentives of at least some states to compete for
people, firms, and their assets by creating desired laws.”32 The term “Market” here does
not point to “particular sets of idealized conditions of exchange, but rather simply to
buyers demanding a commodity (law) and sellers being willing to provide it for a
benefit;”this type of exchange is contrasted with “the view that law is decreed by
government and forced on parties subject to its jurisdiction.”33 As for the demand or
“buyer” side of the market, “parties‘shopping’for law have created their own market by
using several mechanisms such as exit options for avoiding costly regulation.”34 As for
the supply or “seler” side of the market, shopping generates incentives for some interest
groups to favor contracting or legal flexibility (anti-regulatory interest groups), and thus
to oppose those that prefer regulation (pro-regulatory interest groups). The interest group
competition “involves not only the groups directly affected by the regulation, but also
31 Id. at 13-14.
32 Id. at 65.
33 Id. at 66.
34 Id.
19
exit-affected interest groups, which have a stake in the parties’ decisions whether to 
locate, invest, or litigate in the state.”35 In a word, the basic law market demand and
supply forces specify the operations of this market.36
4. International Jurisdictional Competition
4.1 Globalization and Jurisdictional Competition
In general, “[t]he reduction in barriers to trade and the liberalization of financial
markets, transportation and telecommunications have created the basis for the increase in
flows of factors of production between jurisdictions.”37 This increase in mobility is also
because of the drop in exit costs:
Since the 1960s, the competition among distant locations and national jurisdictions
for mobile production factors, such as capital, has greatly intensified. In part this is
due to advances in technology. In the second half of the twentieth century,
containerization, roll-on/roll-off ships, pipelines and jumbo jets have saved transport
costs in innovative ways. But advances in transport technology pale in comparison
to the revolutionary advances in communication (“the transportation of ideas”). The
fax, satellite communication, fiber cables, computing and data compression, e-mail,
microwave transmission and widely available portable video cameras have brought
down the costs of long-distance communication by phenomenal margins. People are
better informed about living and working conditions in distant places and
civilizations.38
35 Id.
36 Id. at 121.
37 Geradin & McCahery, supra note 15, at 1.
38 KASPER & STREIT, supra note 6, at 344.
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The above phenomenon is “globalization,” which is essentially“the phenomenon of
increased international factor mobility.”39 Kasper further argues that “government
administration is a production factor, since good government is an ingredient in
production, raises the productivity of all the other production factors, and enhances a
country’s atractiveness to mobile production factors.”40 Furthermore, Geradin and
McCahery also find:
As countries move to a more liberalized domestic economy, questions of
competition between jurisdictions abound. With the prospect of increased capital
mobility, it is becoming conventional wisdom that national governments are forced
to perform their economic policy functions more efficiently since governments that
yield optimal levels of public goods may be more successful in the competition
between jurisdictions for attracting mobile resources. The concern to attract mobile
resources has shaped entire areas of governmental policy and plays a determinative
role for firms locating new plants.41
Since national laws and institutions are an important type of government-provided goods,
globalization has also galvanized international jurisdictional competition for mobile
production factors by offering better laws and institutions.
To exemplify how globalization promotes international jurisdictional competition, as
David Law argues, globalization involves intensifying international jurisdictional
competition for investment capital and human talent that might give rise to implications
for the worldwide development of constitutional law. Global investment and migration
39 WOLFGANG KASPER, GLOBAL COMPETITION, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE EAST-ASIAN ASCENDANCY 4
(1994).
40 Id. at 11. In the second half of the 20th century,“[i]ncreasingly, local and national institutions are
becoming a key cost factor that determines what is produced where—not surprisingly, because coordination
costs account often for half of all costs and because these are greatly influenced by prevailing institutions.”
KASPER & STREIT, supra note 38, at 345.
41 Geradin & McCahery, supra note 15, at 1.
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patterns may impact the extent to which countries maintain certain constitutional rights.
He adds:“[A]s capital and skiled labor become increasingly mobile, countries will face a
growing incentive to compete for both by offering bundles of human and economic rights
that are attractive to investors and elite workers.”42 He further argues that in “a ‘world
market’in human rights,”
countries bid for skilled workers by offering both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
inducements that include greater or lesser degrees of personal freedom. . . .
[C]ountries that do not boast the rights bundles available elsewhere must in effect
pay skilled workers what might be called a“freedom premium”in order to compete
successfully in the global market for human capital.43
Put differently, “economic globalization includes competition among nations for
investment and human capital. Nations compete by offering investors and those with high
levels of human capital—the well-educated and trained—attractive packages of benefits.
An important component of those packages . . . is constitutional protection.”44 What’s 
more, “[p]eople with high levels of human capital are just about as mobile as investment
capital, and will locate themselves in nations that provide them with what they want by
way of freedom.”45 Therefore, economic globalization forces national jurisdictions to
offer better constitutional protection to engage in the international jurisdictional
competition for investment capital and elite workers.
42 David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1282
(2008).
43 Id. at 1283
44 Mark V. Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law 7 (Hague Institute for the
Internationalization of Law; Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 09-06, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317766.
45 Id. at 9.
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Finally, globalization, or the worldwide intensified movement of capital, know-how
and firms across national borders, strengthens the exit option for the subjects of national
jurisdictions. This phenomenon “weakens the power of governments. . . . It is therefore
useful to constrain the scope for opportunistic national interventions in international
exchanges.”46 For example, as Andrews argues, “the degree of international capital
mobility systematically constrains state behavior by rewarding some actions and
punishing others.”47
4.2 Law Market Forces Underlying International Jurisdictional Competition
Following the insight of the law market as well as the dissection of globalization and
jurisdictional competition, we can realize how law market forces are working in
international jurisdictional competition. First of all, since globalization lowers exit costs
across borders and enhances firm and capital mobility, globalization leads to international
jurisdictional competition for worldwide mobile factors of production by offering better
laws and institutions. We in turn come to the interactions between the economic process
in the international environment and the political process within a jurisdiction when this
jurisdiction engages in jurisdictional competition through changes in the provision of
laws and institutions. Let’s suppose that the jurisdiction propose an excessive law favored
by pro-regulatory interest groups, which create firms’ demand for legal flexibility and 
their incentive to leave. In the international economic process, firms, as “economic
agents,”have some ability to manipulate jurisdictional choice. That is to say, this
46 KASPER & STREIT, supra note 6, at 342. See also id. at 381.
47 David M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International
Monetary Relations, 38 INT’L STUD. Q. 193, 193 (1994). See also id. at 194, 197.
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mobility, in the first place, can feed the demand side of the law market which firms’ exit 
rights underlie, and then spark competition for the supply of law by other jurisdictions on
the international supply side. Exit and entry by firms seeking to avoid regulation creates
costs and benefits for other interest groups in the jurisdiction. This mobility can thus
activate the domestic interest group competition on the supply side. In particular, the exit
or mobility may provide an indirect voice to outsiders and a stronger voice to insiders
who will be burdened by the proposed law.
In the domestic political process, these “exit-afected” interest groups join with the
groups that are directly burdened by the regulation to promote legal flexibility on the
domestic supply side, even if the latter anti-regulatory groups could not alone defeat the
regulation proposed by the pro-regulatory interest groups. This in turn pressures
politicians or lawmakers within the regulating jurisdiction, as “political agents,”to
appreciate the significance of the economic exit signals, to discover that they need to
supply laws and institutions which constitute “an attractive locational factor,”48 and to
enable the relaxation of the excessive law. Hence, where regulation might be excessive,
the jurisdictional competition could push the regulating jurisdiction to improve the
substantive content of local laws.49 What’s more, “[l]egal changes would be provoked by
firms’ increasing need for legal flexibility.”50 In other words, as Prof. Ribstein argues,
“the mobility of firms, people and money across borders, transmitted through interest
groups to political decision-makers, can produce long-run legal changes.”51 That is, the
48 KASPER & STREIT, supra note 6, at 403.
49 SeeO’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 191, 199.
50 Id. at 110.
51 Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, REV. L. & ECON. Vol. 1, Issue 1, Art. 7, 97,
99 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art7.
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feedback mechanisms, options of exit (choice of location) and voice (political action),
might be translated into the regulatory evolution, or the liberalization of excessive
regulation.
B. The Law Markets for Corporate Charters and Cross-Listings
1. Law Market Forces at Work in the U.S. and European Corporate Law Markets
Basically, the corporate law market is simply a part of the broader market for law.52
In general, a market for corporate law is based on parties’ contracting for or choosing, 
through incorporation, the law of a specific state or nation. This market, as a self-ordering
phenomenon, could impose discipline on lawmaking by forcing states or nations to
compete with one another. Additionally, respecting contractual choice-of-law, or
recognizing the incorporation of a locally-based foreign corporation, would encourage
legal improvements to evolve more rapidly and efficaciously. With firms’ ability to move 
among states or nations, the market for corporate law arises in both the U.S. and
European federal systems despite local oficials’ eforts to protect their lawmaking
authority. 53 This dissertation will hereby draw legal implications from the
52 Ribstein &O’Hara, supra note 8, at 665.
53 SeeO’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at217. O’Hara and Ribstein further argue:
Governments cannot control everyone everywhere. Physical mobility allows a person or firm to
choose a single state whose law would apply to all her or its activities. States compete for mobile
parties and their assets by attempting to provide the laws that they want. . . . [P]arties' fundamental
ability to choose among these bundles generates a willingness on the part of states to enforce
choice-of-law clauses, which in turn facilitates an even more valuable market in laws governing
particular relationships and disputes.
Id. at 66.
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nineteenth-century jurisdictional competition for corporate charters in the U.S. and the
developing corporate charter competition in Europe.
1.1 Jurisdictional Competition in the U.S. at the Turn of the 20th Century
Ribstein and O’Hara argue: “The increasing mobility of the corporation in the latter
part of the 19th century was an important factor in developing the IAD,”54 or the
“Incorporation Theory.”55 This rule holds “that the law of the state of incorporation
governs the relationship between the managers, the shareholders, and the corporation.
Corporations can choose their place of incorporation without having any other connection
with the state of incorporation.”56 To be sure,“the corporate law market might be said to
be a product of the industrial revolution.”57 As O’Hara and Ribstein note,
when changes in business practices and technologies increased the benefits of
prohibited practices and gave firms incentives to avoid regulatory impediments . . .
firms had a choice either to engage in costly lobbying to remove local impediments
or to move to states with laxer laws. Clearly they would welcome being able to
choose a state’s law without physicaly moving there.58
Historically, New Jersey thus became the first mover to attract foreign firms to
incorporate locally. Grandy explains:
54 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 675.
55 Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter &, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law
after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s Product for Europe, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 159, 160
(2005).
56 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 662 (footnote omitted). However, as discussed below in Chapter
2.B.1.2, until recently, Europe has long applied the so-caled “real-seat” rule, under which the applicable
law is that of the jurisdictionwhere the firm’s headquarters are located, but recent European case law has
changed to adopt a type of the IAD. Id. at 706.
57 Id. at 675.
58 Id. at 676.
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From 1888 through the general corporation law revision of 1896, New Jersey sought
corporate charters by liberalizing its statutes. The constitutional amendments of
1875 set the stage for chartermongering by ending the era of special incorporation
charters, requiring all corporations to charter under general laws. In 1888 two
consecutive statutes allowed some corporations to merge and hold stock in other
corporations. By 1893 the legislature had liberalized these laws so that most
corporations could merge horizontally and hold stock in any foreign (non-New
Jersey) or domestic corporation. General permission for New Jersey corporations to
operate outside the state came in 1889, and by 1892 the state no longer required
explicit permission—all corporations could presume such consent. New Jersey
partially protected corporations operating outside its borders through reciprocal and
retaliatory laws: the taxes and obligations imposed upon New Jersey firms operating
in other states were imposed upon firms from those states operating in New Jersey.59
In other words, this fact demonstrates that states also have incentives to protect the IAD
because it enables their own corporate laws to be respected elsewhere. State courts also
realize that their judgments which do not recognize the IAD could negatively impact their
own state’s corporations operatingin other states.60 Meanwhile, the states also, in a sense,
lost their power to exclude foreign corporations (i.e. the power not to enforce the IAD)
during the first decade of the 20th century, since“the Supreme Court overruled its earlier
decisions and gave the corporation what amounted to a constitutional right to do lawful
business in every state.”61
59 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681
(1989) (footnote omitted).
60 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 685.
61 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE & AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 249 (1991). In Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, the Supreme Court held: The exaction from a foreign telegraph company for the
benefit of the permanent school fundof a “charter fee” of a given per cent of its entire authorized capital 
stock, as a condition of continuing to do local business in the state, is invalid under the commerce and
due-process-of-law clauses of the Federal Constitution, as necessarily amounting to a burden and tax on the
company’s interstate business and on its property located or used outside the state. See 216 U.S. 1, 18
(1910).
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At any rate, the corporate law market soon got its first test. Woodrow Wilson, the
then Governor of New Jersey, responded in 1913 to reformers’ protests against New 
Jersey’s monopoly-friendly law by convincing the legislature to pass amendments to its
corporate law in order to limit holding corporations and impose stringent antitrust
regulation. Delaware swiftly substituted for New Jersey by allowing “tramp”firms to
register without being subject to New Jersey’sstricter laws. By the time New Jersey came
to its senses and tried to recapture its business by reversing its regulation, it was too
late—Delaware had entrenched itself as a leader in corporate law business and gave the
corporations no reason to reverse their new choices while firms lost their trust in the New
Jersey legislature.62
From a contemporary perspective, the corporate law market, or the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters fuelled by firm mobility, did drive moderation of
excessive regulation. The history of the changes made by New York, Michigan,
Massachusetts and other leading industrial states is illustrative. The removal by these
states of the limitations upon the size and powers of business corporations appears to
have been due to the conviction that it was useless to maintain them in the sense that local
restrictions would be evaded by firms incorporating in, say, New Jersey.63 Indeed, as
Yablon discusses,
the basic contours of the law that emerged in New Jersey in the 1890s is [sic]
essentially the same as the Delaware law that governs most publicly traded
corporations today. Many of the changes that New Jersey instituted at that
62 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 678-79. See also Grandy, supra note 59, at 689; Frederick Tung,
Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 42-43 (2006); Frederick
Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International
Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 614 (2005).
63 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 560-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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time—such as the abolition of limitations on the size, duration, and power of
corporations to hold and sell stock in other corporations, limitations on potential
shareholder liability to creditors for issuing undervalued shares, and development of
enabling statutes giving incorporators greater freedom to create and structure
corporate powers—were criticized at that time as removing important protections for
the public. Most corporate law theorists today, however, would view them as
reasonable, efficiency-promoting rules.64
More importantly, the jurisdictional competition in the U.S. at the turn of the 20th
century suggested that the actual content of a state’s corporate law might be less
important than “its reputation and perceived commitment to the future content of its
laws.”65 In truth New Jersey failed afterwards for not sticking to its previous
commitment to respecting business demands. As a matter of fact, as Yablon argues,
[a]fter 1900, New Jersey no longer had a competitive advantage over other
chartering states, either with respect to price or the actual content of its laws, but was
still able to compete quite effectively for new incorporations primarily on its
reputation for reliability and responsiveness to the concerns of big business. . . .
Many have argued that similar reputational factors, still tempered by a conservative
approach to change, remain the driving force in Delaware’s dominance.66
Therefore, it is not difficult to infer not only that in the jurisdictional competition of
repeated games, being a leader requires continuous respect for business demands, but also
that if regulatory jurisdictions refuse to meet business demands, firms have incentives to
seek out more cost-justified laws in other jurisdictions. In turn this firm mobility would
finally resign governments to lift excessive bans. Put differently, the rise and fall of New
64 Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline
of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 328 (2007) (footnote omitted).
65 Id. at 376.
66 Id.
29
Jersey in this competition for corporate charters illustrates how the corporate law market
works. As William Carney notes,
[c]ostly rent extractions in corporate laws by [pro-regulatory] interest groups,
beyond those attainable through market transactions, raise costs for firms and lower
returns for shareholders. Such gains for [pro-regulatory] interest groups can survive
only if local firms subject to such laws are protected from firms operating under
more efficient legal regimes. Competitive forces from outside a state legal system
weaken the power of [pro-regulatory] interest groups to engage in rent-seeking
activities and cause the resulting laws to be more public-regarding [and flexible].67
From the perspective of the law market, at the turn of twentieth century,
legal changes were provoked by firms’ increasing need for legal flexibility. For 
example, state rules requiring shares to be priced at their initial sale price, or “par,” 
even as the market price rose or fell, significantly constrained corporate finance in
modern capital markets. Firms could and probably did lobby their home states to
ease these restrictions, but clearly found it easier to choose another states’ law 
without having to physically move there.68
If a state from which firms exit is unwilling to moderate the regulation or enforce the
IAD to contain the outflow of firms and capital, just as the general law market forces
“can pressure states to enforce contractual choice of law in order to encourage firms to
maintain and enhance connections with their states,”69 the same underlying supply and
demand forces in the market for law contribute to deregulation or the enforcement of the
IAD in non-competing states. For instance, if firms avoid non-enforcing states, such
exit-affected interest groups as lawyers may lose potential clients and litigation business.
67 William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 303 (1997) (alteration in original).
68 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 110.
69 Id. at 113.
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Therefore, “ignoring the IAD as applied to local firms could deter firms from making
significant local investments, which might trigger a local political backlash against the
regulation.”70 In sum, the output of these market interactions in the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters demonstrates that the U.S. corporate law market
operates to satisfy business demands for legal flexibility.
1.2 Jurisdictional Competition in Europe at the Turn of the 21st Century
Not long ago, European countries had applied the so-caled “real-seat” (siège réel, 
siège social) choice-of-law rule, under which the law of a “company’s real or efective 
seat,”its “central administration,”or its “brain or nerve center” where the main 
operational decisions are made, rather than that of statutory domicile (registered office),
was followed by European nations except for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.71
Nevertheless, as in the U.S., increased firm mobility provoked by liberal trade rules
within the European Union (“EU”) put pressure on the choice of law rule. The revolution
took place in 1999 with the Centros case, which were followed by two others—the
Überseering and Inspire Art cases. Generally speaking, theses cases clarified that the EU
law fundamentally protects full-fledged Delaware-type corporate charter competition for
“tramp” or, in European parlance “brass plate,” corporations.72
70 Id.
71 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 132 (1993); also ERIC STEIN,
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS, NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION
29-31 (1971).
72 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 707.
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What should be emphasized first here is the seminal Cenros case.73 On March 9,
1999, the ECJ held that Centros Ltd., incorporated in the UK, could not be denied
registration in the Danish Business Register even though the company operated entirely
within Denmark and was incorporated in the UK merely in order to avoid more stringent
Danish incorporation requirements on minimum capital.74 In other words, the founders
of a pseudo-foreign corporation 75 publicly acknowledged that they intended to
circumvent the Danish minimum capital rules, and the ECJ disallowed the Danish
regulators from interfering.76 This case suggested that even though a company, as a
pseudo-foreign corporation, simply wanted the more favorable and flexible law of the
incorporation jurisdiction, the ECJ would also enforce the Incorporation Theory or the
IAD, because the real seat doctrine violated the “freedom of establishment” given by 
Article 43(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (the “EC Treaty”).77
As Enriques and Gelter note, “[c]orrespondingly, the ruling prevented Member States
from imposing their own corporate law on such businesses, other than under very limited
conditions. In the past few years, newly incorporated businesses have started to take
advantage of this new development, choosing English law in relatively high numbers.”78
73 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459.
74 Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the
Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 241, 246 (2008).
75 Pseudo-foreign corporations are“corporations essentially local in character but incorporated in a foreign
state.”Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 137, 137 (1955). See also id. at 161-62.
In another word, this corporation“is incorporated in another jurisdiction but has no significant contacts
with that other jurisdiction.”Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—A Comparison of the United
States and European Systems and A Proposal for A European Directive 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2002).
76 Id. at 74.
77 See Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law
Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 614-18 (2003).
78 Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition
and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L, REV. 577, 580 (2007) (footnote
omitted).
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In addition, the Inspire Art case79 should be stressed as well. On September 30,
2003, the ECJ further confirmed the decision by Inspire Art Ltd.—a private company
incorporated in Folkestone, England—to incorporate there; meanwhile it had its main
business extensively within the Netherlands. The Dutch Government maintained that
while the company were able to legally operate in the Netherlands, it was necessary for it
to abide by existing laws provided for real foreign corporations, which inter alia requires
“that directors are personally liable if the firm has minimum capital below the minimum
capital requirement for Dutch firms.”80 The ECJ held that Inspire Art Ltd.’s tacticwas
“permissible even if the only reason for incorporating in the UK was to circumvent Dutch
minimum capital requirements.”81 That is, the ECJ stated that the Netherlands could not
impose local regulations on a locally-based company that had incorporated elsewhere
solely in order to circumvent these regulations.
The above cases determined a European version of the IAD or the Incorporation
Theory, “by which firms that incorporate in one Member State of the E.U. are free to do
business in any other Member State,” andstressed “that freedom of incorporation also
holds for‘round-trip’incorporations, when residents of country A incorporate in country
B with the sole purpose of doing business in country A.”82 Evidently, Centros and other
following cases have galvanized not only certain European competition in the form of
“tramp” UK incorporations by firms based somewhere else in Europe, but also regulatory
79 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., [2003] E.C.R.
I-10155.
80 Becht et al., supra note 74, at 246.
81 Id. at 243.
82 Id.
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responses by other European countries to modify their minimum capital rules and cutting
down costs of incorporations.83
To be concrete, as Enriques & Gelter discuss, the E.U. Second Directive
requires public corporations to have a legal capital of at least €25,000, which need 
not be entirely covered by assets at the time of incorporation. With the Second
Directive not applying to private limited companies (Ltds), Member States have
been able to choose freely the amount for this set of corporations. This resulted in a
broad variety of regulations, ranging from no such requirement in the [UK], Ireland,
and Cyprus to a requirement of €35,000 in Austria.Centros has already induced
France, effectively to abolish minimum capital for private corporations, and even the
German Ministry of Justice proposed a reduction from €25,000 to €10,000.84
Accordingly, since the adjudication of Centros, some regulatory arbitrage at the
incorporation country in order to escape rules on minimum capital for private
corporations have already led to “defensive regulatory competition,” by which a few
Member States such as France and Germany have already begun to relax these
requirements“that were apparently the outcome of isolation from competition.”85 To put
it another way, the regulatory arbitrage“can, at least partly, be credited for a trend toward
the abolition of minimum capital requirements in some countries.”86 Also, since these
avoided minimum capital requirements are outdated as well as unhelpful to creditors and
thus rational creditors should not be concerned about them, “then the changes in the law
induced by corporate law arbitrage so far are not really an issue of creditor protection, but
rather a removal of administrative slack affecting only the interests of the founders of
83 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 707.
84 Enriques & Gelter, supra note 78, at 600-01 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
85 Id. at 600.
86 Id. at 613.
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new companies.”87 More importantly, European countries are responding to the inflow of
new incorporations to the UK by lowering or abolishing minimum capital requirements
and costs of incorporation more generally. Further, “[t]his race to match [UK] standards
shares characteristics with the regulatory competition emphasized by the U.S. corporate
mobility,”even though the phenomena in the E.U. are different from those within the
U.S.88
What’smore, before the corporate charter competition in Europe was initiated, the
legal system creating the U.S. common market where there is no tariffs made it possible
for U.S. firms to exit from costly legal regimes from state to state, which explains the
competitive difference between Europe and the U.S. Exactly as Carney argues, “[t]hese
different competitive settings explain substantive differences in corporate laws.”89 In the
U.S., since there are regulators competing with each other for corporate charters,
“mandatory provisions that are not cost-justified will tend not to survive over time
because firms will exit [from] the regime with the undesirable mandates, migrating to
regimes in which they are absent.”90 As discussed above,the “real-seat” rule might have
obstructed jurisdictional competition in the E.U. Studying the difference between U.S.
states’ corporation laws and those of E.U. Member States, William Carney found that
there are a large percentage of the mandates in the EU company law directives; most of
them don’t existin any U.S. state’s laws. In effect, these mandates which used to be in
U.S. state codes have been abolished for several decades since they are not favorable for
87 Id.
88 Becht et al., supra note 74, at 252 (alteration in original).
89 Carney, supra note 67, at 303.
90 Romano, supra note 18, at 217.
35
contemporary business practices.91 This evidence might support the suggestion that the
ongoing jurisdictional competition for corporate charters in Europe is, after Centros,
nudging European corporate law, at least for private limited companies, in the direction
of legal flexibility. This trend of fewer excessive mandates in the corporate law market,
or rather the trend toward the abolition of minimum capital requirements, can also be
explained by applying the same general supply and demand law market forces as in the
U.S. to European firms’business demands for legal flexibility. 92 Furthermore,
subsequent to Centros, all Member States in the EU are required essentially to adhere to
business demands for regulatory products of legal flexibility, which are driving the
European corporate law market.
To put it in more detail, even though Europe and the U.S. have distinct competitive
environments, the same essential forces of the law market reign in both situations.93
Legislators in both systems seek to regulate corporate governance under the support of
local pro-regulatory interest groups just as they deal with other types of contracts.
However, the ECJ rulings led by Centros have created an active incorporation market in
the European Union. As Becht et al. note, “[i]n some countries in particular,
entrepreneurs are increasingly aware that they can freely choose among all the limited
liability vehicles in the EU to run a business in their home state.”94 Small firms’mobility,
first enhanced by Centros and other following cases, feeds the demand side of the law
market which their exit rights underlie, and then sparks competition for the supply of law
91 Carney, supra note 67, at 319-24.
92 SeeO’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 117.
93 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 709.
94 Marco Becht, Luca Enriques & Veronika Korom, Centros and the Cost of Branching, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD.
171, 172 (2009).
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by foreign jurisdictions. Those firms thus attempt regulatory arbitrage in other E.U.
Member States to satisfy their demands for legal flexibility. For example, “[b]etween
2003 and 2006 more than 40,000 residents of Germany incorporated a UK Limited.”95
Apparently, on the international supply side, the UK has catered to this market, at least to
the extent of lowering incorporation costs for small firms. Moreover, smal firms’ exit 
strengthens their voice on the domestic supply side to petition for less costly regulation of
incorporation. We can find evidence that the governments of France, Germany and the
Netherlands carried through reform with a view either to facilitating establishment of
small firms and entrepreneurship in their own countries or to preventing their losing
jurisdictional control of considerable portions of their economies.96 Specifically, Becht et
al. note that “there is a political cost of loss of control in the case of entrepreneurs
choosing to incorporate abroad. If corporate law is a means of implementing a political
agenda then politicians have an incentive to keep entrepreneurs from incorporating their
companies abroad.”97 Put differently, the demand force, or the economic exit in the
international environment signaled by small firms, bolsters their voice rights in the
political process in the domestic context, and this domestic supply force then pressures
politicians or lawmakers within respective Member States to enable the relaxation of
outdated minimum capital requirements. In a word, spurred by the ECJ rulings, law
market forces underlying jurisdictional competition among Member States are leading to
local governments’providing less costly corporate law, or rather the trend towards the
lightening of rules on minimum capital at least for small firms.
95 Id.
96 Becht et al., supra note 74, at252 (“Domestic incorporation is per se perceived to be important even if it
does not bear directly on government revenues or the location of production or control”).
97 Id. at 243.
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1.3 Summary
What drives the corporate charter competitions in the 19-century U.S. and
contemporary Europe? Why do they end up with a trend towards legal flexibility, or
liberalization of excessive regulation? To start with the implication from the U.S. story,
for New Jersey to succeed, other states had to apply New Jersey law to New Jersey
corporations. Why did they cooperate? The explanation ultimately rests at least partly on
demand-side factors. Without broader recognition of New Jersey law, corporations might
have decided to sell their stock and locate their factories and other corporate assets only
in states that applied the IAD. To be sure, these moves could impose significant costs on
firms, particularly if firms had to forgo conducting business with customers, suppliers or
shareholders in non-cooperating states. But at the same time corporations benefited
significantly from the flexible rules New Jersey offered. And they also had strong reasons
to want a single corporate law to apply to their internal affairs.98 AsRibstein and O’Hara 
argue,
the corporate law market is simply a part of the broader market for law. . . . [T]he
law market exists because parties to most contractual relationships have a strong
incentive to contract for the law applicable to those relationships. States enforce
these contracts despite the fact that they have the efect of eroding connected states’ 
regulatory power. States cede this regulatory authority in order to attract, or at least
to avoid repelling, mobile firms. In short, the IAD did not spring only from forces
unique to corporations, but also from these general law market forces.99
Once more, the usual supply and demand forces of the law market are functioning in the
European jurisdictional competition for corporate charters, even if “this time under
98 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 677-78.
99 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 109.
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different legal and cultural conditions from those in the United States.”100
It appears that the jurisdictional competition in Europe occurred later than that of the
U.S., following the rash of American business mergers beginning in the 1880s by nearly a
century. Even though there are different competitive conditions between Europe and the
U.S., “[a]ny differences between the United States and the EU will not be because
different forces are at work, but because the specific environment affects the strength of
each of these forces—the demand for regulation . . . the supply of regulation . . . and the
resistance of local pro-regulatory interest groups . . . .”101 To put it somewhat differently,
even if the breeding grounds of these two phenomena seem in appearance to be disparate,
the underlying competitive dynamics may, to an extent, be the same, in the sense that,
responding to similar law market supply and demand forces, jurisdictional competition in
both federal systems spurred by business demands for legal flexibility drove the provision
of increasingly cost-effective corporate law. That is not merely because jurisdictional
competition “provides regulators with incentives and the necessary information to be
accountable and responsive to the demands of the regulated,”but also“because there is a
feedback mechanism in a competitive system that indicates to decisionmakers when a
regime need to be adapted and penalized them when they fail to respond: the flows of
firms out of regimes that are antiquated and into regimes that are not.”102 To sum up, as
Romano argues, “[t]his is an important regulatory characteristic in the corporate context,
100 Id. at 123.
101 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 710.
102 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L. J. 1521, 1598 (2005).
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because firms operate in a changing business environment, and their regulatory needs
concomitantly change over time.”103
2. Law Market Forces Underlying Jurisdictional Competition in International
Securities Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
There are strong arguments favoring extending jurisdictional competition from the
American competition between states for corporate charters into international competition
between securities regulators. This normative concept of issuer choice has been in a
fierce debate among scholars. Some commentators propose permitting issuers to choose
their disclosure regime. Specifically, proponents of issuer choice argue that when foreign
firms enter U.S. capital markets, they should be permitted to obey the securities laws of
the jurisdiction that they choose rather than the regulations provided by the Securities and
Exchanges Commission (“SEC”). The proposal of issuer choice, by taking regulatory
monopolies away from regulatory agencies such as the SEC, would force the agencies to
make improvement on the quality of their respective local regulations. 104 In the
meantime, opponents of issuer choice argue that it’s inevitable that jurisdictional
competition in securities regulation would result in a race to the bottom where issuers
would find jurisdictions with the least strict legal rules and the lowest degree of investor
protection, which might drive the overall quality of securities regulation to decline.105
103 Id. at 1598-99.
104 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Need for
Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387 (2001).
105 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 567 (2000);
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 563 (2001).
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Nonetheless, “[p]artial competition exists already, through firms’ choices of where to list 
and issue their shares.”106 Furthermore, “[d]espite some commentators’ fears of a 
race-to-the-bottom in securities regulation, there is substantial evidence that issuers have
chosen to bond their integrity by deliberately choosing regimes with more rigorous
regulation.”107 In another word, foreign firms actually can choose to “bond” their 
insiders by cross-listing in the United States or other improved jurisdictions, thereby
rendering themselves subject to these stricter legal rules in addition to the regulations in
their home countries. Considerable evidence lends support to this bonding explanation of
cross-listing. 108 Nevertheless, with SOX, “full-fledged international competition is
currently hobbled by the fact that the United States insists on regulating all trading within
its borders regardless of where the firms are based.”109 In contrast to the normative
debate on issuer choice, this dissertation seeks to elaborate on a positive statement that
law market forces underlying international jurisdictional competition have provoked
partial exemptions and relaxation of mandatory rules in SOX as the U.S. aims at
encouraging foreign issuers to raise capital there.
To begin with, “the past two decades have witnessed the large-scale process of
internationalization. . . . The U.S. loosened disclosure regulation for foreign issuers
throughout the period of internationalization to maintain a competitive advantage in
attracting participants from the emerging markets.”110 After corporate catastrophes like
106 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 781, 843 (2001).
107 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 60 (2002) (footnote omitted).
108 Ribstein, supra note 51, at 104, 112.
109 HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED;
HOW TO FIX IT 35 (2006).
110 Erin Marks, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Costs and Trade offs Relating to International Application and
41
Enron’s, Congress wrote SOX to strengthen the scope of federal regulation from 
disclosure to corporate internal governance while SOX was applied to domestic issuers
and non-U.S. issuers, otherwise known as foreign private issuers (“FPI”s), equaly. Prof.
Ribstein, however, notes:
[R]egulation may be perverse because markets do not always react to regulation the
way regulators predict they will. For example, rather than pursuing the same
activities more carefully, regulated parties may simply switch to safer activities that
are less likely to lead to the sort of bad outcomes that attract regulatory scrutiny. A
specific example of how markets can react to regulation concerns the risk that a
party will simply move out of reach. Though federal regulation like SOX is harder
for firms to avoid than state law, even the federal securities laws have limited reach.
While it is unlikely that U.S.-based firms will move their activities offshore, stricter
U.S. law might keep non-U.S.-based firms out of U.S. markets.111
Consequently, in order to attract back or retain non-U.S. issuers in the U.S. stock markets,
the U.S. government release exemptions for FPIs from excessive regulation in SOX.
SOX’s efect on the cross-listing market not only suggests that the higher costs of
regulation within jurisdictions are imposed on firms, the more likely firms exit and flee to
where regulation is more flexible, but also illustrates the competitive constraints on
federal law.
2.1 The U.S. Legal Regime Facing Foreign Private Issuers
Most of the foreign issuers which have their shares traded in the U.S. would issue
American Depository Receipts (“ADR”s). This method makes American investors not
Convergence, 17 RES. ACCT. REG. 233, 254 (2004).
111 Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 292 (2004).
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just able to make investment in non-U.S. securities without worrying that cross-border
transactions could often be complicated and costly, but also to gain benefits from largely
the same financial and corporate governance rights as domestic shareholders of the
non-U.S. issuers may enjoy. As the JP Morgan ADR Reference Guide depicts, an ADR is
issued by a U.S. bank serving as an agent to transfer and issue ADRs. Each ADR is
represented by a particular number of a foreign firm’sdomestic shares. There are four
different kinds of ADR programs for foreign issuers to choose: Level I (over the counter,
“OTC”), Level I (listedon exchanges), Level III (public offering), and Level IV (Rule
144A private placement). Normally, only Level II and Level III programs must obey the
registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”).112
Traditionally, the SEC has been promulgating a regulatory scheme differentiating
firms which issue shares in the U.S. market. Domestic issuers need to comply with a
full-fledged regulatory model whereas FPIs need only to obey a less demanding
alternative, or a lower degree of disclosure for raising public capital under the Securities
Act of 1933. FPIs are also substantially exempted from the Exchange Act’s reporting 
provision.113 As Marks finds,
[s]ince its inception in the 1930s and particularly throughout the period of
internationalization in the 1990s, the SEC has expressed its desire to attract foreign
issuers to U.S. capital markets through accommodating and reducing disclosure
requirements for foreign private issuers. These regulatory decisions easing
112 Peter Hostak, Thomas Lys & Yong (George) Yang, Is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Scaring Away Lemons or
Oranges? An Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital
Markets to Foreign Firms, 10-11 (Sep. 1, 2006),
http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/SOX.pdf.
113 Steve M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N. C. L. REV. 89, 130 (2007).
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disclosure requirements have bolstered the demands of foreign firms in raising
capital in the U.S. stock markets. Thus, the U.S. markets in the 1990s witnessed an
explosion of foreign firms registering with the SEC, enabling their ability to raise
capital in the U.S. markets.114
The corporate catastrophes of Enron and other American conglomerates contributed
to a re-consideration of what are the better regulatory regimes to prevent fraud. These
frauds took place due to “monitoring failures at several levels, including directors,
prominent accounting and law firms, institutional shareholders, debt rating agencies, and
securities analysts, and apparently escaped detection by supposedly efficient securities
markets. In response to arguments that government regulators needed to restore
confidence in the securities markets, Congress passed the [SOX].”115 As Prof. Ribstein
notes, SOX“reflects a potential shift in the philosophy underlying the US securities laws
from disclosure to substantive regulation of corporate governance” while “[t]his shift
significantly affects foreign firms’ costs of complying with US law.”116 In addition,
breaking from past securities law tradition, Congress wrote SOX to apply to domestic
issuers and FPIs alike. In spite of opposition and possible retaliation, the SEC is
determined to apply this law equally. Why was there such a significant shift in regulatory
philosophy? To answer this question, Marks argues:
One possible explanation for this shift in policy lies with congressional sentiment
against U.S. companies that incorporate offshore for tax advantages [as
pseudo-foreign corporations]. The practice, often referred to as “corporate
inversion,”became a hot political issue after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Tyco left the U.S. to incorporate in Bermuda in 1997 to lower its effective tax rate.
114 Marks, supra note 110 at 238.
115 Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent of US Law, 3 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 299, 299 (2003) (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
116 Id. at 300.
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In May 2002, Stanley Works announced plans to reincorporate in Bermuda to save
up to $30 million per year paid in taxes on foreign-earned income. Under intense
political pressure, however, Stanley Works abandoned plans to reincorporate in
Bermuda in August 2002, and Tyco began to consider a move back to the U.S. to
end doubts about its transparency and corporate governance in October 2002. By
applying SOX extraterritorially, Congress sent a message to U.S. companies
considering a move offshore: foreign firms would no longer enjoy protection under
the U.S. securities laws.117
Since SOX was intended to cover all SEC reporting companies, there was no
exception for FPIs, other than those issuing Level I and Level IV ADRs, which need not
comply with SEC reporting requirements. SOX did not offer flexibility for the SEC to
explain legislative intent and to provide foreign issuers with exemptions save rules
related to the audit committee, which were later loosened from the initial regulation.118
For instance, the SEC on August 2, 2002 released its proposed rules—Certification of
Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports—which were required under
Section 302 of SOX. In line with the absence of flexibility, “the new rules provided no
exemptions for foreign issuers and specifically emphasized that the‘no exemption’policy
is required under [SOX]. However, the SEC has retained some flexibility in the timetable
to implement the various provisions of [SOX].”119 Therefore, as Davidoff points out,
“the increased level of regulation imposed on non-U.S. issuers by the Sarbanes-Oxley
117 Marks, supra note 110 at 239 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
118 This dissertation will in Chapter 2.B.2.3 discuss how the SEC, given physical exit and threats of exit by
FPIs as well as voice for liberalization by interest groups related to FPIs, allowed accommodation of home
country regulations that would create an audit committee equivalent in independence to that envisaged
under the U.S. rules—for instance, German firms are allowed to include labor representatives on the audit
commitee. Naturaly, it was the international jurisdictional competition activated by FPIs’ exiting from U.S.
stock markets that pushed the SEC to adopt a more flexible regime.
119 Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow
of International Listings 8-9 (Jan. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987 (alteration in
original).
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Act has been qualitatively significant. It is also regulation that makes no attempt to take
into account the special needs of non-domestic issuers.”120
2.2 The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Foreign Private Issuers
As commentators have said, SOX was poorly evaluated and hurriedly enacted
during a regulatory panic. Most people now recognize that the direct compliance costs of
SOX have been greater than expected. For example, as for SOX’s direct effect on the U.S. 
companies, compared with their UK counterparts after SOX, U.S firms’ risk-taking
dwindled substantially. The declines had something to do with several measures, which
include pre-SOX board structure, firm size, and R& D expenditures. In comparison with
the UK, initial public oferings (“IPO”s)in the U.S. were apparently fewer and fewer
after the enactment of SOX; the decline was especially higher for R&D intensive
industries. The overall evidence confirms the assertion that public U.S. companies’
risk-taking is deterred by SOX.121
Moreover, SOX also reduces access to capital markets by the entrepreneurs U.S.
markets depend on, especially FPIs. This indirect cost indicates the discouragement of
foreign firms from trading in the United States, thereby eroding the U.S. dominance in
world securities markets.122 This problem was also noted by the Supreme Court not long
ago:
120 Davidoff, supra note 113, at 132.
121 Leonce Bargeron, Kenneth Lehn & Chad J. Zutter, Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking (March
7, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104063.
122 See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,The Sarbanes Oxley Debacle: What We’veLearned; How to
Fix IT (University of Illinois Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE06-017, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=911277 (the abstract from the book published by AEI Press, 2006).
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Adoption of petitioner's approach would expose a new class of defendants to these
risks. As noted in Central Bank, contracting parties might find it necessary to protect
against these threats, raising the costs of doing business. Overseas firms with no
other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business
here. . . .This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under
our law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.123
Indeed, SOX imposes substantial costs on FPIs to which it applies. It is said that
SOX significantly lessens the trading of foreign securities in the U.S. capital market. For
example, John Thain, former CEO of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), 
expressed that new listings by FPIs declined to half the annual totals prior to SOX during
two years subsequent to the passage of SOX, and that New York’s share of FPIs’ 
cross-listings fell from 90 % in 2000 to 10 % in 2005, largely due to the high costs SOX
imposed on non-U.S. issuers.124 Meanwhile, just when the United States, through SOX,
increased costs imposed on smaller firms, London showed its regulatory advantage by
providing these firms with a special low-cost market, Alternative Investment Market
(“AIM”).125
Furthermore, the latest report in the end of 2007 by the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation mentions that “[b]y any meaningful measure, the competitiveness of
the U.S public equity market has deteriorated significantly in recent years.”126 This
123 Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163-64 (2008) (citation
omitted).
124 Craig Karmin & Aaron Lucchetti, New York Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
26, 2006), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113824819390656771.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing.
125 Craig Karmin, London Calling, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2005), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113530126767530086-search.html?KEYWORDS=london+calling&COLL
ECTION=wsjie/6month/.
126 COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC
EQUITY MARKET 1 (2007).
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deterioration can be observed, for example, from cross-listings in the U.S. and delistings
by foreign companies. As for the former,
[t]raditionally, non-capital raising cross-listings by foreign companies reflect the
desire to bond to high U.S. listing standards. These cross-listings in the U.S. have
steadily declined to insignificance in 2007. Whereas 43 foreign companies
cross-listed in the U.S. without raising capital in 2000, only 4 did so in 2007 through
September. In 2006, 6 foreign companies cross-listed in the United States. The
obvious inference is that foreign companies see diminishing value in bonding to U.S.
standards.127
When it comes to the latter,
[i]n 1997, just 12 foreign companies—3.9% of all listed foreign companies—opted
to delist from the New York Stock Exchange. Foreign delistings rose to 30 in
2006—6.6% of all listed foreign companies. Through October 2007, a record 56
foreign companies (including major European companies)—or 12.4% of listed
foreign companies—have delisted. The significant rise in the delisting rate in 2007
likely reflects a relaxation of SEC rules that previously had made delisting much
more difficult. Some say this spike reflects a pent-up demand to leave and now will
level off. That may be, but such a pent-up demand is itself a negative judgment on
the value of using the U.S. public equity market.128
There are mounting empirical studies to offerevidence of SOX’s negative efectson
FPIs. To name a few, according to Xi Li’s work, responding to the enactment and
enforcement of SOX, cross-listed FPIs get abnormal stock returns of -10%, on average, in
both the U.S. and their home markets; however, Pink Sheets traded FPIs which need not
comply with SOX are not impacted. Generally, better governed FPIs derive more
negative abnormal returns. In comparison with the pre-SOX period, after SOX much
127 Id. at 3.
128 Id.
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more cross-listed FPIs voluntarily delist and deregister to prevent the subjection to SEC
reporting requirements. The abnormal returns at the “going dark”announcements are
negative prior to SOX whereas these returns are positive in the post-SOX period. Overall,
the evidence suggests that cross-listed FPIs are burdened with excessive compliance costs
imposed by SOX.129
Further, Susan Chaplinsky and Latha Ramchand have studied FPIs that delisted in
the post-SOX period owing to the lesser likelihood that they have foreseen a shift in
securities laws when they listed. Holding other factors constant, FPIs delisting in the
pre-SOX period are significantly more likely to be from poor governance countries;
however, it’s significantly more likely that those delisting in the post-SOX period are
from good governance countries. Relative to firms that remain listed in the U.S. markets,
FPIs voluntarily delisting without anticipating the enactment of SOX are smaller, less
profitable firms with low growth, have lower analyst coverage, and take less advantage of
capital-raising. 80% of the home markets of these FPIs caught off guard by SOX are
developed and equipped with strong governance. It seems that these FPIs do not
significantly benefit from U.S. listing while their home equity markets could practicably
substitute for the U.S. markets, which thus caused those from good governance countries
to exit from the U.S. markets.130
Kate Litvak presented several works as direct evidence of whether SOX hurt foreign
firms. For instance, to begin with, she showed that the premium that investors are willing
129 Xi Li, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listed Foreign Private Issuers (2nd Annual Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952433.
130 Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand,From Listing to Delisting: Foreign Firms’ Entry and Exit from 
the U.S. (May 2008), http://www.wlu.ca/documents/30478/delisting_may12_2008_wlu.pdf (last visited Sep.
30, 2008).
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to pay for shares of foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. associated with trading in
the United States (FPIs cross-listed on Level I or IV) was roughly constant, whereas the
premium concerned with being subject to U.S. regulation (FPIs cross-listed on Level II or
III) diminished. FPIs that lost the most were those that were more profitable, riskier, and
smaller, those with a higher degree of disclosure prior to SOX, and those from
well-governed countries. As Litvak notes, “[t]hese results are consistent with the view
that investors expected SOX to have greater costs than benefits for cross-listed firms on
average, especially for smaller firms and already well-governed firms.”131 In addition,
she finds:
stock prices of foreign firms subject to SOX declined (increased) significantly,
compared to cross-listed firms not subject to SOX and to non-cross-listed firms,
during key announcements indicating that SOX would (would not) fully apply to
cross-listed issuers. In cross-sectional tests, high-disclosing firms and firms from
high-disclosing countries experienced the strongest declines, while faster-growing
companies experienced weaker declines. This evidence is consistent with the view
that investors expected SOX to have a net negative effect on cross-listed foreign
companies, with high-disclosing and low-growth companies suffering larger net
costs, and faster-growing companies suffering smaller costs, particularly when they
are located in poorly governed countries.132
The studies discussed above display that FPIs subject to SOX are negatively impacted in
terms of important losses of valuation premia, which might not be completely accounted
for by the increased costs of direct compliance as these losses are significantly large. Her
third study thus investigates one likely reason for the losses—the complaint that SOX
deters FPIs’risk-taking:
131 Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2007).
132 Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, 13 J.
CORP. FIN. 195, 195 (2007).
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I use three sets of proxies for risk: (1) volatility of returns . . . (2) financial
leverage . . . and (3) cash hording . . . . I find evidence, across all measures, that the
pair difference in risk declined significantly after SOX for [level-23-exposed foreign
firms (that is, cross-listed companies listed on Level II or III and thus subject to
SOX)] and did not decline for level-14 pairs, over the post-SOX period from 2003
through 2005. . . . High-Tobin's Q firms experienced stronger reductions in risk.133
As she concludes,
[t]his evidence is consistent with the view that SOX negatively affected corporate
risk-taking, and may have particularly affected firms that were already
well-governed before SOX. It is also consistent with prior research finding
significant declines in market valuations of SOX-exposed foreign firms; the
magnitude of the declines cannot be fully explained by increased costs of
compliance. The analysis in this paper offers a possible explanation for why
investors may have reacted negatively to SOX.134
According to the study by Joseph Piotroski and Suraj Srinivasan, subsequent to the
passage and implementation of SOX, there was little change in large FPIs’ preferences
when they make a choice between American exchanges and the London Stock
Exchange’s (“LSE”) Main Market. On the contrary, they find that after SOX small FPIs
were less likely to engage in a U.S. listing inchoosing between the NASDAQ and LSE’s 
AIM. Since small FPIs has less ability to assume the increased costs imposed by SOX,
SOX negatively affects them.135 Also, based on Christopher Woo’s work, 
133 Kate Litvak, Defensive Management: Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Discourage Corporate Risk-Taking?
4 (3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers; University of Texas Law School Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 108, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120971 (alteration in
original).
134 Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
135 Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 119.
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[t]here is some support for the proposition that European and East Asian issuers
have been increasingly accessing U.S. markets [but] more stringent U.S. securities
regulations may end this trend. . . . Even with the releases [of exemptions], [SOX]
has led to some increased requirements for [FPIs] and will therefore have a
somewhat deterrent effect on them.136
SOX defenders might respond to these anti-SOX studies by saying that the
deterioration of U.S. public equity market cannot all be attributed to SOX, and that this is
partly a story of the rise of non-U.S. exchanges. For example, as Luigi Zingales explains,
the U.S. equity market share has dropped dramatically from 2000 to 2005. This drop
cannot be explained by changes in the geographical or the sectoral composition of
IPOs. The most likely cause is a combination of an improvement in the competitors
(mostly European equity markets) and an increase in the compliance costs for
publicly traded companies.137
Supporters for SOX might also point out that it is primarily the riskier stocks that exit
from the U.S. markets. For instance, Nuno Fernandes, Ugur Lel and Darius Miller
indicate that after the SEC on March 21, 2007 adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 which
better enables FPIs to deregister and terminate the reporting requirements concerned with
a listing on major U.S. exchanges, the U.S. stock markets evaluated as negative the
ability of FPIs from countries whose disclosure and governance are weak to more easily
opt out of the strict U.S. reporting and legal regime, and that in particular as investor
136 Christopher Woo, The Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Foreign Private Issuers 60 (seminar paper,
Int’l Fin. Seminar, Harvard Law Sch.), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/christopher_woo.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2008) (alteration
in original).
137 Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? 1 (ECGI–Fin. Working Paper
No. 192/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028701.
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protections provided in FPIs’home countries are weak, their U.S. shareholders would
value U.S. securities laws very highly.138
Nonetheless, Craig Doidge, George Karolyi and Rene Stulz examined the attributes
of 59 FPIs that immediately declared their potential deregistration after the adoption of
the new SEC Rule 12h-6, what could have motivated them to do so, as well as what
happened to them economically after such decisions. They find that before the decisions
these firms grew significantly more slowly and gained lower stock returns than other U.S.
exchange-listed FPIs. Weak evidence supports that FPIs in announcing deregistration
derive negative stock returns; stronger evidence suggests that those with higher growth
experience worse stock-price reactions. Examining stock-price reactions around events
concerned with the enactment of SOX, they found negative stock-price reactions on
average. Their evidence corroborates the hypotheses that FPIs cross-list in the U.S. with a
view to raising capital at the lowest possible cost so as to financially support their growth
opportunities, and that, as soon as those opportunities vanish, FPI’s insiders place less 
valuation on cross-listings in the U.S. so that there is a higher likelihood that they would
deregister and list back home.139
Furthermore, an empirical study on the capital raising practices of Chinese
companies found that all of the interviewees who were individuals possessing extensive
experience in securities work in the U.S., Hong Kong, and China mentioned SOX as
138 Nuno Fernandes, Ugur Lel & Darius P. Miller, Escape from New York: The Market Impact of Loosening
Disclosure Requirements (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031398.
139 Craig Andrew Doidge, George Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S.
Equity Markets? An Analysis of Deregistrations Under SEC Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 (Fisher College of
Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-013, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1204442.
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“being particularly irritating to foreign issuers, because it goes beyond what has
historically been the purview of U.S. financial securities regulation.”140 This study
further pointed out that“Chinese issuers find that public listings may not always generate
a strong U.S. following,”and that“in order to avoid more stringent securities regulations,
Chinese issuers often choose to list in Hong Kong [(one of the two major players in Asia
while the other bigger one is Tokyo Stock Exchange)] instead of the U.S., with no
significant repercussion.”141 This study shows that indeed FPIs have more stock
exchanges outside the U.S., say, Hong Kong, to go to raise capital, but the problem is that,
with SOX, the U.S. created a higher incentive for them to leave for other non-U.S.
exchanges. This study also implies that even though it’s mainly the riskier stocks like 
those of Chinese issuers whose legal institutions of investor protection at home are
relatively problematic,142 that exit from the American capital market, those stocks are
still significant to the U.S. markets.143
Finally, even if there has been controversy regarding the cause of the decline in
cross-listings to some extent, the actual cause of the decline might not be that significant.
Just asO’Hara andRibstein note, “the actual effect of regulation is seldom clear. For the
purpose of showing the political effect of exit on regulation, it is enough that the
140 Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in
2004-2005, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 243, 263 (2006).
141 Id. at 299 (alteration in original).
142 See generally Donald C. Clarke, The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China (GWU Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 433; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 433, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1245803.
143 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Latest News on SOX vs. US Capital Markets,
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/ (Dec. 10, 2007, 15:54 EST).
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perception that the decline was attributable to regulatory cost triggered a demand to
reduce the regulatory burden.”144
2.3 Exit and Voice Nudge Exemptions
As explained above, the Congress in writing SOX and the SEC in the beginning had
not been wary of the importance of maintaining legal flexibility requested by FPIs and
respecting their business demands. Due to SOX’s heightened regulation over FPIs, the
non-U.S. issuers in the post-SOX period have been cross-listing in other stock markets or
voluntarily delist and deregister to avoid SEC reporting obligations. On the demand side
of the cross-listing law market, they need to find a regulatory product of securities
regulation which can bond their insiders but require lower compliance cost than the U.S.
markets entail. Some improved markets such as LSE or HKSE are able to supply this
type of regulatory product on the supply side. FPIs’ exercise of the “exit” option further
strengthens their“voicing”complaints to the SEC. Under these law market forces at work,
the SEC has adopted several exemptions to relax FPIs’ regulatory burdens and expects
thus to retain FPIs in or attract them back to the U.S. stock markets. The exemptions of
FPIs from SOX’s requirement of independent audit commitees illustrate the regulatory
transition from a strictly mandatory to more flexible regime.
Section 301 of SOX arguably imposes higher costs on FPIs than on U.S issuers with
lower benefits. SOX’s requirement of independent audit commitees and its assigning “to 
the audit commitee al responsibility ‘for the appointment, compensation, and oversight
of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including
144 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 229.
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resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial
reporting)’”145 would lead to a significant revolution for corporations incorporated under
civil law regimes. Civil law countries, such as Germany, often require that there should
be a two-tier board with a lower managing board and an upper supervisory board. The
lower managing board cannot act as the audit committee because none of the members
are independent as defined by SOX. Nevertheless, because the upper board is composed
half of employees, corporations have tended not to give the board “significant substantive 
responsibilities.”146
Although FPIs have continued listing in the U.S., subsequent to the enactment of
SOX they may start to hesitate to an extent. This phenomenon suggests that FPIs will
take the exit option as a response to SOX. For instance, citing problems with SOX,
Porsche has decided not to list shares in the U.S. and announced that it would not change
its mind even after the proposed exemptions were adopted. Likewise Benfield Group Ltd,
also citing SOX, has made a decision to list shares in London rather than in the United
States.147 Daiwa Securities deferred its scheduled listing activity in 2002 to observe how
the new regulations would turn out.148 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone took delisting
into account while LVMH determined a delisting.149
Facing up to this problematic regulation and motivated by FPIs’exit, anti-regulatory
and exit-affected interest groups associated with FPIs have attempted to voice their
145 John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact of Cross-listings and Stock Market
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1825-26 (2002).
146 Id. at 1825.
147 See Craig Karmin & Kevin J. Delaney,SEC’s Exemption Gets Some Praise, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 13, 2003,
at C16.
148 See Mariko Sanchanta, Daiwan Shelves NYSE Listing Plan, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 26, 2002, at 8.
149 Woo, supra note 136, at 19.
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complaints. For instance, Sullivan & Cromwell (UK) argued that home country laws in
some other jurisdictions to which FPIs are subject may entitle shareholders or another
body to the power to select and supervise auditors.150 France Telecom argued that some
entities in foreign governments are required to be a member of the audit committee for
certain FPIs. 151 Furthermore, Linklaters argued that the SEC has not considered
protections provided by foreign law, that the German Corporations Act restrains a parent
company from doing something at the expense of its subsidiaries’ benefits, and that it is
thus unnecessary not to permit representatives from the parent company to vote on the
audit committee of its subsidiary.152 Given potential conflicts from Section 301 as well
as other sections of SOX, the European Commission filed a comment letter to make an
appeal that there should be exemptions for European issuers from the requirements of
SOX. The above comments demonstrate not only that “[w]ithout exemptions many
foreign private issuers might find it hard to comply simultaneously with Section 301 and
home country regulations,”153 but also that FPIs, perceiving excessiveness of the
post-SOX cross-listing regulatory product, attempt to exercise their voice rights, that is,
to improve the relationship with the U.S. stock markets through communication of the
complaint or proposal for change.
In addition, the NYSE, one of the exit-affected interest groups, might be conscious
of the problem with which SOX may burden foreign issuers and wrote to the SEC in the
150 See Comments of Sullivan & Cromwell (UK) on File No. S7-21-02 (Oct. 11, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/sullivanuk1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). See also
Comments of Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson on File No. S7-02-03, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/ericsson1.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
151 See Comments of France Telecom on File No. S7-02-03 (Feb. 18, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/rctreuhold1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
152 See Comments of Linklaters on File No. S7-02-03 (Feb. 18, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/linklaters1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
153 See Woo, supra note 136, at 18.
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comment period. It stated that it was “aware of a number of companies that are 
considering either delisting (to avoid compliance with the audit committee requirements)
or delisting and deregistration (to avoid compliance with these and certain other
provisions of [SOX]) [in particular provided that they] have not yet achieved a significant
U.S. shareholder base.”154 It noted that companies such as the Benfield Group has chosen
to list shares in London instead and that “[t]he London Stock Exchange has been quite
openly using the regulatory hurdles associated with [SOX] as a marketing wedge against
U.S. registration and listing.”155 The comment letter further stressed that SOX has led to
“foreign regulators, companies and media questioning the right of Congress to change the 
rules for non-U.S. listed companies ‘in the middle of the game.’”156 Particularly, the
NYSE supported the accommodation for controlling shareholders, for foreign
governments, and for employee representatives. The NYSE also extended support to a
proposed exemption of auditor oversight via some body other than the audit committee.
What’s more, the NYSE might intend not to ask FPIs to comply with its additional
independence requirements.157
Therefore, the SEC has been wary of how SOX would potentially discourage FPIs,
and considering how to moderate conflicts between SOX and FPIs’ home country 
regulations and practices for some time. On January 8, 2003, it proposed rules on Section
301, entitled “Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Commitees,” including some 
154 See Comments of New York Stock Exchange, Inc. on File No. S7-02-03 (Feb. 21, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/dcstuckey1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (alteration in
original).
155 Id (alteration in original).
156 Id.
157 Woo, supra note 136, at 20.
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exemptions from the audit committee requirement for FPIs.158 After receiving comment
letters, such as those mentioned above, written in response to the proposed rules for
“Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Commitees,” the SEC made a decision to
broaden some of its proposed exemptions.159 The Final Release, implementing Section
301 of SOX, did give a few exemptions to FPIs. The Release clearly states that the SEC
has “long recognized the importance of the globalization of the securities markets both 
for investors who desire increased diversification and international companies that seek
capital in new markets.”160 The SEC realizes that U.S. investors progressively desire to
make investments in foreign securities and tries to make sure that the announced new
rules will not unduly burden FPIs. The Release emphasizes that although Section 301
does not differentiate between foreign and domestic issuers while the adoption of audit
committees is a growing trend, the SEC will grant such exemptions and clarifications that
FPIs will not be required to abide by legal rules in conflict with regulations in their home
countries.161
2.4 Summary
The negative effect of SOX on FPIs has triggered a political dynamic that may have
far-reaching consequences. In the beginning, “[a]voidance by non-U.S. firms of the U.S.
158 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Investment Company Act of 1940, Release No. 8173, Release No. 25885, Release No.
47137, Release No. 33-8173, Release No. 34-47137, Release No. IC-25885, 17 C.F.R. Parts 228, 229, 240,
249 and 274 (2003).
159 For a summary of the comments received, see Summary of Comments: Related to Proposed Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s70203summary.htm#P1123_88469 (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
160 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Investment Company Act of 1940, Release No. 8220, Release No. 47654, Release No.




market may reduce U.S. investors’ abilityto diversify their portfolios. . . . [T]his
avoidance may reduce the revenues of US securities firms [as well as other exit-affected
parties], thereby provoking these firms to lobby for reducing the regulatory burden on
cross-listing firms.”162 Thereafter, the U.S. responded to criticisms from German
companies and other groups by issuing rules that partially exempt foreign firms from
some SOX requirements. Perhaps more importantly, as Butler and Ribstein discuss,
[t]hese rules raise the question of how far the SEC can go in exempting foreign firms
before triggering significant complaints from their U.S. competitors in the U.S.
capital markets. The exemptions undoubtedly are attributable to some extent to the
fact that foreign firms are much better able to exit [from] the U.S. market than
U.S.-based firms. The latter may be subject to U.S. laws even if they trade overseas,
and they have other business reasons for needing to trade in the United States. To
the extent the exemptions are, or should be, based on the costs of compliance, they
arguably should apply to any firm that is incorporated under and must comply with
the corporate law of another country, regardless of where the corporation’s 
operations are based. But any such exemption would invite U.S. firms to avoid U.S.
law by incorporating elsewhere. To the extent that such competition forces U.S.
regulators and legislators to reassess the damage they have done to American
securities markets, such exits by U.S. firms could ultimately help correct the SOX
mistake.163
In other words, the SEC will face pressure from U.S.-based firms, who would use their
“greater” voice inthe U.S. political marketplace to lobby for exemptions similar to those
granted to FPIs, to extend benefits of foreign exemptions to domestic firms.164 In fact,
“in the wake of [SOX], many of the reforms passed to [foreign] issuers have been
162 Ribstein, supra note 115, at 323 (alteration in original).
163 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 109, at 74 (alteration in original).
164 See Ribstein, supra note 51, at 130-39. See also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and
the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1077 (2009).
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ultimately shared by U.S.-domiciled companies or are in the process of being considered
for extension to U.S. companies.”165 That is, exit could lead to general deregulation.166
In general, the phenomenon of SOX and the global cross-listing market discussed
above demonstrates some dimensions of the law market:
First, it shows how even what would seem to be the most mandatory laws must
compete in the law market given the increasingly global nature of competition. This
competition can increase the level and quality of regulation, as shown by the rise of
cross-listing firms. Second, SOX’s aftermath indicates that regulated firms may exit 
in the face of increased regulatory costs. Third, this history shows how the financial
impact of exit on interest groups in regulating countries ultimately can cause states
to make changes in their laws that reduce regulatory costs. Although these changes
may be provoked by the most mobile firms, they have the potential of reducing costs
for all firms, including those that have higher costs of exit.167
In conclusion, in this law market for cross-listings we see “the usual law market
forces could work for securities regulation, just as U.S. states ultimately came to apply
the IAD to tramp corporations.”168 On the buy side of this law market, “regulation and
non-enforcement of contractual choice of law create an incentive to leave,”and on the
sel side “exit activates local industries that depend on the exiting firms; “[t]his, in turn,
pressures politicians to enable jurisdictional choice, sometimes even for immobile
locals.”169 In other words, feedbacks of exit and voice rights are translated into the
regulatory evolution for the SEC to moderate the over-burdensome regulation imposed by
SOX. This SOX case thus implies not merely that “the elements of the law market story
165 Chris Brummer, Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
1067, 1105 (2008) (alteration in original).
166 Ribstein, supra note 115, at 325-26.
167 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 31.
168 Id. at 124 (footnote omitted).
169 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 711-12.
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apply in the international context,”170 but also that law market forces underlying
international jurisdictional competition would provoke a change in excessive regulation
to a more flexible regime.171
170 Id. at 712.
171 Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis also seem to confirm this conclusion:
One can further observe the continuing importance of macroeconomic pressures in the problems that
the NYSE has had since the introduction of [SOX] in response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals.
In a continuation of the regulatory competition created by capital mobility . . . since 2002 the NYSE
has been losing out to the LSE for new listings because of the onerous nature of SOX. Because of
capital mobility, companies around the world, including US companies, can simply choose to avoid
the US regulatory regime when raising capital. As a result, the SEC in May 2007 produced new
guidance on interpreting the most contentious aspects of SOX, with the intention of making it less
burdensome.
Alan J. Dignam & Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context,
28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 242 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154412 (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted).
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CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AMONG GLOBAL LEGAL
CENTERS
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, even if Taiwan and Mainland China are
highly economically interdependent on each other, there is some political antagonism
between them.172 Therefore, facing its flourishing economic relationship with Mainland
China since the late 1980s, Taiwan’sgovernment is in a dilemma of whether and how to
regulate the investments of the Taiwanese business community in China. But with
Taiwan’sgovernment attempting unsuccessfully to hinder further cross-Strait investment,
many Taiwanese corporations have weaved their ways through these bans in order to
hand over needed funds to their affiliates or subsidiaries in Mainland China. This Taiwan
phenomenon seems also to exemplify international jurisdictional competition among
global legal centers, referring especially to Hong Kong and other OFCs in British Central
America (e.g. the Cayman Islands). In effect much evidence to date reveals that this
jurisdictional competition provoked by Taiwanese companies’ exit to elude the
Restrictions prompts substantial ease of capital limits placed by Taiwan’sgovernment.
Chapter 3.A first through a more micro-level account illustrates this jurisdictional
competition in which the above OFCs participated by elaborating on the law market for
listings in the Greater Chinese Economy mainly led by HKSE as a competitor against
Taiwan. Chapter 3.B further offers a bird’seye view of how the international
jurisdictional competition among global legal centers plays a role in causing the
lightening of the Capital Controls: Business demands for increasing investment in China
172 Chien-Min Chao, Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial
Political Culture?, 43 ASIAN SURV. 280, 280 (2003).
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(demonstrated by the surge of China-investment) under economic globalization coupled
with the fact that the international jurisdictional competition (mainly spurred by the
denationalization of financial capital) sent the Capital Controls ineffective, as discussed
below, could be attributable to the stage-by-stage liberalization in question.
A. Jurisdictional Competition among Listing Markets in the Greater Chinese
Economy: Hong Kong as an Example of Competitors against Taiwan
General law market forces are also at work in the law market for listings in the
Greater Chinese Economy as in the law market for cross-listings explained above. In
concrete terms, on the demand side, the Restrictions create incentives of China-based
Taiwanese businesses to exit from Taiwan stock markets and their demands to find a
regulatory product of securities regulation without being subject to the Restrictions. On
the international supply side, neighboring stock markets in the Greater Chinese Economy,
not least Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKSE”), supply this product of legal flexibility.
On the domestic supply side, a torrent of physical exit by these fugitive companies
activates local industries and interest groups that depend on the exiting firms. Subsequent
to interest group competitions over whether or how to relax the related restrictions,
anti-regulatory and exit-affected interest groups successfully voice their petition for
liberalization. Therefore, the jurisdictional competition among listing markets in the
Greater Chinese Economy, through Taiwanese firms’ exit and voice, pressures politicians
in Taiwan to satisfy business demands for legal flexibility, or to loosen the relevant bans
on outwardly investing in Mainland China.
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1. The Demand Side of the Law Market
1.1 The Restrictions on Outward Investment in Mainland China
1.1.1 The Background of the Capital Controls
Historically, since China started opening up during the 1980s, Taiwan-invested
firms have been one of the first companies which invested a lot on the Mainland and have
already made a fortune. As Bradsher reported in 2007,“[e]stimates of total Taiwan
holdings on the mainland run as high as $280 billion.”173 Taiwan’slocal economy has in
some sense benefited from China-investment in the past few years. Why have Taiwanese
firms been increasingly investing in China during these years? A higher degree of
political antagonism existed between Taiwan and China prior to 1979. There were all but
no business connections between them. In 1979, however, the fact that China changed its
mind from liberating Taiwan to calling for peaceful unification made an important
change. As Taiwan suddenly allowed its citizens to visit their relatives on the Mainland in
October 1987, cross-Strait economic relations were further developed. More importantly,
representatives of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (“ARATS”) 
and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (“SEF”) in April 1993 had a historic meeting
in Singapore. In this meeting,“[a]lthough characterized as unofficial, both delegations
were headed by former high level officials tied to the top leadership in each capital.”174
173 Bradsher, supra note 2.
174 Ping Deng,Taiwan’s Restriction of Investment in China in the 1990s: A Relative Gains Approach,40
ASIAN SURV. 958, 962 (2000).
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What follows summarizes what drove cross-Strait trade and investments from
Taiwan to China to turn out to be a torrent. First of all, Taiwan’s democratization drive
was also responsible for this trend. Second, the financial liberalization followed
substantial appreciation of the New Taiwan (“NT”) dollar resulting from the Plaza
Accord. The NT dollar’s value increased, thus making manufacturing in Taiwan less
competitive and lessening Taiwanese exporters’ profits. Taiwanese firms, to remain
internationally competitive, started to make large investments on the Mainland, which
attracted much of the manufacturing and exporting activities originally based in Taiwan.
Another crucial factor was the decrease of cross-Strait political tension as shown above.
In addition, the justification for Taiwanese investment mainly rests on comparative
advantages as well as economic complementarities. Taiwan’s plentiful funds and
improved technology match China’s abundant natural resources and low production cost
almost perfectly. These comparative advantages, combined with cultural and linguistic
similarities as well as geographic closeness, primarily contribute to capital flow from
Taiwan to China. Last but not least, Taiwanese firms would lose the market to rivals like
South Korea, if not for relocating their factories to China.175
Even though cross-Strait economic interactions have turned really intense, officials
of Taiwan’sgovernment kept struggling to impede the fast development of business
connections. In September 1996, President Teng-Hui Lee stressed a “No Haste, Be
Patient” investment policy(the “NHBP” policy) while requiringTaiwanese firms to
brake their rapid expansion of Mainland operations. He emphasized that Taiwan would
become susceptible to Chinese political pressure with greater cross-Strait economic
175 Id. at 962-64.
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interdependence. The Council for Economic Planning and Development (“CEPD”), the
official think tank of Taiwan’sgovernment, at the same time withdrew a suggestion to
lighten restrictions on China-investment. 176 The following July, the Ministry of
Economic Afairs (“MOEA”) released its revised Principles Governing the Review of
Investment or Technical Cooperation in Mainland China (the “Principles”). What should 
be noted is that the cap amount of investment is specified in Article 3 of the Principles,
which is enacted under the authorization by Paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the Act
Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (the
“Act”). The intention of the Principles was to protect Taiwan’s economic growth and 
national security. The Principles broadened the scope of prohibited investments,
prohibited major infrastructure projects, confined single-project investments in China to
$50 million, and imposed a general system to limit Taiwanese firms’ investments in the 
PRC according to their overall financial exposure and ownership structure (the “Capital
Controls”).177
1.1.2 The Legal Basis of the Constraints
Although Taiwan has turned to large-scale deregulation178 since President Ma of
KMT won the presidential election in March 2008, prior to this notable legal change
176 Id. at 965-66.
177 See Fu-Lung Lee, Tai Shang Zai Da Lu Shang Shi De Zheng Ce Yu Fa Lü Ji Qi Yin Ying Zhi Dao [On
Policy, Law and the Suggestion for Taiwanese Enterprise to Go Public in the Mainland Area], 34 TAIWAN
DA XUE FA XUE LUN CONG [NTU L. J.] 277, 279-80 (2005) (Taiwan).
178 See, e.g., Shu-Fang Huang, Deng Lu Tou Zi Shang Xian Fang Kuan Zhi Bai Fen Zhi Liu Shi Zong Bu
Zai Tai Zhe Bu She Xian [The Capital Cap on Investment in China Is Relaxed to 60 % while No Cap Is
Applied if Administrative Centers Are Established], ZHONG YANG SHE JI SHI XIN WEN [CENTRAL NEWS
AGENCY NEWS], July 15, 2008, http://news.msn.com.tw/print.aspx?id=862620 (last visited July 15, 2008);
Yi-Feng Lin & Gui-Xiang Wen, Zong Tong Hui Wu Liu Kui Qiao Ding Deng Lu Tou Zi Shang Xian Song
Bang [President Met Premier and Decided for the Relaxation of the Capital Cap], ZHONG YANG SHE JI SHI
XIN WEN [CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY NEWS], July 14, 2008, http://news.msn.com.tw/print.aspx?id=862618
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MOEA maintained the Capital Controls that the total dollar amount of direct and indirect
investment in Mainland China cannot exceed the upper limits, generally 40% of a
Taiwanese firm’s net worth. In order to thoroughly implement the Capital Controls,
Taiwan’s government further imposed several constraints through administrative
regulations to restrain Taiwanese and even foreign issuers from investing funds raised in
Taiwan stock markets outwardly in Mainland China (the “Constraints”). First, according
to Article 7 of Regulations Governing the Offering and Issuance of Securities by
Securities Issuers, Taiwanese issuers were not allowed to directly or indirectly invest any
capital raised in Taiwan stock markets in Mainland China. Second, the predecessor
organization of the Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”) in Taiwan, equivalent to
the SEC in the U.S., also released an administrative regulation to prohibit public
Taiwanese companies from investing capital raised through private placements, no matter
in Taiwan or overseas, in Mainland China.179 Third, Article 9 of Regulations Governing
the Offering and Issuance of Overseas Securities provided that the fund raised from the
issuance of securities in overseas stock markets was not allowed to be used for direct or
indirect investments in Mainland China beyond the upper limit, 20-40% of the amount of
the fund raised in each offering. Fourth, Regulations Governing the Offering and
Issuance of Securities by Foreign Securities Issuers stipulated that neither could funds
raised in Taiwan stock markets by foreign issuers be used for investments in Mainland
China.
(last visited July 15, 2008).
179 Order of Securities and Futures Commission, Ministry of Finance, Executive Yuan, Tai-Cai-Zheng-Yi
Zi No. 09100168912 (passed Jan. 17, 2003). See also Shang Shi Gong Si Si Mu Zi Jin Ke Yi Tou Zi Lu Gu
Shang Xian Bai Fen Zhi Liu Shi [Listing Corporations Can Invest Up to 60% of Capital Raised through
Each Private Placement in Buying Chinese Stocks], FAYUAN FA LÜ XIN WEN [LAWBANK’S L. NEWS]
(Taiwan), Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.lawbank.com.tw/fnews/pnews.php?nid=64123.00 (hereinafter
Placements) (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
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In addition, it should be noted that foreign issuers in Taiwan may be classified into
two groups: one group, having not listed their shares on any other stock exchanges abroad,
applies for listing shares in Taiwan stock markets (“Primary Listing Issuers”) while the 
other group, with securities being traded on stock exchanges abroad, applies for the
listing of Taiwan Deposit Receipts (“TDR”s) in Taiwan stock markets (“Secondary 
Listing Issuers,” the equivalent of cross-listing issuers in the U.S. stock markets).
1.2 Problems of the Restrictions: Strong Intention but Weak Capability of
Enforcement
1.2.1 Ignoring Economic Globalization and Business Demands
The Restrictions apparently ignore Taiwanese firms’ business demandscreated by
economic globalization. Cross-Strait economic relations may have been treated as an
issue of excessive politicization, with little economic reasoning, for policy making in
Taiwan. From the perspective of economic statecraft180 favored by the pro-regulatory
interest groups, Taiwanese investment in Mainland China has a negative impact on
Taiwan’s economic development; the primary one is the emptying out of Taiwan’s labor 
intensive industries as well as the flowing awayof Taiwan’s industrial competitiveness to 
China. Taiwanese Direct Investment (“TDI”)in China “may increase Taiwan’s 
180 No matter in which form the economic regulation is imposed, economic statecraft is per se a kind of
intervention in the law of comparative advantage of international economy and trade. That is, in order to
reach expected political goals, the power of a state is wielded against market mechanisms. Tse-Kang Leng,
Cong Mei Guo Dui Nan Fei De Jing Mao Guan Zhi Tan Tao Wo Dui Da Lu De Jing Mao Zheng Ce
[Research on Taiwan’s Policy on Economic Relations with Mainland China in Light of U.S. Economic
Regulation on South Africa], 41 ZHONG GUO DA LU YAN JIU [MAINLAND CHINA STUDI ES] 17, 17
(1998) (Taiwan).
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vulnerability and sensibility to the Mainland’s ‘economic warfare’.”181 Put differently,
“the main reasons behind Taiwan’s tough economic regulations are concerns over 
national security—that is, worries that China could use its economic power to make
Taiwanese businessmen in China further the [PRC’s] policy aims.”182 Nonetheless, it is a
natural trend of economic globalization that accounts for the gradual growth of
investment by Taiwanese companies on the Mainland:183
Growing Taiwanese Investment in the PRC and intensified trade across the Strait is
[sic] part of larger East Asian and global economic trends. East Asian firms became
increasingly tied to the dynamism of China in the 1990s. In its May 2001 White
Paper on Trade, Japan’s Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry analyzed how 
China emerged as the center of growth in East Asia. China’ share of East Asian 
GDP grew from 25% in 1980 to 37% in 1999. This phenomenon was driven in large
part by two key trends: PRC liberalization of tariffs and investment opportunities
and a large influx of [foreign direct investment (“FDI”)]. Competition intensified
significantly in East Asia in the 1990s with the quadrupling of FDI into the region,
further liberalization of trade and investment barriers, and the subsequent
cross-border specialization occurring in the region as evidenced by the rapid growth
in the trade of intermediate goods.184
Accordingly, as Suter further argues, “Taiwan's growing commercial ties to China's
economy are part of a larger globalization trend that ultimately puts cross-Strait relations
into a much larger scheme of regional and global economic interdependence.”185 In a
181 Tse-Kang Leng, Securing Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: New Challenges and
Opportunities, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA, 261, 262 (2002).
182 Tain-Jy Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Can They Ameliorate the Political
Problem?, in TAIWAN’S PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 215, 221 (Muthiah Algappa ed., 2001) (alteration in original).
183 YAN-ZHI ZHU, LIANG AN JING MAO [CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP] 31 (2006)
(Taiwan).
184 Karen M. Sutter, Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications for Cross-Strait
Relations, 42 ASIAN SURV. 522, 527 (2002) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
185 Id. at 534.
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word, TDI in China “is a part of the global division of labor.”186 Obviously, the
phenomenon of economic globalization—the removal of barriers to free trade and the
closer integration of national economies—plays a central role in why Taiwanese firms
have massive business demands for increasingly investing in Mainland China.
To be concrete, first of all, as Stiglitz puts it, globalization can be understood as“the
closer integration of countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by
the enormous reduction in the costs of transportation and communication, and the
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and
(to a lesser extent) people across borders.”187 When it comes to globalization at work
across the Strait, for instance, “exchange of human capital is the most intimate form of
international commerce, and, despite political differences, economic globalization has
added this dimension to cross-Strait relations.”188 Discussing the causes and process of
the mobility of advanced talent between Taiwan and China, as well as its impact on
cross-Strait relations, Tse-Kang Leng argues that “[e]conomic globalization,
demonstrated by new waves of Taiwanese investment and the formation of global
Information Technology (IT) production networks with the U.S., is the major impetus
behind talent flows between Taiwan and China,”that “cross-Strait talent interaction is
boosted by Taiwanese investment in China’s metropolitan areas such as Shanghai and by 
financial instruments such as [venture capital],”and that“human capital flows across the
186 Chen-Yuan Tung, The Impact on Taiwan, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 190, 201
(Shang-Jin Wei, Guanzhong James Wen & Huizhong Zhou eds., 2002).
187 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002).
188 Tse-Kang Leng, Economic Globalization and IT Talent Flows across the Taiwan Strait: The
Taipei/Shanghai/Silicon Valley Triangle, 42 ASIAN SURV. 230, 230 (2002).
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Taiwan Strait are facilitated by the networking of production through international
channels, especially through high-tech centers located in the U.S.”189
Second, Chang & Goldstein note that “cross-Strait trade and investment were
intimately linked,” that“[u]nderlying the dramatic growth of trade in the [period as early
as prior to China’s and Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in 2002] was a related, and
equally significant, evolving cross-Strait division of labor,“ and that this international
specialization “was driven by a parallel and similarly-rapid growth of investment by
Taiwanese companies on the mainland, which began in the late 1980s.”190 In addition,
according to a study on TDI tendency, Taiwanese firms prefer investing in areas with
similar business customs as well as cultural and linguistic affinity to Taiwan, in the sense
that investment destinations with these characteristics show less investment risks (the
“mental” factor). Moreover, Taiwanese firms’ international competitive edges rest on
Taiwan’s networking with production through international channels (the “network” 
factor). These two factors contribute to Taiwanese firms’ investing in the PRC. When the 
international production network requests setting up bases of manufacturing in Mainland
China, Taiwanese firms cannot resist this request in that if they are unable to interact well
with the international production network, they will lose their position in this network.191
For instance, many multi-national corporations (“MNC”), such as Dell Computers,
outsource their manufacturing to Taiwanese firms while asking them to establish factories
189 Id. at 231 (alteration in original).
190 Julian Chang & Steven M. Goldstein, Introduction: The WTO and Cross-Strait Economic Relations, in
ECONOMIC REFORM AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: TAIWAN AND CHINA IN THE WTO 1, 21 (Julian Chang
& Steven M. Goldstein eds., 2007).
191 Tain-Jy Chen & Yinh-Hua Ku, Quan Qiu Hua Xia Tai Shang Dui Da Lu Tou Zi Ce Lüe [Investment
Strategies of Taiwanese Firms in China during Globalization], in JING JI QUAN QIU HUA YU TAI SHANG DA
LU TOU ZI: CE LÜE BU JU YU BI JIAO [ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND TAIWAN’S INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
IN CHINA] 13, 13, 35 (Te-Sheng Chen ed., 2008) (Taiwan).
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in the PRC given lower production costs and large consumer markets so as to directly
ship products to customers in China and worldwide. 192 In order to follow this
international industrial specialization, Taiwanese firms have no other choice but to make
large investments in China.
Third, subsequent to the entry into the WTO of both Taiwan and China, “growing
business pressures and WTO commitments are converging in a way that would add
pressure for . . . significant reductions in barriers to trade and investment in both the PRC
and Taiwan.”193 The gradual breaking down of trade and investment barriers means that
Taiwan will and need to fit in with the international division of labor. Faced with the
trend of globalization and international specialization, Taiwan is required to take into
account the production resources and vast markets located in China, which drives
Taiwanese firms to invest more in China. 194 Put differently, market
incentives—economic globalization as wel as China’s and Taiwan’s accession to the 
WTO—dominate cross-Strait economic interaction. Under economic globalization, in
order to maintain their core competence, MNCs which confront more intense competition
worldwide outsource other sectors not indentified as core business. This strategy results
in more sophisticated international specialization. Since Mainland China has not only
abundant resources such as labor and land but also a large potential domestic market,
192 Xiao-Jia Qiu, Song Bang Liang An Jing Mao Yi Li Taiwan Chan Ye Quan Qiu Bu Ju [Liberalizing
Cross-Strait Economic Relations to Facilitate Taiwanese Enterprises’ Global Operation], 1 GUO JIA
ZHENG CE LUN TAN [NAT’L POL’Y F.] (ISSUE 8) 143, 143 (2001) (Taiwan).
193 Sutter, supra note 184, at 530.
194 See Bing-Zhong Lin, WTO Quan Qiu Hua Yu Liang An Jing Mao Jing He [WTO, Globalization and
Cross-Strait Economic Co-opetition], 25 TAIWAN JING JI YAN JIU YUE KAN [TAIWAN ECO N . RE S .
MONT HLY] ( ISSUE 1) 64, 67 (2002) (Taiwan); also Horng-Ming Tsai & Koong-Lian Kao, You Quan Qiu
Jing Ji Zheng He Jing Yan Kan Liang An Jing Mao Hu Dong Xin Jia Gou [The New Framework of
Cross-Strait Economic Interaction in Light of the Experience in Global Economic Integration], 1 GUO JIA
ZHENG CE LUN TAN [NAT’L POL’Y F.] (ISSUE 10) 39, 50 (2001) (Taiwan).
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MNCs believe that China will play an increasingly important role in the international
specialization. Especialy after China’s entry into the WTO, MNCs wil highlight China’s 
significance in global operation. As a result, economic globalization (in particular
demonstrated byTaiwan’sremoval of trade and investment barriers intended for the entry
into the WTO) and market inducements offered by the accession to the WTO to engage in
international division of labor have been boosting Taiwanese firms’ demands for active 
investment in China for the past few years.195
In summary, under economic globalization, as Sutter points out,
[f]urther cross-Strait economic integration and specialization seem inevitable given
the highly complementary nature of the economies of the PRC and Taiwan. Despite
the tendency to see relations as zero-sum, both the PRC and Taiwan share a
convergence of economic interests. For example, both are highly dependent on an
open U.S. market, especially for jointly developed PRC-Taiwan exports. A large
percentage of PRC exports to the U.S. (both via the PRC directly and Hong Kong
indirectly) are exported by Taiwan-invested firms. While statistically Taiwan's
exports appear to depend less on the U.S. market, in fact they depend on the health
and openness of the U.S. market more than ever via their investments in the PRC.
Many products that the U.S. used to import directly from Taiwan are now imported
indirectly via Taiwan-invested firms in the PRC.196
In other words, in spite of the Restrictions, market forces—economic globalization and
cross-Strait specialization—drive the surge of TDI in China. Taiwan’s regulation of TDI
in China seems incapable of thwarting the operation of market incentives. At best, the
Restrictions delay or force underground TDI in China. As discussed above, Taiwanese
195 See Charng Kao, Zong Tong Da Xuan Hou Liang An Jing Mao Guan Xi Zhan Wang [The Prospect of
Cross-Strait Economic Relations after the Presidential Election], 2 ZHAN WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT
& EXP LOR AT ION ] ( ISSUE 5) 13, 16-17 (2004) (Taiwan).
196 Sutter, supra note 184, at 538.
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firms do have their strong demands for investing in China and further for legal flexibility
of the regulation on outward investment in China. Nonetheless, due to the Restrictions,
on the one hand, Taiwan is incapable of being properly integrated into the system of
international specialization. In this case, Taiwan cannot exploit its competitive advantage
and might thus be trapped in a bottleneck in economic development.197 On the other
hand, as elaborated below, “the political foundation [and legitimacy] for a coherent and
feasible policy [of the Restrictions] is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing
from the Taiwan government’s policy goals”by exit to evade the Restrictions.198
1.2.2 High Enforcement Costs of the Restrictions
1.2.2.1 Pervasive Evasion of the Restrictions
Many Taiwan-invested firms have funneled funds to China through their affiliates or
subsidiaries incorporated in third countries like the Cayman Islands in order to skirt the
investment restrictions, laid down by Taiwan’sgovernment in 1997 subsequent to a wave
of investment in China.199 To be concrete, regardless of these obstacles, Taiwanese
capital, goods, and know-how kept flowing across the Strait, in many cases indirectly via
Hong Kong. Obviously, the investment restrictions urged Taiwanese firms to incorporate
overseas in Hong Kong or other OFCs such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin
Islands(“BVI”). As Sutter finds,
197 Lin, supra note 194, at 70.
198 Szu-Yin Ho & Tse-Kang Leng,Accounting for Taiwan’s Economic Policy toward China, 13 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 733, 733 (2004) (alteration in original).
199 Chyan Yang & Shiu-Wan Hung,Taiwan’s Dilemma across the Strait: Lifting the Ban on Semiconductor 
Investment in China, 43 ASIAN SURV. 681, 682 (2003).
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[t]o skirt equity caps, companies have formed international consortiums of several
players and phased in major investments over time. Ironic situations can result: As
Taiwan’s Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. was breaking ground onits new
integrated circuit facility in the Pudong district of Shanghai in 2000, legislators in
Taipei were still debating whether to ease restrictions on semiconductor investments
in the PRC.200
In sum, to avoid the Restrictions, evasive tactics through international channels that
Taiwanese firms employ not only turn TDI in China underground but also lead to
physical exit of their operation from Taiwan.
We can observe from the illustrations below how underground outward investment
in Mainland China becomes. Even in the face of stringent government regulations, TDI in
China remained vibrant. Table 2 shows the disparate statistics of TDI in China. Two sets
of statistics are shown: one recorded by Taiwan’sgovernment and the other by Chinese
government, both on a prior approval basis. A large disparity exists between these two
statistics. According to Taiwanese statistics, by June 2000 there were a total of 22,475
projects approved to invest in China and a total investment reached $15,598 million. In
the same period 44,915 investment projects were recorded in Chinese statistics while a
total amount of investment arrived at $45,758 million. This suggests that about a half of
Taiwanese investment projects did not obtain the prior-approval from Taiwan’s
government as the law requires. In other words, about half of investments in China by
Taiwanese entrepreneurs have evaded Taiwan’sCapital Controls. Moreover, a tendency
appeared here, showing that even if Taiwan-invested firms did register with Taiwan’s
government they mostly underreported their investment amounts. For instance, the
200 Karen M. Sutter, WTO and the Taiwan Strait: New Considerations for Business, 29 THE CHINA BUS.
REV. 28, 29 (2002).
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amount of investment registered by Taiwan’sgovernment is about one-third of the
amount registered by Chinese government. This suggests that the investment amounts
that Taiwanese firms reported to their government are also under-stated. Although some
of the approved projects have never materialized, the investment figures recorded by the
Chinese government are believed to be closer to the reality.201 Why do the two statistical
sources (the official data both from Taiwan and China) differ that substantially? As Hou
and Zhang argue, the dominant reason for the discrepancy is that the Capital Controls
placed by Taiwan’sgovernment“forced many Taiwanese investors to avoid documenting
their cases to their government.”202
Similar to the above view, Ho and Leng note:
The huge Taiwanese exports to mainland China are driven by the investment
activities of Taiwanese business people. However, a huge gap exists between official
estimation and real investment value to China. According to official statistics from
Taiwan's [MOEA] released in July 2002, the Taiwanese have invested 22.1 billion
US dollar in China since 1992. The mainland Chinese authorities estimate that the
“negotiated value” of Taiwanese investments has reached US$59.9 billion.
According to Huai-Nan Peng, Chairman of the Central Bank of Taiwan, the
accumulated Taiwanese investments to China in the past decade may be around
US$104.5 billion. Peng's estimation reconfirms the huge gap existing between
official data and business activities across the Taiwan Straits. In other words, the
real economic dynamics across the Taiwan Straits come from autonomous actions
from the business community.203
201 Chen & Chu, supra note 182, at 218.
202 Jack W. Hou & Kevin H. Zhang,Taiwan’s Outward Investment in Mainland China, in FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA 182, 186 (Hung-gay Fung & Kevin H.
Zhang eds., 2002).
203 Ho & Leng, supra note 198, at 738 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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We could thus conclude that “most Taiwanese investments projects on Mainland China
are not screened by the Taiwan government,”204 and that “[g]overnmental interventions
from Taiwan play only a marginal role in regulating this unique economic
relationship.”205 Overall, the rampant evasion might demonstrate high enforcement costs
of the Restrictions and their regulatory failure.
1.2.2.2 Regulatory Failure of the Restrictions
To enforce the Capital Controls, Paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the Act states: “Any
individual, juristic person, organization, or other institution of the Taiwan Area permitted
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs may make any investment or have any technology
cooperation in the Mainland Area . . .(emphasis added).” According to Article 86 of the 
Act, any person who makes an investment or has technology cooperation in violation of
the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 35 (i.e. without MOEA’s ex-ante approval) shall
be punished with an administrative fine of not less than NT$50,000 but not more than
NT$25 million. To clarify andidentify what would be “investment in the Mainland Area” 
in the above provisions, MOEA reenacted the Regulations Governing the Approval of
Investment or Technical Cooperation in Mainland China (the “Regulations”)on July 31,
2002. Article 4 of the Regulations stated:
For the purposes of these Regulations, the term “investment in the Mainland Area” 
shall denote any of the following activities by any nationals, legal entity,
organization or other institution in Taiwan Area: 1. Establishing a company or
business entity; 2. Increasing the capital of an existing local company or business
204 Tse-Kang Leng, Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The Role of Private Firms,
38 ASIAN SURV. 494, 501 (1998).
205 Ho & Leng, supra note 198, at 738.
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entity; 3. Acquiring the equity of, and operating, an existing local company or
business entity, but excluding the purchase of stock of a listed company; or 4.
Establishing or expanding the business of a branch company or business entity.
(Paragraph 1) These Regulations shall be applicable to those investments mentioned
above made by any company in a third area in which any national, legal entity,
organization or other institution in Taiwan Area invested while owning a controlling
interest of that company.(Paragraph 2)
Given that Taiwanese parent companies are not permitted to freely shift funds
located in Taiwan to satisfy their branches’ and subsidiaries’ demand in Mainland China, 
many Taiwanese companies or individuals would thus decide to organize a company in a
third area like the Cayman Islands while owning a controlling interest in that company, or
to delegate investment on the Mainland to a company in the same third area.206 Then
those companies established or delegated would directly set up a company in Mainland
China and transfer capital to that company or have that company list shares in Shenzhen
or Shanghai stock market on the Mainland, or would indirectly head for stock exchanges
in the neighboring areas in the Greater Chinese Economy (sometimes also encompassing
Singapore207), HKSE mostly, so as to raise capital there which the parent company in
Taiwan could freely invest in Mainland China.208 Several cases are introduced here to
206 As detailed below in Chapter 3.B.3.1, under the two judgments made byTaiwan’sSupreme
Administrative Court—Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 92 Pan Zi No. 1463 (2005) (Taiwan)
and Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 95 Pan Zi No. 1065 (2006) (Taiwan)—the above two
routes were held to be in violation of Article 4 of the Regulations.
207 Mainland Affairs Council, The Executive Yuan, The Republic of China (Taiwan),
http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/rpir/2nd7_2.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
208 During these years, more than 53 Taiwanese companies through these tactics listed on HKSE and 23 on
Singapore Stock Exchange. Chin-Ho Hsieh, Wan Dian Zai Wang Tai Wan Xin Cai Fu Zao Shan Yun Dong
[Approaching 10,000 Points of Taiwan’s Bourse: Taiwan’s New Orogeny of Wealth], JIN ZHOU KAN [BUS.
TODAY] (Taiwan), July 16, 2007, at 138. Additionally, some Taiwanese companies also directly
incorporated in Mainland China and in turn listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange or the Shanghai Stock
Exchange. Chong Chen [Sean Chen], Tai Min Jin Rong He Zuo Hu Meng Qi Li [The Financial
Cooperation between Taiwan and FuJian Province, PRC Benefits Each Other], MIN ZHONG RI BAO [THE
COMMONS DAILY] (Taiwan), Nov. 4, 2006, www.ettoday.com/2006/11/04/141-2011380.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008).
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exemplify how these Taiwanese companies find their investment avenues into Mainland
China and how Taiwan’s judicial authority treats these tactics.
The First case is Taipei Gaodeng Xingzheng Fayuan [Taipei High Admin. Ct.], 95
Su Zi No. 4266 (2006) (Taiwan). In this case, the defendant MOEA argued that the
plaintiff United Microelectronics Corporation (“UMC”), founded in 1980 as Taiwan's
first semiconductor company and a foundry technology leader and industry leader, by
organizing a holding company in BVI (the “Holding Co.”) and through a succession of
transactions between its subsidiaries, incorporated Hejian Technology (Suzhou) Ltd.
(“Hejian”) in Mainland China, and that UMCthen supplied Hejian with necessary skills
and resources to help Hejian smoothly pass through the start-up stage, for which UMC
received 15 % of the Holding Co.’s share capital in exchange. MOEA deemed that 
without its ex ante approval, UMC’s above conductwas in violation of Paragraph 1 of
Article 4 of theRegulations, which stipulates: “For the purposes of these Regulations, the
term ‘investment in the Mainland Area’shall denote any of the following activities by
any nationals, legal entity, organization or other institution in Taiwan Area: 1.
Establishing a company or business entity . . . .” Consequently, MOEA punished UMC 
with an administrative fine of NT$5 milion. UMC appealed MOEA’s decision to the
Taipei High Administrative Court. This court of appeals held for UMC that by relying
only on documentation provided by the prosecutor indicting UMC’s board chairman and
other two executive employees,209 MOEA did not meet its burden of proving that UMC
209 See also Taiwan HsinChu Difang Fayuan [Taiwan HsinChu Dist. Ct.], 95 Zhu Su Zi No. 1 (2006)
(Taiwan). In this criminal judgment, the district court held that the three defendants, who were the
executive management of UMC, were not guilty owing to lack of evidence that Hejian was given human
capital, customer base, management skills and trade secrets by UMC. Taiwan’s high-tech industry indicated
that this case made salient ilegitimacy of the government’s re-tightening the Capital Controls announced in
the beginning of 2006, as detailed below in Part B.1.2.3 of this chapter. See, e.g., Lian Dian Sheng Su Zhu
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did make an “investment in the Mainland Area” in violation of Paragraph 1 of Article 4
of the Regulations.
The second case is Taipei Gaodeng Xingzheng Fayuan [Taipei High Admin. Ct.], 95
Su Zi No. 3566 (2006) (Taiwan). In this case, the defendant MOEA argued that the
plaintiff An-Hai Ling, a national of Taiwan, by first organizing Cando Investment
Limited (“Cando”) in BVI and then through Cando incorporated ARROW in Shanghai,
PRC, a company specializing in manufacturing TFT-LCD, and that the plaintif’s above 
activities were tantamount to the term “investment in the Mainland Area” in violation of 
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of theRegulations, which provides: “These Regulations shall be
applicable to those investments mentioned above made by any company in a third area in
which any national, legal entity, organization or other institution in Taiwan Area invested
while owning a controlling interest of that company.” In consequence, MOEA punished
the plaintiff with an administrative fine of NT$2 milion. The plaintiff appealed MOEA’s 
decision to the Taipei High Administrative Court. This court of appeals held against
MOEA that failing to submit ARROW’s stock ledger or record but merely relying on
reports bought from private detective agencies expert in acquiring corporate internal
information, MOEA did not meet the burden of proof.210
Ke Ye Jie Ren Dui Chan Ye Da Lu Zheng Ce Ju Zhi Biao Zuo Yong [UMC Wins—High Tech Industry
Deems It a Leading Case against the Government’s Anti-China-Investment Policy], ZHONG GUANG XIN
WEN WANG [BCC NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan), Oct. 27, 2007, http://news.msn.com.tw/print.aspx?id=45087
(last visited Oct. 27, 2007). Although the prosecutors appealed this case, Taiwan High Court, the court of
appeals, still overruled this appeal and held that the prosecutors met no burden of proof of the defendants’ 
criminal conduct. See, e.g. Guo-Ren Zhang, Han Jian An Er Shen Cao Xing Cheng Pan Wu Zui [UMC’s 
Former Chairman of the Board Was Found Not Guilty by the Appeals Court], GONG SHANG SHI BAO
[INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Jan. 1, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page/0,4733,contentx122009010100365,00.html.
210 Also in other two cases, Taipei Gaodeng Xingzheng Fayuan [Taipei High Admin. Ct.], 95 Su Zi No.
1507 (2006) (Taiwan) and Taipei Gaodeng Xingzheng Fayuan [Taipei High Admin. Ct.], 93 Su Zi No. 1063
(2004) (Taiwan), the defendant MOEA could only submit reports bought from these private detective
agencies as evidence to show that the plaintiff individual did “invest in the Mainland Area.” As explained 
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As discussed above, MOEA struggled to enforce the Capital Controls, especially
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Regulations. Nonetheless, at least according to these cases,
we could find that MOEA often failed to submit documentation with sufficient
evidentiary weight, like stock ledgers or records of companies incorporated in a third area
such as the Cayman Islands, but punish those allegedly in violation merely by reports
bought from private detective agencies expert in acquiring corporate internal information.
The courts thus hold against MOEA on the ground of their failure to meet the burden of
proof. In otherwords, the failure of MOEA’s enforcement conspicuously reveals that the 
enforcement cost might be too high in that MOEA does not have the necessary skills and
resources to collect required evidence. Therefore, administrative courts often hold in
favor of fleeing corporations which adopt evasive tactics,due to the government’s failure 
to meet theburden of proof to establish “investment in the Mainland Area.” This fact also
implies that it is not so difficult for Taiwanese companies, especially closely-held
corporations usualy adopted by Taiwan’s smal- and medium-sized enterprises, to
circumvent the Capital Controls if those companies so doing are not required to report all
material activities within their enterprise group under Taiwan’s securities and company
laws.211
As a matter of fact, Taiwan’sgovernment to an extent cannot help but acknowledge
China-investment projects that are already underway via underground channels. As
below, this fact reveals that MOEA, the authority concerned in Taiwanese government’s executive branch,
lacks the required skills and resources to enforce these restrictions on investing in Mainland China.
Apparently, the enforcement cost of the Capital Controls may be too high.
211 See Cheng-Kai Chou, Fang Kuan Dui Zhong Guo Da Lu Tou Zi Jin E Shang Xian Zheng Ce Zhi Yan
Jiu [Research on the Policy of Lifting the Amount Ceiling for China-bound Investment from Taiwan] 123
(Jan. 2008) (unpublished master thesis, Tamkang University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
82
shown in Table 3, numbers in parentheses are investment projects recorded through
make-up registration rather than prior approval. Any jump in official Taiwan investment
figures should thus be considered against unofficial estimates of what has been moving
into the PRC market via offshore structures. For example, in 2002 MOEA issued a
six-month grace period for firms that have illegally invested or entered into technology
cooperation in the PRC, during which they can register with MOEA with no or merely a
trifling fine.212 In March 2008 before the Presidential election, MOEA announced a new
round of make-up registration and attracted considerable registrations by substantially
lowering administrative fines.213 As these outliers in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, and
2008 demonstrate, on the one hand, Taiwan’sgovernment through these “amnesties” 
intends to make Taiwanese firms’ exit to the PRC emerge from underground; on the other
hand, Taiwan’sgovernment, in a sense, recognizes its regulatory failure of Taiwanese
firms’ outward investment in Mainland China.
Moreover, since 1991 Taiwan’s outward investment has initially been concentrating
on countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”). In 1995 the 
investment in ASEAN increased to 62.29% of Taiwan’s overal outward investment.
Afterwards, Taiwan’s investment in China increases gradually while the investment in
ASEAN decreases year by year. In 1995 the investment in China remains only 17.34% of
Taiwan’s overal outward investment.214 Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4, in April
212 Yi-Fu Lin, Bu Zhang Zhi Tai Shang Gong Kai Xin [Public Letter from Minister of MOEA to
China-Based Taiwanese Firms] (June 26, 2002) (on file with author) (calling on Taiwanese firms to conduct
make-up registration).
213 Deng Lu Tou Zi Shang Xian Ke Wang Tan Xing Song Bang Zheng Yuan Da She Tai Shang [The
Investment Caps Are Expected to be Relaxed; the Executive Yuan Will Pardon China-Based Taiwanese
Firms], FAYUAN FA LÜ XIN WEN [LAWBANK’S L. NEWS] (Taiwan), Mar. 6, 2008,
http://www.lawbank.com.tw/fnews/pnews.php?nid=57870.00 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
214 TAIWAN JING JI YAN JIU YUAN [TAIWAN INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH], LIANG AN MAO YI YU
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2008 the accumulative total of investment in Mainland China turns out to be the largest
proportion of Taiwan’s overal outward investment, that is, 55.64%. The second largest 
goes to British Central America with 16.91%. In fact, British Central America points to
tax havens mainly involving BVI and the Cayman Islands. Via these OFCs, Taiwanese
firms indirectly make large investment in Mainland China largely in order to evade the
Capital Controls imposed from 1997, as further discussed in Part B.2.1.1 of this chapter.
Therefore, the real total of investment in Mainland China would exceed 70% of Taiwan’s 
overall outward investment if the percentage of British Central America is added. This
fact further illuminates that Taiwan’sgovernment possesses poor knowledge of the
realities regarding Taiwanese firms’ investment in Mainland China,215 and that Taiwan’s 
economic regulation hardly could completely stem the outflows of Taiwanese capital and
firms. As a matter of fact, Po-Chih Chen, a former chairman of CEPD who helped
President Chen’s administration to carry through the regulatory transition of relaxation
from the NHBP policy to the “Proactive Liberalization with Effective Management” 
policy(the ”PLEM” policy)in 2001, admitted that it was not easy to effectively enforce
the Capital Controls given that Taiwanese firms were able to evade this regulation
through third countries.216 Furthermore, by the time President Chen replaced the NHBP
with his own PLEM policy in September 2001, “many had already invested in the
TOU ZI YING XIANG PING GU BAO GAO [ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE INFLUENCE OF CROSS-STRAIT TRADE
AND INVESTMENT] 20-21 (2007) (Taiwan).
215 The current Taiwan’s SEF Secretary-General Koong-Lian Kao has expressed a similar opinion. See
Koong-Lian Kao, Liang An Jing Mao Zheng He De Qi Dian—Zi You Mao Yi Qu [The Starting Point of
Cross-Strait Economic Integration—Free Trade Area], 2 GUO JIA ZHENG CE LUN TAN [NAT’L PO L’Y F.]
(ISSUE 7) 26, 31 (2002) (Taiwan); also Xue-Yi Tsai [William Tsai], Quan Qiu Hua Yu Liang An Jing Ji
Fa Zhan [The Dynamics and Analyses of Direct Trading Relationships between Taiwan and China], 2 ZHAN
WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT & EXP LORAT ION] 34, 43 (2004) (Taiwan).
216 Po-Chih Chen, Dui Zhong Guo Da Lu Tou Zi De Zheng Ti Ce Lüe [The Integral Strategy of Investment
in Mainland China], 25 TAIWAN JING JI YAN JIU YUE KAN [TAIWAN ECON . RE S . MON TH LY] (ISSUE 4)
137, 141 (2002) (Taiwan).
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Chinese market, disregarding government regulations. To many in the business
community [the PLEM policy] is nothing more than a rationalization of fait accompli, as
it is an open secret that many investors could simply route their money to a third country,
then transfer the fund to China.”217
To put it in a nutshell, the huge gap between Taiwan’s official estimation and
Taiwanese firms’ real investment value to China, on the one hand, reveals that costs of
enforcing the Capital Controls are so high that ineffective enforcement results. This, on
the other hand, emphasizes that Taiwan’s regulatory failure is a consequence of 
Taiwanese firms’ internationalization.218 In particular, the pivotal lesson we can learn is
concerned with the changing role of nation states. The above discussion illustrates that
even if Taiwan has the intention to enforce the Capital Controls as effectively as possible,
it is endowed with little capability for such enforcement. Therefore, despite the strictness
of the Capital Controls, Taiwan’sgovernment possesses few required resources and skills
to implement the regulations, which highlights Taiwan’s predicament that laws alone
cannot carry themselves into practice. For instance, although the huge gap existing
between Taiwan’s official data and business activities across the Strait clearly evidences
that many Taiwanese firms circumvent the Capital Controls, MOEA and other authorities
concerned scarcely succeed in meeting their burden of proof to punish these illegal
activities. That way, the regulatory authority of Taiwan’sgovernment suffers many a
setback. Since Taiwanese firms progressively change into MNCs with the ability of
international planning and management, the Taiwanese government’s substantial 
217 Ho & Leng, supra note 198, at 737-38 (alteration in original).
218 See Leng, supra note 180, at 34.
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intervention in market mechanisms of cross-Strait economic interaction naturally brings
about the salient gap between private activities and government policies.219
Coming up against the Capital Controls and Constraints, Taiwanese companies with
mass investment in Mainland China would thus be unwilling to raise capital in Taiwan
stock markets. Indeed, they need a huge amount of capital to meet financial demand of
their subsidiaries or affiliates in Mainland China. Therefore, they cannot but through the
following similar tactics list their shares in other stock markets in the Greater Chinese
Economy, HKSE among others, so as totake the “exit” option to evade the Restrictions.
1.3 Common Evasive Tactics to List Shares Overseas
As Deng reports, “the total amount of Taiwanese capital flowing into China remains
difficult to estimate. . . . By 1998, the amount of Taiwanese investment approved by
China had reached a formidable $41.11 billion going to 41,455 projects. In monetary
value, Taiwanese investment in China ranked second after Hong Kong at that time.”220
What’s more important is that“investment in China has shifted from labor-intensive, low
value-added and short-term operations to more capital- and technology-intensive
industries with longer investment horizons such as computers, construction equipment,
machinery, and petrochemicals.”221 For instance, Taiwan’s biggest manufacturer of
personal computers (“PC”), Acer Computer, Inc. (“AcerComputers”),222 “has begun to
219 See id. at 37.
220 Deng, supra note 174, at 962.
221 Id. at 963
222 Founded in 1976, Acer Computers ranks as the world's third-largest company for total PC shipments, is
No. 2 for notebooks, and has a global workforce of more than 6,000 employees. See Acer Group,
http://www.acer-group.com/public/The_Group/overview.htm (last visited May 19, 2009).
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manufacture a large number of advanced color monitors in China and half of its capital is
valued as technology transfer.”223 This example means that regardless of Chinese
military intimidation, Taiwan’s Information Technology (“IT”)firms, “over the past two
decades, have continued to sail across the strait for cheaper land and labor.”224
Specifically, in order to enlarge their business or acquire necessary natural and labor
resources in Mainland China, many Taiwanese companies that have listed in Taiwan
stock markets might usually, through companies incorporated in a third area such as the
Cayman Islands, invest in Mainland China indirectly. For fear of being subject to the
Restrictions while avoiding MOEA’s oversight, most of these listed companies might
through spin-offs split their China-based business into another company incorporated in
some OFC, and subsequently have that company list shares in other neighboring stock
markets, not least HKSE.225 In this case, Taiwan lost many excellent companies which
could have listed in Taiwan stock markets. Meanwhile Taiwan should have not lost
relevant business, such as financial services, if these companies had maintained their
head offices at home. This common type of evasive tactics may be regarded as a physical
exit by many China-based Taiwanese companies.
For example, take Hon Hai Precision Industry Company Limited (“Hon Hai“), a 
renowned high-tech company incorporated in Taiwan, to elaborate on a type of these
large companies’ similar routes into Mainland China. According to Global Offering
Prospectus of Foxconn International Holdings Limited (the “Prospectus”), Hon Hai is “a
223 Deng, supra note 174, at 964.
224 Yang & Hung, supra note 199, at 681-82.
225 Ming-Hsuan Lin, Tai Shang Qi Ye Zhi Xiang Gang Shang Shi Zhi Xing Tai Mo Shi Fen Xi [The Model
Analysis of Listing Types in Hong Kong for Taiwan Enterprise] 94-95 (June 2007) (unpublished master
thesis, TamKang University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
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company incorporated on February 20, [1974] under the laws of Taiwan and listed on
Taiwan Stock Exchange,”226 and has “a consolidated turnover of over $11 billion in
2003.”227 Since Hon Hai’s formation, it together with its subsidiaries (the “Hon Hai 
Group”), including the main actor in this story — Foxconn International Holdings
Limited (“FIH”),
has become one of the largest global manufacturing services providers in the
computer, communications and consumer electronics industries. The Hon Hai Group
designs, manufactures and markets connectors and cable assemblies in the computer
and computer peripherals, communications and consumer electronics industries. It
engages in the design, manufacture and marketing of enclosures, principally for
personal computers. Within the Hon Hai Group, [FIH] has specialized in
manufacturing handsets.228
Nevertheless, the Hon Hai Group effectuated the “Restructuring” in early 2004.
Subsequent to the Restructuring, FIH, having become an independent stand-alone
company, owns 100% of the business of handset manufacturing services, which is mainly
based in Mainland China but previously owned by Hon Hai. That is, since the
Restructuring, FIH has separated its production and management from that of Hon Hai
while developing client relationships independently of Hon Hai.229
Moreover, the majority of FIH’s assets are located in the PRC, Hungary and Mexico
while only a handful of its remaining assets are located in Taiwan.230 In other words,
before FIH was spun off from Hon Hai, Hon Hai had had a need to freely shift funds
226 GLOBAL OFFERING PROSPECTUS OF FOXCONN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED 15 (Jan. 24, 2005),
http://main.ednews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20050124/LTN20050124000.htm (alteration in original).
227 Id. at 2.
228 Id. at 93 (alteration in original).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 10, 41.
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raised in Taiwan stock markets in order to satisfy FIH’s financial demand in Mainland 
China but was not permitted so under the Constraints. Furthermore, it was not feasible for
Hon Hai’s overseas subsidiaries based in Mainland China to list their shares in Taiwan
stock markets due to the Constraints. Therefore, for the expansion of the capacity of
FIH’s existing production facilities in Mainland China, Hon Hai cannot but opt, through a 
succession of transactions between its subsidiaries incorporated in the Cayman Islands, to
incorporate FIH at the same place, to which Hon Hai transferred relevant production,
management and clients with respect to the handset business while indirectly owning a
controlling interest in FIH. Then FIH established its head office in Shenzhen, Guangdong,
PRC231 and headed for HKSE to raise capital which could freely be utilized in Mainland
China. As commentators maintain, all of Hon Hai’stactics are arguably to evade
Taiwan’s Capital Controls and Constraints.232 This, nonetheless, results in the physical
exit of Hon Hai’s nearly entire handset business from Taiwan. Accordingly, even if many
China-based Taiwanese companies desire to keep their head offices in Taiwan while
expanding their business in Mainland China, the Restrictions apparently discourage them
from doing so. At the very least, a Taiwanese corporate group could, though, avoid the
Capital Controls and Constraints by possessing an independent subsidiary incorporated
offshore with the ability to freely raise funds overseas to satisfy financial need of
expansion or operation in China.
231 Id. at 58.
232 See e.g., Lin, supra note 225, at 95; Chou, supra note 211, at 118; Jerry G. Fong, Chu Zou Taiwan Yuan
Li Mei Guo—Cong Ri Yue Guang An Kan Tai Shang Chu Zou Chao [Exi t ing from Taiwan and
Leaving the United States: On Trends of Taiwanese Firms’ Exit in Light of the Incident of
ASE Group ] , 611 NENG LI ZA ZHI [LE ARN ING & DEV. ] 96 , 99-100 (2007) (Taiwan); Zhao-Ming
Wu, Tai Zi Qi Ye Yu Da Lu Ji Xiang Gang Shang Shi De Yan Jiu—Yi Xiang Guan Ge An Yan Jiu Wei Li
[The Study of Public Listing on the China and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges for Taiwan-Based
Companies—Related Case Study] 101 (July 2006) (unpublished master thesis, National Chengchi
University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
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Once waves of large Taiwanese companies list their shares on HKSE, the proportion
of these issuers’ aggregate value to that of al listed firms on HKSE will thus increase.
What follows is that international investors would appreciate more and more highly the
stocks of these Taiwan-invested firms which are incorporated in OFCs and based in
China. For instance, investors started to classify China-based Taiwanese businesses listed
on HKSE as “T-Share.” If T-Share group becomes bigger and bigger, international
investors intending to share China’s economic development wil buy these T-Shares. In
Hon Hai’s case, Hon-Hai spun off its handset business, which is one of its core
competencies, into FIH, and had FIH list shares on HKSE. Since FIH is growing faster
than Hon-Hai, foreign investors may purchase more FIH shares than those of Hon-Hai on
Taiwan Stock Exchange (“TWSE”)instead. Because Hon Hai’s shares are TWSE’s 
value-weighted stocks, if HonHon’s stock price declinesaccordingly, TWSE stock index
may be forced to run down as well. Supposing that more and more large Taiwanese listed
companies, under the cluster effect, would through tactics similar to Hon Hai’s 
Restructuring have their China-based overseas subsidiaries listed on HKSE, because the
stock price of Taiwanese parent companies might fall, the outlook of the TWSE stock
index would also be gloomy.233
2. The Supply Side of the Law Market
2.1 Mainly Selling Legal Flexibility, Rather than Legal Bonding
233 See Chia-Chen Lee, Tai Zi Qi Ye Zai Xiang Gang Shang Shi Wen Ti Zhi Yan Xi [A Study on the Issue of
Taiwanese Enterprises Listing in Hong Kong], 8 JING JI YAN JIU [ECON. RES.] 357, 371-73 (2008) (Taiwan).
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As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the bonding explanation of
cross-listing. Under this dominant explanation, cross-listing firms are seeking stronger
laws.234 To name a few, John Coffee presents the thesis that “although the cross-listing
decision involves a complex interaction of bonding, signaling, self-selection, and reduced
informational asymmetry, the overall evidence supports the ‘bonding hypothesis’and
suggests that U.S.’s greater emphasis on enforcement reduces informational asymmetry
and gives it a lower cost of equity capital.”235 He also asserts that “one legal
variable—the level of enforcement—does distinguish jurisdictions in a manner that can
explain national differences in the cost of capital (especially between common law and
civil law countries) . . . .”236 Nonetheless, in Taiwan’s case, it seems that China-based
Taiwanese businesses spurn exchanges at home and choose to go public in other
neighboring stock markets, especially HKSE, not mainly to opt into the laws thereof and
to bond their insiders given the “bonding” hypothesis, but rather to “avoid” the 
Restrictions.
As shown in Table 5237, JP Morgan has made an assessment of listing merits among
TWSE, HKSE, and the U.S. stock exchanges in 13 indices. Some may think this report
appears to support a bonding hypothesis that Taiwanese firms flock to list on HKSE just
because Investor Protection of HKSE is better than that of TWSE where Investor
Protection in the former is evaluated as high whereas the latter is medium. Nevertheless,
234 Ribstein, supra note 51, at 104.
235 John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 3 (Columbia Law & Econ.
Working. Paper No. 304, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=967482.
236 Id. at 6.
237 Table 5 is cited from: SHI JIE ZONG HE YAN JIU ZHONG XIN GU FEN YOU XIAN GONG SI [ACCUMIND
RESEARCH, INC.], CONG TAI SHANG HAI WAI SHANG SHI KAN TAIWAN ZI BEN SHI CHANG GUO JI HUA
ZHUAN TI YAN JIU BAO GAO [THE PROJECT REPORT ON THE INTERNALIZATION OF TAIWAN’S CAPITAL
MARKETS IN LIGHT OF LISTING OVERSEAS BY TAIWANESE FIRMS] 28 (2007) [hereinafter
Internationalization] (Taiwan).
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the differences between TWSE and HKSE do not appear to be that large: When it comes
to the U.S., Listing Requirements and Disclosure Requirements are both “strict” while 
Investor Protection, Listing Cost and Expenditure, and Visibility in International Markets
are “high.” Compared with the U.S., both TWSE and HKSE are inferior in a similar 
manner.238
As Litvak notes, “cross-listing has important costs (compliance with stricter
governance and accounting rules; exposure to the threat of shareholder litigation, which is
common in the United States and rare elsewhere, and so on).”239 In comparing listing
costs among TWSE, HKSE, the Singapore Stock Exchange and China’s two stock 
markets, a famous senior partner in Taiwan’s branch of KPMG (one of the top four
global accounting firms) has said that the listing cost in Taiwan, including listing fees,
underwriting fees, tax, attorney fees, accountant fees and time cost, is the lowest.240
Another research paper indicates that the listing cost of HKSE is four or five times that of
TWSE.241
The fact that Taiwanese firms listed in Hong Kong despite higher costs, and surged
to list back in Taiwan after the Capital Controls were considerably lightened in 2008 as
discussed below in Part A.2.3 of this chapter indicates that the securities regulation in
238 Id. at 27.
239 Litvak, supra note 131, at 1862.
240 SONG-QI TSAI [EDWARD TSAI], SHANG SHI GUI ZHI TONG CHE: LIANG AN SAN DI JI XIN JIA PO SHANG
SHI SHI YONG ZHI NAN [ATHROUGH TRAIN TO GO PUBLIC: PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR LISTING IN CHINA,
HONG KONG, TAIWAN OR SINGAPORE] 264-65 (2008) (Taiwan). See also Chia-Chen Lee, Tai Zi Qi Ye Zai
Da Lu Shang Shi Wen Ti Zhi Tan Tao [A Study on the Problems of Stock Market Listing by Taiwan-Invested
Firms in Mainland China], 4 JING JI YAN JIU [ECON. RES.] 157, 173-74 (2003) (Taiwan); Li-Jun Hong, Tai
Zi Qi Ye Zai Da Lu Zheng Quan Shi Chang Fa Xing Shang Shi Zhi Tan Tao [The Research on Listing in
China’s Stock Markets by Taiwanese Firms] 164 (June 2007) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, National
University of Kaohsiung) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Internationalization, supra note 237, at 74.
241 Lee, supra note 233, at 364.
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Hong Kong might not be meaningfully stricter or otherwise significantly different (except
for the Capital Controls)242 than that in Taiwan when Taiwanese firms considered listing
shares in Taiwan or Hong Kong prior to the relaxation in 2008. In concrete terms,
according to Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu in Taiwan (one of the top four global accounting
firms), since the relaxation of the Capital Controls occurring in the second half of 2008
through October 9, 2009, a record 34 Taiwan-invested offshore corporations have
initiated or completed the procedures to list shares back in Taiwan. Among them, 29
firms intend to apply for doing IPOs (they would be Primary Listing Issuers).243 From
the relaxation in question until November 13, 2009, 10 Taiwanese offshore firms mostly
listed in Hong Kong have applied for listing TDRs (they would be Secondary Listing
Issuers); most of them are China-based.244 Among them, Taiwan Ting Hsing Group
(whose Master Kang-brand instant noodles have been a great success in China) is the
largest food and drinks manufacturer in the Greater Chinese Economy. It has had its
overseas holding company, Tingyi (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp., list shares in
242 See Tai-San Ciou & Jung-Pao Kang, Hai Wai Tai Shang Ru He Zai Taiwan Shang Shi Gui? [How Do
Overseas Taiwanese Firms List Shares in Taiwan?], 349 GUAN LI ZA ZHI [MGMT. MAG. ] 54, 54-55
(2003) (Taiwan) (arguing that compared with other stock exchanges in China, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Malaysia, Taiwan stock markets would be Taiwanese firms’ best option for listing shares if the Capital
Controls and Constraints could be further liberalized in the future).
243 Xin-Ren Wang, Qin Ye Qian Zheng Tai Shang Hui Tai Shang Shi Ju Di Yi [Deloitte Stays Top in
Granting Certification to Taiwanese Firms Listing Shares Back in Taiwan], GONG SHANG SHI BAO
[INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050709+122009100900351,00.ht
ml.
244 Jia-Qi Zhang, Tai Shang Sheng Ma Ding Shen Qing Fan Tai Fa Xing TDR [Sandmartin Applies for
Listing TDRs Back in Taiwan], ZHONG GUANG XIN WEN WANG [BCC NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan), Oct. 31,
2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,130508+132009103100566,00.html;
Shu-Yi Wang, Kang Shi Fu Shen Qing Hui Tai Fa Xing TDR [Master Kang Applies for Listing TDRs Back
in Taiwan], ZHONG SHI DIAN ZI BAO [CHINA TIMES DAILY NEWS] (Taiwan), Nov. 3, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,130508+132009110300646,00.html;
Rui-Yi Zhang & Jing-Wen Zhang, Qi Jing Quang Dian Shen Qing Di Yi Shang Shi [Himax Technologies,





Hong Kong since 1996 and has so far become the Taiwan-invested HKSE-listed
company with the largest market value and profitability. It made an application for listing
its TDR on TWSE on November 2, 2009245 and has already listed TDRs on December 16,
2009.246 In addition, no major amendment to Taiwan’s securities laws has been made in 
this post-relaxation period. Since the bonding effect provided by Taiwan stock markets
stays constant, as Taiwanese investment banks247, TWSE248, Investment Commission of
MOEA249 argue, the moderation of the Capital Controls, to a great extent, contributes to
the current craze of offshore Taiwanese firms listing back in Taiwan.250 In other words,
the remarkable rise in the listing-back rate up to now likely reflects the relaxation of the
245 Tingyi (Cayman Islands) Holding Corp., Filing of the Application for the Listing of Taiwan Depositary
Receipts (Nov. 2009), http://www.masterkong.com.cn/InvestorInformationen/Circulars/ (last visited Nov.
10, 2009); Jia-Qi Zhang, Kang Shi Fu Fan Tai Fa TDR Shi Pin Qu Jiao Hao [Master Kang Went Home to
List TDRs, Food Stocks Rally], ZHONG GUANG XIN WEN WANG [BCC NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan), Nov. 3,
2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,130508+132009110300885,00.html.
246 Xiu-Yun Cao, Kang Shi Fu TDR Shi Er Yue Shi Qi Ri Gua Pai [Master Kang TDRs Will Be Listed on
December 17], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Nov. 18, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050802+112009111800387,00.ht
ml.
247 Zong-Tong Wang & Zong-Zhi Liu, Gui Yu Fan Xiang TDR Re Tai Gang Shi Chang Da Fan Pan
[Listing TDRs Back in Taiwan like the Return of Spawning Salmon, The Game Has Been Changed between
Taiwan and Hong Kong Stock Markets], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 12, 2009,
available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050802+112009101200151,00.ht
ml; Zong-Tong Wang , Liang An Hong Li Tai Gu Jiang Cheng Ya Tai“Na Si DaKe”[The Restrictions on
Cross-Strait Exchange HaveBeen Relaxed, TWSE Would Become the Asia Pacific “NASDAQ,”], ZHONG
GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 12, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050802+112009101200152,00.ht
ml.
248 Zong-Zhi Liu, Tai Shang Hui Tai Shang Shi Ma Zheng Fu Ji Ji Tui Dong [The Ma Administration
Aggressively Attracts Taiwanese Firms to List Shares Back in Taiwan], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINATIMES]
(Taiwan), Apr. 16, 2009, at A5; Jia-Qi Zhang, Wang Wang TDR Xiao Ying Si Yue Fen You San Jia Tai Shang
Shen Qing Fan Tai Gua Pai [The Efect of Want Want China’s TDR: 3 Taiwanese Firms Apply for Listing 
Shares Back in Taiwan this April], ZHONG GUANG XIN WEN WANG [BCC NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan), May.
1, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,130508+132009050100851,00.html.
249 Song Bang Deng Lu Shang Xian Liu Shi Er Jia Tai Shang Ni Hui Tai Shang Shi Gui [The Upper Limits
on Investment in Mainland China Are Relaxed, 62 Taiwanese Firms Plan to List Shares Back in Taiwan],
TAIWAN XIN SHENG BAO [TSSDNEWS] (Taiwan), Feb. 5, 2009, at 2.
250 See also Tai Shang Fan Xiang Gua Pai Shang Ji Wu Xian [Taiwanese Firms’ Listing Back in Taiwan 
Brings Much Business], DA LU TAI SHANG 1000 DA: TAI SHANG JIN HUA LUN [TOP 1000 CHINA-BASED
TAIWANESE FIRMS: THE EVOLUTIONISM OF TAIWANESE FIRMS], June 12, 2009, at 153-55 (Taiwan).
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Capital Controls which previously had left listing shares in Taiwan a worse choice than in
Hong Kong. This fact indirectly evidences that the quality of the mandatory disclosure
law and enforcement regime of the Hong Kong stock market neither is significantly better
than those of Taiwan stock markets nor matters in the competition for cross-listing
business, and that when Taiwanese firms considered listing shares in Taiwan or Hong
Kong before the relaxation in 2008, the determinant affecting their decisions would likely
be primarily to avoid the Capital Controls, rather than to bond their insiders. Therefore,
it’s difficult to jump to the conclusion that China-based Taiwanese firms spurn stock
exchanges at home and choose to go public in other neighboring stock markets,
especially HKSE, mainly in order to opt into the laws thereof and to bond their insiders
according to the bonding hypothesis.
What’s more, according to Taiwanese scholars’ empirical studies explicated below,
the trend that many Taiwanese firms list shares on HKSE during recent years can be
primarily attributed to the fact that they cannot but avoid the Capital Controls and
Constraints and then buy regulatory products of legal flexibility which HKSE and other
stock markets in the Greater Chinese Economy can sell. In this case, they would rather
trade the higher costs of listing incurred in the short term for the legal flexibility to use
funds raised in neighboring stock markets, which would offer the long-term reward of
investment in Mainland China. In other words, it is more likely the Capital Controls,
rather than legal bonding, that drove the choice of Hong Kong or Taiwan listing markets
prior to the relaxation in 2008 as discussed below.
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In a case study on Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (“Taiwan Mayer”),the General
Manager of Taiwan Mayer was interviewed for reasons why it followed a pattern similar
to Hon Hai’s Restructuring to have its Mainland subsidiary, Mayer Holdings, list shares 
on HKSE. To begin with, Taiwan Mayer is the first specialized manufacturer of steel
pipes and tubular products in Taiwan. Since its founding in 1959, Taiwan Mayer has been
devoted to the production and selling of high-quality steel pipes and tubes and has also
built up a powerful distribution network to ensure its market share leadership. In April
1993, Taiwan Mayer went public on TWSE. In 1997, Taiwan Mayer, through a
succession of offshore transactions, established Guangzhou Mayer in Mainland China.
Guangzhou Mayer has received wide recognition and support from clients, with its
products already reaching Eastern and Central China markets with great success. On
October 9, 2003, Taiwan Mayer incorporated Mayer Holdings in the Cayman Islands to
hold a majority of shares of Guangzhou Mayer. On June 21, 2004, Mayer Holdings went
public on HKSE.251 Taiwan Mayer’s General Manager suggested that factors such as
legal bonding cannot be responsible for the key underlying reason that Mayer Holdings
listed shares on HKSE. He indicated that the primary cause for Mayer Holdings to list on
HKSE was to find a stock market where they can use raised capital without being subject
to the Restrictions.252 He added that even though Mayer Holdings was listed on HKSE,
they were still unfamiliar with Hong Kong law and regulations, and that if Taiwan’s
government had not imposed the Capital Controls and Constraints, Taiwan Mayer would
251 See Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation, http://www.mayer.com.tw/about/about-english.htm (last visited May
20, 2009); Cui-Huang Weng, Tai Shang Zai Xiang Gang Shang Shi Yu Hui Tai Shang Shi Wen Ti Zhi Tan
Tao [The Discussion on Issues of Taiwanese Enterprises’Listing Shares in Hong Kong and Back in Taiwan]
79-80 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished master thesis, National Chengchi University) (on file with author)
(Taiwan).
252 Id. at 86-87.
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not have had Mayer Holdings list shares overseas.253 This case study led to a conclusion
that the principal cause for Taiwanese listed companies to have their Mainland
subsidiaries or affiliates list share overseas, rather than in Taiwan, was the Capital
Controls and Constraints.254 This conclusion was also confirmed by a study conducting
in-depth interviews with TWSE, a leading Taiwaneseinvestment bank’s branch in Hong 
Kong, the Taiwanese branch of Ernst & Young (one of the top four global accounting
firms), and five Taiwan-invested firms which either listed shares in Taiwan, Hong Kong
or Mainland China, or were considering where to go public.255
253 Id. at 89.
254 Id. at 97.
255 Shu-Min Li, Tai Shang Hui Tai Shang Shi Wen Ti Ji Jie Jue Fang An Zhi Tan Tao [The Analysis of
Initial Public Offering Problems and Solutions of Returning Taiwan to Listing Security for Taiwan
Overseas Companies] 78-79, 91-92 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished master thesis, National Chung Hsing
University) (on file with author) (Taiwan). Not a few commentators come to similar conclusions as well.
See, e.g., Sen-Ying Qiu, Da Lu Tai Shang Hui Tai Shang Shi Gui Huan Jing Zhi Yan Jiu [The Analysis of
the Environment for Listing Shares Back in Taiwan by China-Based Taiwanese Firms] 71 (May 2003)
(unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology) (on file with author)
(Taiwan); Yu-Chen Ling, Wai Guo Qi Ye Lai Tai Shang Shi Gui Wen Ti Zhi Yan Xi [A Study on the
Problems of Public Listing by Foreign Enterprises in Taiwan], 4 JING JI YAN JIU [ECON. RES.] 135, 145,
149-50 (2003) (Taiwan); Horng-Ming Tsai, Da Lu Zheng Quan Shi Chang Fa Zhan Dui Liang An Jing Mao
Zhi Ying Xiang [The Impact of the PRC's Stock Market Developments on Cross -Strait
Economic Interactions ] , 5 ZHAN WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT & EXPLORAT ION] ( ISSUE 1) 54,
68 (2007) (Taiwan); Town-Shine Wu, Taiwan Qi Ye Hai Wai Chou Zi Zhi Yan Jiu—Jian Lun Hai Wai
Taiwan Qi Ye [A Study on Overseas Fundraising by Taiwanese Enterprises: With Discussion on
Fundraising by Overseas Taiwanese Enterprises in Taiwan] 67-68, 114, 120 (July 2008) (unpublished
master thesis, National Taiwan University) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Wu, supra note 232, at 100-01;
Yong-Kang Wang, Da Lu Tai Shang Qi Ye Shang Shi Jue Ce Yin Su Fen Xi—Ge An Zhe Jiang Guo Xiang
Zhi Leng Gong Ye Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si [The Analysis of Factors for Decision-Making in IPOs by
China-Based Taiwanese Firms—A Case Study on Zhejiang King Refrigeration Industry Co., Ltd], at 2 (of
Chapter 5) (Jan. 2004) (unpublished master thesis, National Chengchi University) (on file with author)
(Taiwan); YA-HUI YANG & XIAO-TIAN LONG, ZI BEN SHI CHANG FA ZHAN YU TAIWAN QI YE CHOU ZI ZHI
FEN XI [THE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND TAIWANESE FIRMS’FINANCING]
60 (2004) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Zai-Dong Zhao, Tai Shang Qi Ye Zai Da Lu Shang Shi Zhi Ke
Xing Xing Yan Jiu [The Feasibility Study of Entering China Stock Markets for Taiwanese Enterprises] 49,
71 (June 2006) (unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology) (on file
with author) (Taiwan); Chou, supra note 211, at 107-08; Hong-Yuan Chang, Tai Shang Fu Gang Shang Shi
Yu Qi Ke Neng Zhi Ying Xiang [The Influence on Taiwan Enterprise IPO in Hongkong Stock Market], 5
ZHAN WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT & EXP LORAT ION ] ( ISSUE 12) 11, 11 (2007) (Taiwan);
Research Department, Supervision of Markets Division, The Securities and Futures Commission, Hong
Kong Consolidates its Role as a Fund-raising Platform for the Greater China Region with Increased
Listing of Taiwanese Companies 5 (May 2008),
www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/research/research/RS%20Paper%2040.pdf (hereinafter Platform) (last visited Dec.
1, 2009) (H.K.); CHU-CHIA LIN, CHONG HUI JING JI GAO DIAN: LIANG AN JING MAO YU TAIWAN WEI LAI
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Moreover, from July 2006 to January 2007, a research team led by I-Ru Liu, a
former legislator in Taiwan and also an adjunct professor of finance in National Taiwan
University, (“I-Ru Liu Team”) made research into the reasons for Taiwanese companies 
to list shares overseas. They held three large conferences with scholars, industries,
government officials and professionals. They surveyed Taiwanese companies and
investment banks by questionnaires. They also extensively interviewed a foreign
investment bank and a domestic one respectively, both of which have experiences to
guide and counsel listing shares overseas by Taiwanese companies. Although there are
other reasons for Taiwanese companies to list overseas, the team concludes that the
policy and direct reason is that the Capital Controls and Constraints compel
Taiwan-invested companies to list overseas. Specifically, China-based Taiwanese
businesses wish to expand their markets in Mainland China. If they list shares in Taiwan
stock markets, the capital raised cannot be used freely for investments in China.
Encountering the Capitals Control and Constraints, they are forced to avoid the regulation
and list shares overseas. For these Taiwanese firms with large investment needs in
Mainland China, HKSE provides them with a capital-raising venue where they can at
liberty use the capital raised to invest in China.256 To put it in another way, Taiwan stock
[COMING BACK TO AN ECONOMIC CLIMAX: CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
TAIWAN] 148 (2008) (Taiwan) (arguing that the Capital Controls and Constraints have driven Taiwanese
firms with heavy investment in China to be listed on HKSE even if listing costs are higher in Hong Kong
than in Taiwan, in the sense that the capital raised in Taiwan cannot be freely used for investments in China
due to the Restrictions).
256 Internationalization, supra note 237, at 85-86. Many other commentators also arrive at the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Ya-Hui Yang, Gong Si Shang Shi Gui Ying Xiang Yin Su Yu Guo Ji Ban Yuan Jing
[Factors Affecting Firms’Listing and the Vision for International Listings], 34 QUAN QIU TAI SHANG E JIAO
DIAN [THE E-FOCUS OF GLOBAL TAIWANESE FIRMS] (Sep. 6, 2005), http://twbusiness.nat.gov.tw/; JUNG-PAO
KANG, TAI SHANG QI YE JIU DI SHANG SHI YIN YING CE LÜE ZHI YAN JIU [THE RESEARCH ON RESPONSIVE
STRATEGIES OF LOCAL LISTINGS BY TAIWANESE FIRMS] 160-61(2003) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Tsai,
supra note 240, at 237, 274; I-Ming Chang, Da Lu Tai Shang Yu Guo Nei Shang Shi (Gui) Ke Xing Xing
Yan Jiu— Yi Taiwan Zi Ben Shi Chang Wei Li [The Study of Taiwanese Enterprises in Mainland China
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markets should have been China-based Taiwanese firms’ best listing option to raise funds 
for investments in China. But due to the Capital Controls and Constraints, HKSE turns
out to be the second best choice in the sense that it provides a listing product of legal
flexibility for investing raised funds in any purpose as Taiwanese firms themselves see
fit.257
Furthermore, there exists another study to interview two Taiwanese companies
having been listed in TWSE. Both of them build plants in China mainly in order to lower
manufacturing costs and cultivate huge local consumer markets. They both, through
evasive tactics like the Restructuring of Hon Hai, have their subsidiaries list on HKSE.
Their decisions are based on the ground that expansion in production in China requires
more funds but parent companies in Taiwan are subject to the Capital Controls and
Constraints so that they have no other choice but to list shares on such a neighboring
stock exchange as HKSE to raise necessary funds.258
Launching IPO at Taiwan Securities Market] 93, 95-96 (June 2004) (unpublished master thesis, National
Chiao Tung University) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Lee, supra note 233, at 376; Chun Min Huang,
Taiwan Yu Xiang Gang Zi Ben Shi Chang Zhi Jing Zheng Tai Shi—Jian Lun Cheng Xiao Shou Xu Fei Zhi
Cha Yi [To Evaluate the Competition between Taiwan and Hong Kong Capital Market and Follow Up the
Comparison of the Management Fee] 59, 63 (June 2007) (unpublished master thesis, National Sun Yat-sen
University) (on file with author) (Taiwan); Fong, supra note 232, at 98-99; Jung-Pao Kang, Liang An San
Di Zai Na Li IPO? [Where to do IPOs among Cross Tri-Regional Securities Markets], 362 GUAN LI ZA ZHI
[MGMT. MAG. ] 30, 34 (2004) (Taiwan); Lin, supra note 225, at 8, 89; Xiupo Wu, Zhong Guo Wang
Wang Wei He Cong Xin Jia Po Dao Xiang Gang Shi Chang Shang Shi ? [Why Did Want Want China
Choose to Be Listed in Hong Kong Instead of Singapore?], GUO JI RONG ZI [INT’L FINANCING], June 2008,
at 45 (P.R.C.); Jianhua Wang, Xian Zhi Tai Duo Zheng Ju Bu Wen Xin Xin Bu Zu Tai Shang Bei Po Fu Gang
Shang Shi [Too Many Restrictions, Unstable Politics and Lack of Confidence Forced Taiwanese Businesses
to Be Listed in Hong Kong], TAI SHENG [VOICE OF TAIWAN], Sep. 2004, at 52 (P.R.C.) (quoting General
Manager of the Hong Kong subsidiary of a Taiwanese leading investment bank as saying that the greatest
advantage to list shares in Hong Kong lies in the legal flexibility to use the raised funds as compared with
that in Taiwan).
257 See Kun-Yuan Xu, Liang An San Di Tai Shang Chou Zi Ping Gu Zhi Yan Jiu [IPO and SPO for Taiwan
Enterprise in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan] 144, 162, 164, 168-69 (Jul. 2006) (unpublished master thesis,
National Chengchi University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
258 Hung-Huei Liao, Tai Shang Xuan Ze Taiwan Huo Xiang Gang Gu Piao Shang Shi Zhi Yan Jiu
[Research of Taiwanese Enterprise’s View in Deciding a Listing between Taiwan and Hong Kong Stock 
Markets] 55-66 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University) (on file with author)
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The last empirical study involves interviews of three other Taiwanese companies, H,
Y and S, all of which invest in Mainland China. H, a company having listed shares on
TWSE, plans to have its subsidiary in China list shares on HKSE given that listing shares
in Taiwan stock markets is subject to the Capital Controls and Constraints. Y, a company
having been listed on the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market in Taiwan, plans to have its 
subsidiary list on Shanghai Stock Exchange in China given the problem associated with
the Capital Controls and Constraints. S, a parent company having invested in China,
intends to list its own shares in Taiwan first, because of complications in its industry and
its business strategy. Nevertheless, S still worries about future obstacles created by the
Capital Controls and Constraints.259
In sum, the jurisdictional competition in primary listing markets in the Greater
Chinese Economy is not strictly comparable to the U.S. cross-listing (secondary listing or
dual listing) markets. Nonetheless, competition for primary listings among these stock
markets also leads to a law market in which Taiwanese firms with mass investment in
Mainland China can select a regulatory product without being subject to the Restrictions,
or instead of exposing themselves to regulatory burdens imposed by Taiwan’s
government. These stock markets supply these China-based Taiwanese businesses with
regulatory products of legal flexibility to use raised capital at liberty. Therefore,
Taiwanese firms went public on HKSE, among others, like a torrent prior to the
(Taiwan). See also Chen-Min Hsu, Jian Li Taiwan Cheng Wei Ya Tai Zi Chan Guan Li Zhong Xin Yu Chou
Zi Zhong Xin Zhi Fen Xi (Shang) [The Analysis of Establishing the Center for Asia-Pacific Asset
Management and Financing in Taiwan—Part I], 114 QUAN QIU TAI SHANG E JIAO DIAN [THE E-FOCUS OF
GLOBAL TAIWANESE FIRMS] (Oct. 14, 2008), http://twbusiness.nat.gov.tw/.
259 Yi-Qing Ye, Tai Shang Gua Pai Zhi Dong Ji Yu Hui Tai Shang Shi Mo Shi Tan Tao [The Research on
Taiwanese Firms’ Motivations to List Shares and Models of Listing Back in Taiwan] 93-116 (Jul. 20, 2006)
(unpublished master thesis, Soochow University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
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considerable lightening of the Capital Controls and Constraints in 2008. The physical exit
or threats of exit regarding listing shares overseas thus activated the interest group
competition in Taiwan’s political marketplaceover whether and how to relax the
Restrictions.
2.2 Interest Group Competition to Seek Deregulation
Accordingly, the demand side of the law market, in the first place, sparks
competition for the supply by neighboring stock markets like HKSE of a primary-listing
legal environment without being subject to the Capital Controls and Constraints. The exit
of Taiwanese companies seeking to avoid the Restrictions creates overwhelming costs but
little benefit for anti-regulatory and exit-affected interest groups in Taiwan. Therefore,
the physical exit and threats of exit drive those directly or indirectly affected by the
Restrictions to voice their petition for relaxation of the Restrictions not only for
themselves but also on behalf of exiting firms to an extent. The anti-regulatory interest
groups include China-based Taiwanese firms represented by local chambers of
commerce260 as well as even foreign investors mostly represented by the European
Chamber of Commerce Taipei (“ECCT”)261 and American Chamber of Commerce in
260 For example, two major players in Taiwan are the Chinese National Federation of Industries (“CNFI”) 
and the GeneralChamber of Commerce of the R.O.C. (“ROCCOC”). The former is “a non-profit
organization consisting of 152 member associations in their respective fields of manufacturing industry in
the Republic of China. With each member association representing its specific line of manufacturing, all the
associations together stand for more than 100,000 industrial companies in this country.”CNFI,
http://www.cnfi.org.tw/kmportal/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Rcg=100020&Part=ENGLISH-homepage (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009). The latter is also“a non-profit organization of leading commercial chambers, trade
associations in the Republic of China (Taiwan). It was founded on Nov.1, 1946 mainly to represent the
interests of Taiwanese business community . . . .”ROCCOC, http://www.roccoc.org.tw/english/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009).
261 Tsai, supra note 255, at 68-69 (citing a report issued by ECCT in October 2007 that the Capital
Controls also drove European firms to exit from Taiwan’s markets since Taiwanese firms with whom they
cooperated were so restrained that they had no other option but to dissolve their strategic alliances).
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Taipei (“AmCHam”).262 These anti-regulatory interest groups are all directly burdened
by the Restrictions and thus promote ease of the regulation.263 The anti-regulatory
interest groups’ voice appears to be so strong that some legislators 264 and even
government officials of the former ruling party DPP came out in support of them as
well.265
Since Taiwan’s economy highly relies on foreign trade and investment, foreign
investors are interesting examples of anti-regulatory interest groups which merit
highlighting here. In general, foreign firms trust Taiwanese companies’ business 
reputation and the better-governed legal environment (e.g. intellectual property protection)
262 See, e.g., Dao Nei Gong Shang Jie Ji Wai Shang Hu Yu Tai Dang Ju Ying Song Bang Liang An Jing Mao
Zheng Ce [LocalIndustries and Foreign Businesses Appeal to Taiwan’s Government for Loosening Limits 
on Investment in the Mainland], ZHONG XIN SHE [CHINA NEWS SERVICE] (P.R.C.), Dec. 4, 2005,
http://big.china.com.cn/chinese/TCC/1050949.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); Yen-Po Tang, Liang An Jing
Mao Fa Zhan Qu Shi Yu Zhan Wang [The Developmental Trend and Outlook of Cross-Strait Trade], 5 ZHAN
WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT & EXP LORAT ION] 20, 34 (2007) (Taiwan) (describing that both ECCT
and AmCHam keenly called on Taiwan’s government to promote stronger economic ties with
China—otherwise Taiwan would lose its competitiveness).
263 See Rian He Wan Bao: Ri Yue Guang Shi Jian Xuan Gao Bian Zheng Fu Zhi Zheng Shi Bai [United
Evening News: The ASE Case Demonstrates the Failure of the Chen Administration’s Policy on 
Mainland-Investment Restrictions], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (P.R.C.), Nov. 28, 2006,
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14811/14872/5100043.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); Guan Zhi Tai Yan
Taiwan Fang Di Chan Ye Cu Dang Ju Fang Kuan Deng Lu Men Kan [Taiwan’s Real Estate Industry 
Appeals for Loosening Limits on Investment in the Mainland], ZHONG XIN SHE [CHINA NEWS SERVICE]
(P.R.C.), Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.china.com.cn/overseas/txt/2006-11/03/content_7311026.htm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2007); Tai Shang Tou Zi Da Lu Chuang Xin Gao Bu Man Tai Lian Dang Zu Nao Liang An Kai
Fang [The Investment in the Mainland by Taiwanese Companies Hit a New High While Pro-Regulatory
Legislators are Criticized for Impeding the Deregulation], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE]
(P.R.C.), http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14810/4618949.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
264 Lü Wei Pi Bai Fen Zhi Si Shi Shang Xian Tai Yan Ke Wang Liang An Jing Mao Da Dan Kai Fang [A
DPP Legislator Criticizes the Harshness of Limits on Investment in the Mainland and Expects a Brave
Deregulation], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (P.R.C.), July 26, 2006,
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/4627533.html (last visited May. 21, 2009). In 2003, Tai-san
Ciou, a DPP legislator, has already argued that if a Taiwan-invested firm has established its headquarter in
Taiwan, legal barriers restraining Taiwanese enterprises’ global management and planning, such as the
Capital Controls and Constraints, should also be removed. This argument is similar to one of the relaxation
measures later taken since KMT took power in 2008. Ciou & Kang, supra note 242, at 58.
265 Tai Qi Ri Yue Guang Xiao Ying Kuo Da Tai Dang Ju Mo Xu Deng Lu Shang Xian Song Bang [Impacted
by the ASE Case, Taiwan’s Government Acquiesced in the Direction of Loosening Limits on Investment in
the Mainland], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (P.R.C.), Nov. 26, 2006,
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/5101410.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
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in Taiwan than China.266 They want to use Taiwan as their base or fortress and team up
with Taiwanese businesses to enter markets in China.267 Therefore, once Taiwanese
companies are fettered with the Restrictions and prohibited from investing in China
mainly in accordance with their business demands, foreign investors will also directly
assume the cost of this excessive regulation and begin to consider exiting from Taiwan.268
We may obtain the very answer from a quote of I-Ru Liu Team’s interview with a
domestic investment bank and a foreign one, both of which possess much experience as
underwriters for Taiwanese companies listing shares overseas:
Many foreign investors interested in investing in China expressed that they did not
trust Chinese companies and were willing to make deals with Taiwanese companies
directly. Yet, Taiwan’s regulation on investing in China drove away the foreign 
capital. Besides, many foreign firms wished to cooperate with Taiwanese
266 Chen-Yuan Tung, Taiwan Dui Wai Jing Ji Zhan Lüe Zhi Jian Tao Yu Jian Yi [The Review and Suggestion
of Taiwan’s International Economic Strategies], 98 YAN XI LUN TAN YUE KAN [FORUM ON TRAINING AND
DEVELOPMENT] 15, 20-21 (2009) (Taiwan).
267 See Koong-Lian Kao, Taiwan Jing Ji Xu Yao Hong Guan De Liang An Jing Mao Zheng Ce [A
Macroscopic Cross-Strait Economic Policy Is Required for Taiwan’s Economy], 1 ZHAN WANG YU TAN SUO
[PROSPE CT & EXP LORAT ION] ( ISSUE 5) 38, 46 (2003) (Taiwan). For example take Japanese
companies:
There are quite a few cases where strategic alliances have been formed between Taiwanese and
Japanese companies in order to invest in Mainland China. There are a number of different alliances
including joint ventures, Japanese companies licensing Taiwan brands and granting the use of
Japanese technology to manufacture in China, Japanese companies purchasing products from
Taiwanese companies in China and transferring technology to them. There is a clear picture that
shows Japanese and Taiwanese companies cooperating with each other to develop the Mainland
market. The primary reason for collaboration is so [sic] companies can take advantage of
management systems and market development. Japanese and Taiwanese firms get along together
because they have complementary qualities. Through strategic alliances, companies obtain mutual
benefits and increase their competitive strengths. Taiwanese companies obtain technology and
scalability from the manufacturer, which increases Taiwan’s industrialization. On the other hand, 
Japanese companies are able to break into the Chinese market and acquire cheaper products and parts.
Furthermore, collaboration has accelerated the globalization of companies, which will lead to
stronger competitiveness in the world market.
Yan Zhu, Tai Shang Da Lu Tou Zi De Ri Ben Yin Su Yu Jing Ji Quan Qiu Hua Yi Han [Japan’s Influence on 
Taiwan’s Globalization and Investment in Mainland China], in JING JI QUAN QIU HUAYU TAI SHANG DA
LU TOU ZI: CE LÜE BU JU YU BI JIAO [ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND TAIWAN’S INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
IN CHINA] 319, 320 (Te-Sheng Chen ed., 2008) (Taiwan).
268 Li, supra note 255, at 81. See also Chou, supra note 211, at 118.
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management and R & D teams to do business in China. For instance, a Swedish firm
intended to buy out a leading Taiwanese company in traditional industries and
wished to employ the same management in this Taiwanese company to help them
invest in China. Taiwan’sgovernment, however, intervened in this deal pursuant to
the Capital Controls. It was incredible for this Swedish firm to find that it was also
subject to the Capital Controls that they forwarded money from abroad to Taiwan
and subsequently to China for investment. This Swedish firm cannot understand that
even though they were willing to make local investment and pay the tax on behalf of
their Taiwanese subsidiary after the buy-out, Taiwan’sgovernment would keep
preventing them from investing in China through their Taiwanese subsidiary, which
meant that Taiwan’sgovernment required them to exit from markets in Taiwan. In
consequence, this Sweden firm, after buying out the Taiwanese company in question,
did exit from Taiwan towards China. Nothing was left in Taiwan. Taiwan lost
everything.269
Moreover,O’Hara and Ribstein note:
[V]oice and exit intersect. When a jurisdiction loses or fails to attract people and
firms because of its laws, those who forgo or lose business have an incentive to
lobby to improve the law. Put differently . . . [e]xit by some can add voice to
others who benefit by the presence of those who have exited. These “exit-affected
groups” are then added to the mix of proregulatory and antiregulatory groups
competing to enact their preferred laws. In a world of enhanced mobility, outside
interests are often powerful despite their lack of physical proximity to local
lawmakers.270
Good examples of these exit-affected interest groups in the Taiwan case are local
securities industries, securities professionals, TWSE, and not least Taiwanese retail
investors. The problem that the Restrictions adversely impact Taiwan stock markets can
be observed from the fact that Taiwan’s total capital-raising dollar amount of IPO deals
269 Internationalization, supra note 237, at 69.
270 Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market: Views from the
U.S. and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147, 2155 (2008).
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in 2006 is the lowest during the last decade because many Taiwanese firms, following
patterns similar to Hon Hai’s Restructuring,do their IPOs on HKSE instead.271 This
problem can also be noted from the fact that the total number of companies listed in
Taiwan has been declining according to the statistics in 2006, and even backslides to the
last among East Asian Tigers—including Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan. An FSC official in private admitted that one of the significant causes of this
distress is the political obstacle, namely, the Restrictions which discourage China-based
Taiwanese firms from listing shares in Taiwan.272 Therefore, it is reasonably presumed
that the financial services industry in Taiwan is one of the exit-affected interest groups
that indirectly feel negative impact of the Restrictions. In particular, listing-related
benefits do not come to the local financial services industries, such as investment banks,
law firms, and accounting firms, (and indirectly, to their local economies in terms of tax
revenue, employment rates, real estate prices and the like), as more and more
China-based Taiwanese corporations do their IPOs in other capital markets, HKSE
among others,to avoid Taiwan’s jurisdiction.Furthermore, Gordon Shu Chen, then board
271 Tai Shang Shi Gong Si Chou Zi Chuang Shi Nian Xin Di [Capital-Raising Dollar Amount of IPOs in
Taiwan at the Lowest in 10 Years], PEOPLE’S DAILY (P.R.C.), Nov. 21, 2006, available at
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/5066386.html. See also Taying Liaow et al., Qi Ye Jin Rong Fa
Zong Lun [The Overview of Law on Business Association and Finance], in QI YE CHOU ZI FA WU YU GE
AN FEN XI [CASE STUDIES AND LEGALAFFAIRS ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE FINANCING] 1, 10 (Taying Liaow
et al. eds., 2008) (Taiwan) (discussing that according to TWSE’s statistics from 1998 to January 2008, the 
number of IPOs has been decreasing since 2002 year by year).
272 Tai Gu Chen Lun Shang Shi Gong Si Zong Shu Wei Suo Diao Ya Zhou Si Xiao Long Zhi Wei [Taiwan’s 
Stock Market is Backsliding with the Smallest Number of Listing Companies among East Asian Tigers],
REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (P.R.C.), Nov. 27, 2006,
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/5092097.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). It is said that most
Taiwanese firms that exit from Taiwan’s stock markets and list shares overseas intend to get rid of 
impediments created by the Capital Controls and Constraints, and to seek out legal flexibility for
investments in China somewhere else. According to the business community’s statistics, of the capital 
raised by Taiwanese firms in 2004, 13% of IPOs and 60% of Secondary Public Oferings (“SPO”) were 
done overseas; this trend accelerated. For instance, Taiwanese firms filed 40 IPO applications with HKSE
in 2005 whereas there were only 17 IPO applications in Taiwan. According to Fong, this problem of listing
overseas was pinpointed by a survey by McKinsey & Company that more than 200 of China-based
Taiwanese firms were inclined to raise capital in Hong Kong in two or three years so as to meet their
financial demand for investments in China. Fong, supra note 232, at 98.
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chairman of TWSE (another exit-affected interest group), in May 2007 also stressed that
more and more international private equity funds were coming to Taiwan to acquire
Taiwan-listed companies, like the ASE case discussed below in Part B.2.2.2 of this
chapter, owing to lower stock prices in Taiwan273 and to the Capital Controls. Therefore,
he advocated the Restrictions should be further relaxed in the near future.274
More importantly, Taiwanese retail investors are also exit-affected interest groups
that indirectly assume regulatory costs of the Restrictions. Specifically, the majority
traders in Taiwan stock markets are domestic retail investors. For example, in 2007 they
have accounted for around 70% of local stock market turnover. 275 Taiwan had a
population of 23 million in 2008, among which as many as 8.5 million had opened
securities accounts. 276 Since these ordinary Taiwanese citizens, as domestic retail
investors, dominated Taiwan stock markets, they are an exit-affected interest group
impacted severely when Taiwan-invested firms list shares overseas to avoid the Capital
Controls and Constraints. In addition, before the relaxation of the Restrictions in the
second half of 2008, in order to fully enforce the Capital Controls, the Taiwanese
government restrained ordinary Taiwanese citizens from buying stocks listed in Mainland
273 In the whole year of 2007, the benchmark of Taiwanese stocks, Taipei's Weighted Price Index, rose
8.7%, and“ranked as the second-worst performing regional market behind Japan's Nikkei Stock Average,
which fell 11.1%.” Chris Oliver, Taiwan Stocks Rally after Pro-China KMT Landslide, MARKETWATCH, Jan. 14,
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/taiwan-stocks-rally-after-pro-china-partys-election-win (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009).
274 Tai Zheng Jiao Suo Dong Shi Zhang Hu Yu Song Bang Taiwan Qi Ye Fu Da Lu Tou Zi [Chairman of
Taiwan Stock Exchange Advocates Easing Mainland-Investment Restrictions], ZHONG GUO TAIWAN WANG
[CHINA TAIWAN ONLINE] (P.R.C.), May 10, 2007,
http://big5.chinataiwan.org/xwzx/bwkx/200705/t20070510_371567.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
275 Platform, supra note 255, at 6; James J. Kung & Wing-Keung Wong, Efficiency of the Taiwan Stock
Market, 60 JAPANESE ECON. REV.389, 390 (2008) (Taiwan’s annual trading “drops from 89.30% in 1996 to 
68.80% in 2005 for local individual investors . . . .”).
276 Editorial, Bu Jian Lu Shan Zhen Mian Mu, Zhi Yuan Shen Zai Ci Shan Zhong—Zong Ti Jing Ji Zhi Biao
VS. “Shu Min Jing Ji”Zhi Biao [A Layperson Could Hardly Understand Macro-Indexes—On the Indexes
of Macroeconomics VS. the Reference of the “Grassroots Economy”], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY &
BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Sep. 21, 2009, at A2.
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China, Hong Kong and Macau through stock brokers located in Taiwan. Both offshore
and domestic mutual funds offered and sold in Taiwan could not invest more than 0.4%
of their net asset values in stocks listed in Mainland China and 10% in stocks listed in
Hong Kong and Macau.277 Therefore, due to the Restrictions, Taiwanese retail investors
are deprived of opportunities to directly and indirectly share the returns from these
prosperous China-based Taiwanese firms as these companies do not list shares in
Taiwan.278 Perceiving the former DPP government maintaining and even re-tightening
the Capital Controls in 2006 as discussed below in Part B.1.2.3, Taiwanese retail
investors could arguably join anti-regulatory groups in the March presidential election in
2008 as a strong exit–effected interest group given that they were a large percentage of
voters.279 The influence of these retail investors280, who should have benefited from
277 Charng Kao & Cheng-Hsu Wang, Liang An Guan Xi De Hui Gu Xin Qing Shi Yu Qian Zhan [The
Review, New Circumstances and Foresight of Cross-Strait Relationship], 9 YUAN JING JI JIN HUI JI KAN
[PROSPECT Q.] (ISSUE 3) 167, 188 (2008) (Taiwan); Jing Wai Ji Jin Tou Zi Gang Gu Xian Zhi Wan
Quan Qu Xiao Zheng Yuan Tong Guo [The Executive Yuan Lifted the Bans on Ofshore Mutual Funds’ 




e=&type_id=1,10,19,20,21,22&total=1&nid=61411.00&seq=1 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
278 Chou, supra note 211, at 118; Editorial, He Jian An Zui Da Shu Jia Shi Zheng Fu [The Biggest Loser in
the UMC Case is Taiwan’s Government], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 28, 2007, at
A2 [hereinafter UMC] (reporting that the Restrictions compelled Taiwanese firms to delist from Taiwan and
list shares in Hong Kong, that the Capital Controls led offshore mutual funds to retreat from Taiwan, and
that for the last three years 23 offshore mutual funds have left Taiwan such that products of investment
Taiwanese investors can choose turned fewer).
279 After the legislature election on the weekend in January 2008 in which the then-opposition party KMT
won a landslide victory, Taiwanese stocks climbed sharply by 1.8%, or 144.1 points to 8,173.41
immediately on Monday. The news report from MarketWatch said:
“The election signals a reordering of national priorities toward growth and commercial
prospects, and away from idealistic issues such as national identity," said Bear Stearns strategist
Michael Kurtz in a research note Monday.
Saturday's result saw the Kuomintang take 81 seats with 51.3% of the popular vote while the
Democratic Progressive Party held on to 27 seats, with a 36.9% share of the vote.
Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian stepped down as chairman of the DPP hours after the
results were announced. A key pillar of Chen's administration had been Taiwan's independence from
China.
. . . .
"With the KMT in power investors in general feel that the policies will be more turning
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Taiwan-invested corporations’ local listings, might help explain the interest group
competition on the supply sidewithin Taiwan’s political marketplace.
In consequence, the Restrictions not only forced Taiwanese companies with
substantial investment in China to list their shares abroad, mostly on HKSE, to raise
capital for investments in Mainland China, but also discouraged many China-based
Taiwanese businesses not yet doing their IPOs from listing stocks back at home. Wave
upon wave of leading large conglomerates in Taiwan like Hon Hai decided to have their
business substantially based in China exit from Taiwan. This physical exit substantially
underminedTaiwan’s reputation as an investment environment. Afterwards many foreign
investors, direct or indirect, gradualy lost their confidence in Taiwan’s markets and 
exited as well. The physical exit and threats of exit bolstered the voice rights of
anti-regulatory and exit-affected interest groups, thus helping them dominate the arena
especially in the March presidential election in 2008. This can be evidenced by the fact
towards collaboration with China," [Pauline Dan, a fund manager with MFC Global Investment
Management,] said, adding the KMT was likely poised to win the upcoming presidential elections.
. . . .
Analyst said the DPP's thrashing at the polls and subsequent resignation of Chen will likely
inspire a shift in the party's strategy towards economic and environmental issues to win back voters.
A softer approach by the DPP would like mean fewer political flare-ups between Beijing and Taipei
regardless of who's in power.
"The DPP will attempt to rebrand itself in the future as a more moderate party, which . . . could
shift Taiwan's entire political center of gravity rightward," Bear Stearns' Kurtz.
Oliver, supra note 273 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). This quote could to some extent imply that
investors in general, a large percentage of which are the retail investors, show their confidence in KMT’s 
potential victory in the March presidential election with the rise of the stock market index, and that retail
investors as an exit-affect interest group may arguably join anti-regulatory interest groups to push for the
moderation of the Capital Controls in the arena of the presidential election.
280 To illustrate their influence in another context, in early August 2007 when the U.S. financial crisis had
just started, as Taipei's Weighted Price Index was also negatively impacted and thus plunged by around
10%, it is argued that the pressure from retail investors was so great that Taiwan’s government was pushed
to intervene in the stock market by buying stocks with money from public pension and retirement funds,
insurance funds and deposit funds of post offices, in order to stop the drop. Editorial, Cong Liang Jian Shi
Kan Zheng Fu Shi Zheng Pin Zhi [Observing the Quality of the Government Administration in Light of Two
Incidents], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Aug. 6, 2007, at A2.
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that prior to the presidential election, candidates from both major parities similarly
suggested in the second half of 2007 that the Capital Controls should be relaxed.281 As
Coates explains why SOX was then enacted,“[i]n a democracy in which most voters own
stock either directly or indirectly through their pension and retirement funds, government
was certain to react. The only question was the shape the reaction would take.”282
Similarly in Taiwan, since the Restrictions substantially adversely impacted Taiwan stock
markets, the pressure on politicians of both parties to lighten the Restrictions—especially
from a huge number of retail investors as an exit-affected interest group—was so great
that maintaining the Restrictions was not an option. In other words, it is likely that
anti-regulatory and exit-afected interest groups’ voice rights strengthened by exit were 
successfully exercised to push presidential candidates from both camps to advocate the
easing of the Capital Controls. Therefore, because of these firms’ continuous exit from 
local markets, Taiwan, under the decisive interest group competition over whether and
how to deregulate, experienced a radical change of political power in the first half of
2008 as Chang-Ting Hsieh (Frank Hsieh), from the former President Chen’s own DPP,
was defeated while President Ying-Jeou Ma of KMT, advocating anti-regulatory and
pro-China policies, won the presidential election. An editorial in the China Times, a
major Taiwanese newspaper, argued that when in power in Taiwan, the more proactively
the former DPP government intended to contain Taiwan’s outward investment in 
Mainland China, the more sophisticated tactics these firms would take to evade the
Capital Controls while investing more in Mainland China, and that since the DPP
government overlooked the voice for relaxation of the Capital Controls from KMT and
281 Chou, supra note 211, at 3-4.
282 John C. Coates, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (2007).
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the business community, Taiwanese citizens just voted out DPP to say no to the
re-tightened regulation in 2006.283 Apparently, pro-regulatory interest groups in Taiwan
failed. Immediate relaxation of the Restrictions was under way.284
2.3 Ensuing Liberalization
President Ma in his interview on June 18, 2008 by New York Times and The
International Herald Tribune said:
There are so many Taiwanese businesspeople around the area [who] now keep their
money out of Taiwan. You know, in the last five, four years, many Taiwanese
companies went public on Hong Kong’s stock exchange. More than 60 of them. 
Large companies. Without even thinking about coming back to Taiwan. Some even
left Taiwan’s stock market to invest in the mainland. So that was really, you know,
283 Editorial, Min Jin Dang Hai Yao Bu Yao Chong Fan Zhi Zheng? [Does DPP Want to Come Back into
Power?], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Apr. 13, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,11051402+1120090413
00109,00.html.
284 Lin Lin, Mei Bao: Shi Xian Xuan Zhan Cheng Nuo Ma Ying-Jeou Jiang Mian Lin Zhong Da Tiao Zhan
[Wall Street Journal: To Implement His Promise during the Campaign President Ma Will Face Major
Challenges], ZHONG YANG SHE JI SHI XIN WEN [CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY NEWS], Mar. 23, 2008,
http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/080324/5/vxu.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). As Bradsher
reports,
President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan called on Wednesday for a rapid expansion of economic relations
between Taiwan and mainland China over the next year or two. . . . Mr. Ma said he wanted broad
access to the mainland market for Taiwanese financial services businesses, an end to double taxation
by government agencies in Taipei and Beijing and the removal of investment restrictions. . . . Mr. Ma
led his Nationalist Party to a decisive victory in the March elections, prevailing over a candidate
warier of closer ties with mainland China. Mr. Ma had promised to strengthen the Taiwanese
economy through reconciliation . . . .
Keith Bradsher & Edward Wong,Taiwan’s Leader Outlines His Policy toward China, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/asia/19taiwan.html?_r=1&sq=China%20Taiwan&st=cse&oref=
slogin&scp=4&pagewanted=print (emphasis added). Hui-Ru Zhou, Ma Xiao Xin Zheng—Fan Suo Guo
Jing Ji Wei Wang [President Ma’s New Deal: Stop Closing Taiwan to Cross-Strait Exchanges and the
Economy Is the King], DA LU TAI SHANG 1000 DA: LIANG AN HE PING SHENG SHI TAI SHANG DA FU HUO
[TOP 1000 OF CHINA-BASED TAIWANESE FIRMS: CROSS-STRAIT PEACE RISES AND TAIWANESE BUSINESSES
WILL THRIVE AGAIN], June 6, 2008, at 42 (Taiwan) (arguing that in the 2008 presidential election Ying-Jeou
Ma of KMT won more than half of the votes, which showed that relaxation of regulation on cross-Strait
trade and investment was expected by most people in Taiwan).
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very bad for Taiwan. Now, we certainly want to change that. We want to attract
more foreign capital, and capital of [locally-based] companies that have made
billions of dollars on the Chinese mainland.285
Therefore, the KMT government started a series of relaxations of the Capital
Controls and Constraints. First, MOEA revamped the Capital Controls, mainly Point 3 of
the Principles, to loosen the upper limit of investment in China, or increase Investment
Allowance, from 40 % to 60% of a corporation’s net worth. Furthermore, if a corporation 
is qualified by MOEA to be a subsidiary of a Multi-National Enterprise or to establish its
headquarter in Taiwan, there will be no upper limit for this corporation. Responding to
the large-scale relaxation of the Capital Controls, the FSC revised the Constraints as
follows:
(1) Article 7 of Regulations Governing the Offering and Issuance of Securities by
Securities Issuers is revised so that Taiwanese issuers are allowed to directly or
indirectly invest up to 60% of capital raised in Taiwan stock markets in Mainland
China.
(2) According to the revised Capital Controls the FSC declared that public Taiwanese
companies can use up to 60% capital raised through each private placement, no
matter whether located in Taiwan or overseas, for investments in Mainland China.286
(3) Subsequent to the revision of Article 9 of Regulations Governing the Offering and
Issuance of Overseas Securities, funds raised from the issuance of securities in
overseas stock markets in each offering are all allowed to be used for direct or
indirect investments in Mainland China despite the upper limit, 60% of net worth.
(4) After Regulations Governing the Offering and Issuance of Securities by Foreign
Securities Issuers are revised, funds raised in Taiwan stock markets by foreign issuers
can all be used for investments in Mainland China. Hence, a parent company in
Taiwan such as Hon Hai can, as they see fit themselves, invest in Mainland China
through its foreign subsidiary like FIH which is incorporated in the Caymans Islands.
285 An Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/asia/19taiwan-interview.html?ref=asia.
286 Placements, supra note 179.
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In another word, a Taiwanese parent company can first establish a holding company
in an OFC and have this offshore company list shares in Taiwan stock markets. Since
this offshore subsidiary or affiliate is a foreign issuer, the capital raised by this
offshore company is not subject to the Capital Controls and can all be used for
investments in China.287
These measures seemed to have broadcast messages of liberalization successfully.
Hon Hai thus started to take into account founding its Asian logistics hub in southern
Taiwan, and having its subsidiary FIH (already listing shares on HKSE) list its TDRs
back in Taiwan.288 The FSC added that, by October 2008, 54 China-based Taiwanese
businesses expressed their intense willingness to list their shares or TDRs in Taiwan. 30
of these firms planned to cross-list on TWSE by issuing TDRs while the rest 24 of them
intended to do primary-listings by directly listing shares in Taiwan’s OTC market.289
Accordingly, more and more Taiwanese firms already incorporated overseas and listing
shares in China or Hong Kong began to contemplate listing shares back in Taiwan or
even moving back their headquarters towards their motherland. For example, Want Want
287 See Rui-Yi Zhang & Shu-Fang Zheng, Fa Ling Song Bang Tai Gu Yue Ju Tai Shang Shang Shi Shou
Xuan [With the Laws Relaxed TaiwanStock Markets Are Turning into the First Choice for Taiwanese Firms’ 
Listing Shares], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Mar. 9, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050802+122009030900284,00.ht
ml; also An-Ni Lin, Tai Shang Ke Yi Kong Gu Ming Yi Hui Tai Shang Shi Bu Shou Deng Lu Bai Fen Zhi Liu
Shi Shang Xian Xian Zhi Mian Jiao Bai Fen Zhi Er Shi Wu Ying Suo Shui [Taiwanese Firms Can List Back
in Taiwan in the Name of Holding Companies, Which Is Not Subject to the 60% Upper Limit on Investment
in the Mainland and the 25% Profit-seeking Enterprise Income Taxation ], JING JI RI BAO [ECONOMICS
DAILY] (Taiwan), Aug. 2, 2008, at A6.
288 Zong-Zhi Liu & Qiong-Yu Yan, Hong Hai Za Qian Yi Jian Shu Wei Huan Bao Ke Ji Cheng [Hon Hai
Will Spend More than 100 Billion NT Dollars on Establishing A Digital Eco-Tech City], ZHONG SHI DIAN
ZI BAO [CHINA TIMES DAILY NEWS] (Taiwan), Aug. 7, 2008, available at
http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/080807/4/noh.html; Hong Hai Zi Gong Si Fu Shi Kang Chou Hua
Hui Tai Shang Shi [FIH Is Planning for Listing Back in Taiwan], ZHONG GUANG XIN WEN WANG [BCC
NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan), Aug. 6, 2008, http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/080806/1/mdl.html (last
visited Aug. 7, 2008).
289 Xiang-Zhi Xue & Zhen-Ling Peng, Jin Guan Hui: Wu Shi Si Jia Tai Shang Fan Xiang Shang Shi [FSC:
54 Taiwan Companies Will List Back at Home], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan),




China Holdings Limited (“Want Want China”), a Taiwan-invested firm and the largest
maker of rice cakes and flavored milk in China, was incorporated in the Cayman Islands,
headquartered in Shanghai, and listed on HKSE in 2007. In light of the large-scale
liberalization of the Restrictions, Want Want China became the first runner for listing
TDRs on April 28, 2009 to back up the Ma administration’s regulatory transition to more 
legal flexibility.290 In addition, Natural Beauty, a franchise chain of cosmetics originating
in Taiwan, headed towards China to develop the Chinese market more than a decade ago
and listed its shares in Hong Kong in 2002. Nevertheless, Natural Beauty returned to
Taiwan to set up its global headquarters in Taipei on November 25, 2008.291 Under the
cluster effect of industries, foreign firms attempting to carve out their business in
Mainland China may follow Taiwan-invested firms’ steps, and the inflows of FDI into 
Taiwan may be in an upsurge again.292 Consequently, accounting, legal services and
other industries or markets supporting capital markets and local corporate headquarters
290 Zong-Tong Wang, Hui Tai Gua Pai Shang Shi Zhong Guo Wang Wang Qiang Tou Xiang [Want Want
China Is the First Runner to Be Listed Back in Taiwan], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan),
Apr. 1, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,5010502+11200904010
0345,00.html; Hong-Hui Guo, Zhong Guo Wang Wang TDR Jin Zheng Shi Shang Shi! [Want Want China Is




291 Li-Man Li, Cai Yan Ping Hui Tai She Quan Qiu Zong Bu [The Founder of Natural Beauty Is Going
Home to Set Up the Global Headquarter], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Nov.
19, 2008, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page/0,4442,content+120601+122008111900387,00.htm
l.
292 See, e.g., Mo-Yun Wang, Hu Di Wen: Liang An Reng Xu Jia Kuai Kai Fang Jiao Bu [Bayer’s Head in 
Taiwan Branch: Deregulation of Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy Should Be Accelerated], ZHONG GUO SHI
BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 9, 2008, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110507+112008100900
035,00.html (reporting that the board chairman of the Taiwanese subsidiary of Bayer, a German chemical
and pharmaceutical company, expressed that even though there is a global economic downturn, Bayer
promises to establish two major R & D centers in Taiwan, given that teaming up with Taiwanese firms
Bayer can process orders in Taiwan while final products can be manufactured in Mainland China and
Vietnam and shipped from there).
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would be thriving again.
Finally, according to a study by Jia-Ke Hung and Chen-Yuan Tung, before the
large-scale lightening of the Capital Controls in 2008, the Capital Controls drove TDI in
China to change into underground economic activity by circuitously transferring
Taiwanese funds to corporations registered in OFCs such as the Cayman Islands and BVI
and later investing these funds in China. These funds were not indentified by both
Taiwanese and Chinese officials as TDI.293 From 1979 to 2008, if these funds transited
via the Cayman Islands and BVI were recognized as TDI in China, Taiwanese capital
would be estimated to be approximately $122.285 billion, which is 14.34% of total FDI
in China as well as the second largest FDI inflow to China (FDI from Hong Kong and
Macau still ranked as the top one), even though TDI at face value in the same period is
indentified as the fifth largest FDI (the top four in order: Hong Kong and Macau, BVI,
Japan, and the U.S.) according to Chinese statistics.294 This number of TDI in China
($122.285 billion) has so far been recognized by many Chinese and Taiwanese scholars
as the closest to the reality.295
On the other hand, according to FDI statistics made public on Sep. 15, 2009 by
293 Jia-Ke Hung & Chen-Yuan Tung, Tai Shang Dui Zhong Guo Jing Ji Fa Zhan De Gong Xian: 1999-2008
Nian [Contributions of Taiwan Businesspeople towards the Economic Development of China: 1988-2008],
Address at Symposium of the Center for China Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan: Tai
Shang Da Lu Tou Zi Er Shi Nian: Jing Yan Fa Zhan Yu Qian Zhan [Taiwan Businesspeople Invested in
China for Two Decades: Experience, Development & Foresight] 5-6 (Oct. 3-4, 2009) (on file with author).
294 Id. at 7-8.
295 Wen-Hui Li, Zi Xun Bu Ming Zao Cheng Yan Jiu Kun Nan [The Insufficiency of Information Creates
Difficulties over Research], , ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 23, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,50501637+1120091023
00154,00.html; Wen-Hui Li, Xue Zhe Yan Jiu Tai Shang Dui Lu Gong Xian Du Pai Di Er [According to the
Scholar’s Study Taiwan Is Ranked as the Second Largest FDI in China], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA




PRC’s Ministry of Commerce, as the Capital Controls are largely relaxed in the second 
half of 2008, TDI at face value climbed from the ninth largest FDI inflow to China in
2008 to the second largest (only second to Hong Kong) in the period of January-August
2009, without the inclusion of Taiwanese funds circuitously through those OFCs. Also, in
the same period, FDI from OFCs including BVI, the Cayman Islands, Samoa, Mauritius
and so forth turned out to be out of top 10 FDI inflows to China. Although OFCs’ lower 
ranking was possibly owing to the fact that PRC’s tax authorities recently strengthened 
their investigation of tax evasion via OFCs, it was more likely that the liberalization of
the Capital Controls started in the second half of 2008 substantially removed Taiwanese
firms’ incentives to indirectly invest in China via OFCs such as BVI and the Cayman 
Islands, which thus galvanized the considerable increase of TDI in China at face value.296
The above evidence explicates that the Capital Controls enforced from 1997 to 2008 as
discussed below in Part B.1.2 cannot overcome the market reality that Taiwanese firms’ 
vigorous business demands rendered themselves the second largest FDI inflow to China
from a perspective of substance, and that Taiwanese capital emerging from underground
thanks to the relaxation in question largely narrowed the gap between official estimation
and Taiwanese firms' real investment value to China.
3. Comparisons between the Phenomena of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Taiwan
3.1 Differences
296 Zhang-Rong Kang, Taiwan Jin Nian Yue Sheng Ya Jun [Taiwan Rises to the Runner-up this Year], GONG




What implications can we derive from the cross-listing competition in the SOX case
discussed in Chapter 2.B and the primary-listing competition in the Taiwan case? Before
comparing the actual scope of loosening the regulation in both cases, some might suppose
that there should be certain differences to the extent that cross-listing markets in SOX’s 
case should impose more discipline upon U.S. government than primary-listing markets
in the Greater Chinese Economy upon Taiwan’sgovernment. They might advance the
hypothesis that it would be easier for cross-listing firms to exit from U.S. markets than
Taiwanese firms to exit from their home country. Accordingly, global cross-listing
markets would, in theory, exercise more discipline on US government than primary
listing markets in Taiwan’s case upon Taiwan’sgovernment, in that costs of foreign
issuers’ exiting from US markets are lower than those of Taiwanese firms’ exiting from
Taiwan’s stock markets, and that the mobility of foreign firms in SOX’s case is thus
higher than Taiwanese firms’. Nevertheless, the truth is that the SEC merely makes 
partial exemptions for foreign firms and even fewer substantive changes for domestic
issuers whereas Taiwan’sgovernment makes such a large-scale substantive change on the
Capital Controls and Constraints. Therefore it seems that the above hypothesis is wrong.
Why?
We might come forward with the following explanations. First, as Hart argues, the
best explanation to enact SOX is“that the pressure on politicians to act—from the public,
interest groups, and the politicians themselves—was so great that nonintervention was
not an option.”297 The U.S. thus has a stronger need to regulate domestic firms than
foreign firms to react to corporate catastrophes like Enron’s. With respect to the
297 Oliver Hart, Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 437, 444 (2009).
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regulatory necessity, cross-listing firms are not as important as domestic firms. Therefore,
in order to retain or attract back foreign issuers, the U.S. government is willing to supply
foreign issuers with some exemptions while maintaining the intensity of the regulation on
domestic issuers.
Second, even if many Taiwan-invested firms are incorporated overseas, their direct
or indirect equity owners are mostly still Taiwanese who generally have stronger voice in
Taiwan’s political marketplace than foreign issuers in the U.S. politics. Therefore,foreign
issuers could pressure the SEC to exempt them from some SOX mandates merely via
their exit and weaker voice in the U.S., whereas Taiwanese firms can exert greater
pressure on Taiwan’sgovernment in the legislature and especially in the presidential
election in 2008 to liberalize the Restrictions on a large scale. This is largely because
Taiwanese firms’mobility via listing shares overseas might motivate a strong
exit-affected interest group, local retail investors, to join anti-regulatory interest groups,
especially in the March presidential election in 2008. 298 This probably drove the
298 Immediately subsequent to KMT’s landslide victory of the legislature election in January 2008, stock 
analysts indicated that “[w]ith the KMT in power investors in general feel that the policies will be more
turning towards collaboration with China,” and that “the KMT was likely poised to win the upcoming
presidential elections.” Oliver, supra note 273. This might, as discussed above, suggest that the Capital
Controls were so against general investors’ interests as to tilt to KMT their potential support for the triumph 
of the prospective presidential election in March 2008. Also, after President Ma was swore in May 2008,
Horng-Ming Tsai, the Vice Secretary General of CNFI (one of the two major Taiwanese chambers of
commerce), was invited to accept the honorary position of Advisor of National Security Council and then
became an adviser to President Ma. See Fong-Ying Chen, Gao Charng Tsai Horng-Ming Ru Lie Deng Lu
Song Bang You Wang [With Charng Gao and Horng-Ming Tsai Joining the Ma Administration Bans on
Investment in China Are Expected to Be Lifted], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), May. 12,
2008, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110501+112008051200
058,00.html; Ci-Ti Cui, Guo An Hui Zi Wei Tsai Horng-Ming Ci Zhi Tsai Wei Chan Ye Jie Zai Guo An Hui
De Wei Yi Dai Biao Shi Fou Yin Fa Gu Pai Xiao Ying Bei Shou Guan Zhu [Horng-Ming Tsai Resigns His
Commission as Advisor of National Security Council; Given Tsai Is the Only Representative from the
Business Community in that Council Whether His Resignation Will Bring About A Domino Effect Deserves
to Be Watched], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Aug. 24, 2009, at A2. Before
KMT won the presidential election, Mr. Tsai had written many articles to advocate the relaxation of the
Capital Controls, which resonated with CNFI’s consistent petition. Given that Tsai engaged the service of 
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presidential election candidates from both major parities to countenance the petition that
the Capital Controls should be further relaxed. Put simply, the Restrictions deterring
Taiwanese firms from making significant local investments and listing shares at home
trigger a larger local political backlash against the regulation than in SOX’scase.
Third, as compared with Taiwan, the U.S. is a much larger and richer country and
has a more captive market that local interest groups can exploit, in part, by lobbying to
assure the maintenance of regulatory intensity on domestic issuers. 299 Meanwhile,
domestic firms more tied to the U.S. market are more stuck in their home country and
thus less mobile than foreign firms, because the former rely more on listing shares in the
U.S. stock markets to develop or keep their reputation for local business300 whereas the
latter can just exit and go public in other markets such as LSE. The U.S. political
jurisdiction can thus enforce her laws against domestic firms that have higher costs of
the close advisor to President Ma after the election, it might, at least partially, be argued that before the
election the Capital Controls would prompt businesses to shift to KMT in terms of support such as
campaign contributions or endorsements. More importantly, the endorsement from the business community
for Ma’s bid for presidencymight be confirmed by the fact that when Mr. Ma attended the Conference of
Chairpersons of Taiwanese Chambers of Commerce in China, most attendant China-based Taiwanese
businessmen publicly expressed their support to KMT and Mr. Ma in the presidential election. See Min Jin
Dang Guang Shuo Bu Zuo Tai Shang Qun Qi Ting Lan [DPP Only Pays Lip Service without Any Actual
Action; Taiwanese Businessmen Altogether Support KMT], ZHONG GUO PING LUN XIN WEN [CHINA
REVIEW NEWS] (P.R.C.), June 4, 2007
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1003/8/1/4/100381470.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=10038147
0 (last visited Dec. 3, 2009) (reporting that even if both Mr. Ma and Mr. Hsieh advanced the similar policy
to open up cross-Strait exchange, most Taiwanese businessmen said they did not trust the latter and DPP,
but believed that the victory of the former and KMT would really help them out).
299 There is an analogous discussion under the U.S. Federalism by O’Hara and Ribstein:
The discipline that mobility exerts on state politicians depends on the benefits states can offer firms to
offset bad laws. The more desirable a location is because of its non-law attributes such as its labor
pool, its extensive consumer market, or its plentiful natural resources, the more it can get away with
harsh regulations promoted by local interest groups. We would therefore expect large and rich states
like California to be less responsive to the law market than small states like Delaware. In short,
physical mobility works to enhance, but not to guarantee, the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses.
O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 68.
300 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 109, at 74.
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exit. Put somewhat differently, domestic firms would be less willing than foreign issuers
to incur the costs of listing shares outside the United States. Conversely, cross-listing
firms are less locally based and more likely to be listed somewhere except the U.S. stock
markets. Since foreign issuers are less tied in the U.S. captive market and have greater
ability to expatriate than domestic firms, they are relatively less burdened by the costs of
shopping for laws in the global cross-listing markets.
By contrast, Taiwan has been an economy heavily relying on foreign trade and
investment, without a comparably captive market as the U.S. does to keep domestic firms
home and even lure foreign issuers from elsewhere. Because, to Taiwanese and foreign
firms with the intent and need to invest in China, Taiwan’s local marketsare not as
attractive as broader markets in China, Taiwan-invested firms that are mobile enough are
more incentivized to exit from Taiwan so as to evade the Capital Controls and
Constraints. In order to react to these firms’continuous exodus, Taiwan’sgovernment is
pressured to lighten the Restrictions significantly. Therefore, this demonstrates that
primary-listing markets in Taiwan’s case impose more discipline than cross-listing
markets inSOX’scase.
Nonetheless, globalization promotes mobility of capital and talent, or of firms, and
then reduces their costs of exit from a country. This in turn helps materialize the rise of
international jurisdictional competition, or international law market. What implications
can we gather from this phenomenon? We can observe a lesson from a perspective of
business strategy. Mihir Desai argued:
Following the uproar over Stanley Works proposed move to Bermuda, for example,
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the United States enacted legislation that limits the ability of U.S. firms to change
their legal domicile. . . . Such efforts may work in the short run for very large
countries. They will likely fail for smaller countries that cannot censure companies
by withholding government contracts. And they will surely fail in the long run as the
global market for corporate control can circumvent local efforts to retain ownership.
In other words, saying an American corporation can’t leave for Bermuda is a recipe 
for a foreign acquirer to buy the American firm and achieve the same result in other
ways.301
Therefore, in the long run, whether jurisdictions are large countries and possess local
captive markets or not, they are treated equally by law market forces underlying
international jurisdictional competition. That is, if their regulation on firms is
over-burdensome, they would all be disciplined by the international law market and then
pressured to moderate the excessive regulation to some degree.
3.2 Similarities
As for how the law market operates,O’Hara and Ribstein argue:
Our analysis of the market for law begins with the role of party mobility in
producing a kind of market for public goods, or government services. We then
extend that market concept to consider markets for law, in which people select
among given packages of legal rules, and, in turn, these selections also help shape
the laws that states offer.302
International jurisdictional competition of securities regulation in both cases of the U.S.
and Taiwan similarly illustrates the above market for law in action.
301 Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271, 1282 (2009).
302 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 27.
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In the case of SOX, jurisdictional competition in securities regulation is through
cross-listing markets—that is, listing ADRs on American stock exchanges outside their
home country. AsRibstein & O’Hara discuss,
The demand side of this market consists of [FPIs] that seek to “bond” their 
disclosures by willingly subjecting themselves to tight U.S. disclosure standards and
fraud rules [or the regulation provided by other advanced markets such as LSE]. On
the supply side, interest groups in cross-listing countries, including lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers, get significant benefits from cross-listing and
therefore incur costs if cross-listings dry up. This law market is quite competitive,
since cross-listing firms can fairly easily avoid the United States and stay home or
go to other capital markets like London if the cross-listing country raises the cost or
lowers the benefit of its regulation. All of this was brought home with a thud when
foreign companies started avoiding the United States after the adoption of stringent
new regulation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.303
In other words, FPIs take the “exit” option to respond to decline in benefit of the 
cross-listing regulatory product created by SOX. The demand force in turn sparks the
supply force within the United State. That is to say, both the anti-regulatory interest
groups on behalf of FPIs and exit-affected interest groups like the U.S. law firms who are
affected by the exodus of cross-listers take the “voice” option to pressure the U.S.
government to partially exempt foreign issuers from U.S. law.
In the case of the Capital Controls and Constraints in Taiwan, jurisdictional
competition among global legal centers occurring in the Greater Chinese Economy is
through primary-listing markets—that is, listing shares for the first time on securities
exchanges outside Taiwan. Due to the excessiveness of the regulation on outward
303 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 711 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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investment in China, Taiwanese firms with major investment in China cannot but exit
from Taiwan’s stock markets and through evasive tactics seek out a regulatory product
without being subject to the Constraints, in order to raise necessary funds to meet
financial demand of investments on the Mainland. On the supply side, most of these
Taiwanese firms go public on HKSE primarilyto “avoid” the Restrictions, rather than to
“bond”their insiders by willingly subjecting themselves to seemingly a little stricter
Hong Kong laws. The torrential “exit” of these Taiwanese firms could therefore activate
interest group competition in Taiwan to seek the relaxation of the Restrictions. Finally,
anti-regulatory interest groups arguably joined by exit-affected interest groups, mainly
represented by local retail investors, successfully voice their petition for liberalization. A
series of large-scale relaxation measures are thus followed subsequently.
The fact that Taiwan’sgovernment enforces the regulation on investment in China
equals wielding its local regulation against foreign companies as domestic firms turn into
pseudo-foreign corporations to a degree. This scenario resembles the U.S.’s atempt to 
enforce its securities regulations against foreign issuers listing in the U.S. stock markets.
The similarity rests on that both Taiwan and the U.S. intend to expand their local
regulation extra-territorially against corporations incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the U.S., a global superpower with a relatively captive market that local
interest groups can exploit, still confronts “difficulties in enforcing disclosure regulations
against foreign firms because of problems of gathering evidence, particularly given U.S.
pleading and discovery burdens. Accordingly, it must rely on foreign cooperation.”304 On
the other hand, compared with the U.S., Taiwan is a Lilliputian state and barren locale
304 Ribstein, supra note 51, at 108.
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with fewer chips to bargain over the type of regulatory cooperation with Hong Kong and
other OFCs such as the Cayman Islands, all of which also compete for benefits derived
from corporate charters, listings and other related local economic transactions of
China-based Taiwanese companies. Therefore, Taiwan certainly faces a higher difficulty
of enforcement, which meanwhile highlights one of the problems created by the Capital
Controls. The other problem is that, as discussed above, there is little benefit and
tremendous cost to deviating from the market realities of comparative advantages
generated by economic complementation between China and Taiwan under economic
globalization, as well as ignoring business demands for investment in Mainland China
accordingly.
As in the SOX context, the elements of the law market story apply in the
international context. From the case study showing that Taiwanese companies’ exit to
elude the Restrictions brings about large-scale ease of investment limits, we can learn that
the jurisdictional competition among listing markets in the Greater Chinese Economy
dominated by Hong Kong responds by exit and voice to the same demand and supply
consideration once again. We can thus find that just as expansion of the U.S. federal law
may be constrained by an international jurisdictional competition fuelled by
cross-listing,305 the Taiwanese government’s excessiveregulation may be constrained by
the jurisdictional competition fuelled by Taiwanese companies to list shares overseas.
More importantly, both cases not just exemplify the operation of the law market for
cross-listings, but also suggest “how jurisdictional competition could break out even
305 Id. at 122-39.
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where the initial legal rules are not conducive to it—just as U.S. states ultimately came to
apply the IAD to tramp corporations.”306
Finally, both of the U.S. and Taiwan stories regarding international listing markets
seem far different from the state competition for corporate charters in the U.S. because
they function “on the national level rather than within a federal system like the United
States or Europe,”but their developments display that law market forces“similar to those
operating on corporate law within federal systems are also operating on international
securities laws.”307 In other words, these two stories imply that although somewhat
disparate from corporate law markets under federalism in the U.S. and Europe, there are
also general law market forces at work in the international context: The mobility of
capital and talent enhanced by globalization serves as fuel to ignite and maintain the
operation of international jurisdictional competition, which eventually leads to local legal
changes. To conclude, the phenomena of the U.S. and Taiwan in listing markets tell with
one accord that law market forces underlying international jurisdictional competition
could provoke a change in excessive regulation to a more flexible regime. This assertion
of jurisdictional competition would be further substantiated in the following macro-level
analysis by elaborating on the relaxation transitions of the Capital Controls from 1997 to
2008.
B. The Output of Market Interactions in the International Jurisdictional
Competition: Taiwan’s Regulatory Evolution from 1997 to 2008 on Outward 
Investment in Mainland China
306 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 123.
307 Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 8, at 710.
124
The Capital Controls has turned more flexible by now; however, the trajectories of
the gradual relaxation of the Capital Controls appear to demonstrate how international
jurisdictional competition would shape the regulatory evolution of such a democratically
constrained onshore jurisdiction as Taiwan. Hence, this dissertation will, from a more
macroscopic perspective, examine the function of the international jurisdictional
competition among global legal centers, and tentatively argue that according to Taiwan’s 
regulatory transitions law market forces underlying international jurisdictional
competition nudge Taiwan’sgovernment to relieve the excessive regulation on outward
investment in Mainland China and create a more flexible regime.
Part 1 begins with a detailed statement of why the amount of outward investment in
Mainland China has been increasing substantially over time, and analyzes how and why
the transition of Taiwan’s Capital Controls is a trend towards liberalization stage by stage:
from the NHBP policy in 1997, to "Proactive Liberalization with Effective Management"
in 2001, to "Proactive Management and Effective Liberalization" in 2006, and to the
wide-scope relaxation of the Capital Controls in 2008. It then points to the paradox that
with the surge of investment in China the Capital Controls should have remained as strict
or stricter to contain the outflows of capital and firms but the fact is just the opposite. Part
2 investigates the answer to this puzzle. It first makes clear the predicament in which the
Capital Controls were landed that, disregarding business demands stimulated by
globalization, Taiwan’sgovernment did try her best to regulate outward investment in
China more effectively but failed after all. This displays how an onshore jurisdiction’s 
regulatory capacity like Taiwan’s is impaired by globalizationgenerally and unfettered
capital mobility in particular. Finally, this Taiwanese phenomenon demonstrates that,
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under globalization, law market forces underlying international jurisdictional competition
activated by business demands galvanize Taiwan’sgovernment into a quest for more
legal flexibility, or the liberalization of the Capital Controls. To be sure, there might be
alternative theories to account for the above Taiwan case. Part 3 thus addresses these.
1. The Puzzle of the Transitional Trajectories of the Capital Controls
1.1 The Upswing of Outward Investment in Mainland China
The historical development and recent trends of TDI in Mainland China could
generally be illustrated by Figure 1. It was found that TDI has been attracted most to the
other side of the Strait since 1990s for the following reasons.
First, as discussed above, Taipei decided in October 1987 to lift the ban on its
citizens’ visiting their relatives on the Mainland. Second, since 1987, Taiwan’s
government has become increasingly liberal about regulation of foreign exchanges and
FDI outflows; therefore the capital mobility has been enhanced ever since,308 which will
be further explained immediately below in Chapter 3.B.1.2.1. Third, TDI flowed
substantially to China primarily because of huge market size and low production
costs—low labor costs as well as cheap and abundant resources such as raw materials and
land.309 For example, Natural Beauty, a franchise chain of cosmetics originating in
308 Zhong-Cong Xie, Tai Shang Dui Da Lu Tou Zi Zhi Jin Kuang Fen Xi [Recent Analysis of Taiwanese
Businesses’ Investment in Mainland China], DIAN GONG XI XUN YUE KAN [TEEMADATA] (Taiwan), July
2003, at 54, 54.
309 According to a survey in 2002 by Investment Commission of MOEA on the motivations of Taiwanese
firms’ investment in Mainland China (the samples are colected in 2000), 76.18% of these China-based
Taiwanese firms express that the main factor is the low production costs and the second incentive lies in its
broad potential market. Ping-Jui Wu, Da Po Tou Zi Zhong Guo De Mi Si [Destroying the Myth of
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Taiwan, has not only developed a huge market in China but also listed its shares in Hong
Kong. It was low labor costs and strong demands in Chinese market that incentivized the
franchise owner and founder to invest in China in the early 1992.310 Fourth, “[g]rowing
faster than the FDI from other countries, TDI in China has risen substantially since 1987
when the New Taiwan dollar started to appreciate against the U.S. dollar.”311 Fifth,
“[c]ultural and linguistic affinity between Taiwan and China make it much easier for TDI
to cross the strait than investments from industrial countries. In fact, linguistic and
cultural affinities, and low labor and land costs, were recognized as the top motivations
for most TDI in China.”312 Sixth,“[t]he geographic proximity . . . [has] led to Taiwanese
firms’ preference for investing in China” as wel.313
What should also be noted is that the outward investment pattern continues as
cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan enter a new stage in which both China
and Taiwan have been represented in the WTO since 2002, and the two countries’ 
economies are thus increasingly interdependent. Wang explains:
Investment in China], 27 TAIWAN JING JI YAN JIU YUE KAN [TAIWAN ECON . RE S . MONT HLY ] ( ISSUE
8) 22, 24 (2004) (Taiwan). See also Peng-Fei Shen, Quan Qiu Hua Qu Shi Xia Tai Shang Dao Da Lu Tou
Zi Wen Ti Zhi Tan Tao—Yi Zi Jin Liu Dong Guan Dian Fen Xi[Research on Issues of Taiwanese Firms’ 
Investment in Mainland China under Trends of Globalization: From a Perspective of Capital Flow],
Address at Symposium of East Asian and Taiwan’s Economic Development in Cross-Strait Economy and
Trade Research Center, Chihlee Institute of Technology, Taipei, Taiwan 1 (Nov. 9-18, 2005) (on file with
author); Horng-Ming Tsai, Taiwan Jing Mao Fa Zhan Dui Liang An Jing Mao Hu Dong Zhi Ying Xiang
[The Impact of Taiwan’s Economic Development on Cross-Strait Economic Interaction], 7 YUAN JING JI JIN
HUI JI KAN [PROSPE CT Q.] (ISSUE 2) 269 (2006) (Taiwan).
310 Mao-Zhong Ma, Tai Shang Fu Da Lu Tou Zi Jin Ru Mo Shi Yu Cheng Zhang Ce Lüe Guan Xi Zhi Yan
Jiu—Yi Zi Ran Mei Guo Ji Shi Ye Ji Tuan Lian Suo Jia Meng Wei Li [The Relationship between Entry
Modes and Growth Strategies in Mainland China for Taiwanese Companies—The Case Study on Natural
Beauty Franchise Chain] 68 (June 2004) (unpublished master thesis, Da-Yeh University) (on file with
author) (Taiwan).
311 Hou & Zhang, supra note 202, at 190.
312 Id. at 193.
313 Id. at 194 (alteration in original).
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Membership in the WTO opens China’s economy further for foreign investors.
China has promised to open telecommunications, banking and finance, insurance,
commercial, and other service industries to foreign investors. It has allowed foreign
investors to acquire business enterprises in China, besides setting up joint or
cooperative ventures, and wholly owned enterprises. It has agreed to eliminate
restrictions on markets, by allowing them to set up domestic sales outlets. It will
lower tariffs and thus the costs of production, but the advantage of production for
domestic sales would be decreased by competition from imports. The net effect of
the further opening is to increase foreign investment. The composition will also
change towards more of the service industries opened up under WTO
membership.314
For Taiwanese firms, the opening of new markets in the PRC as a consequence of WTO
accession in 2002indicates that the institutionalization of China’s trade system can lower 
the uncertainty of the business environment, which thus increases medium- and
large-sized Taiwanese firms’ incentives for investment in China. Moreover, after both the
PRC’sand Taiwan‘s WTO accession, Taiwanese firms encounter higher international
competition from other industrial countries, which pressures Taiwanese firms to invest
more in China with a view to reducing production costs and expanding domestic market
share.315 In other words, upon China’s accession to WTO, the wide opening up of the
market and swift increase in domestic demand in China accelerated Taiwanese
manufacturing enterprises’ seting up factories while atracting Taiwanese service 
industries to capture the market.316 Therefore, in light of Chinese official statistics, TDI
314 Chen-Yu Wang, The Impact of Regional Economic Integration under the GATT/WTO Regime toward
the Peace Process: The Case of Conflict Resolution between Taiwan and Mainland China 265-66 (Dec.
2006) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, American University) (on file with author) (citation omitted).
315 Horng-Ming Tsai, Zhong Guo Da Lu Jia Ru WTO Hou Dui Tai Shang Tou Zi Zhi Ying Xiang—Jian Lun
Wo Zheng Fu Zhi Zheng Ce Tiao Zheng [The Impact of China’s Accession to WTO on the Taiwan Investors 
and the Adjustments of Government Policy], 3 YUAN JING JI JIN HUI JI KAN [PROSPE CT Q.] (ISSUE 3)
161, 161, 201 (2002) (Taiwan).
316 Joseph Jaushieh Wu, Chairperson, Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Liang An Jing Mao Guan
Xi Ji Tou Zi Li Ji Fen Xi [The Analysis of Cross-Strait Economic Relations and the Investment Niche],
Address at the 25th World Chinese Traders Convention 12 (Oct. 4, 2006) (slides available at:
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in China has been increasing more, at least apparently since 2000 thanks to the above
WTO factor.317
Taking it by and large, abovethe rise in Taiwan’s labor costs and labor shortages,as
Hou and Zhang point out,
[t]he TDI boom in China is the result of an intimate interaction between Taiwanese
push force and Chinese pull gravity. This is a typical story of conventional
comparative advantages plus cultural and linguistic affinity across the Taiwan Strait.
On the one hand, China is at a lower stage of development, with abundant cheap
labor, vast amounts of land, and raw materials, which are attractive to foreign
investors. On the other hand, Taiwan has already industrialized, with sophisticated
technology and a well-established international marketing network, but seeking
industry upgrading because of changing international comparative advantages and
continued growth. Such economic complementarities are conducive to large
unilateral capital flows from Taiwan to China, as long as both governments do not
impose too many restrictions that might hamper such movement.318
In a word, the relative stages of development between the Taiwanese and Chinese
economies plus the international division of labor under economic globalization have led
to Taiwanese firms’ preference for investing in China.Meanwhile, the entry into WTO in
2002 of both China and Taiwan speeds the more obvious rise of TDI in China, in
particular demonstrated by the changing nature of TDI industries from labor-intensive
small firms to capital-technology-intensive large conglomerates.319
http://wctc25.taiwantrade.com.tw/20061004-1340-1.ppt).
317 CHARNG KAO, DA LU JING GAI YU LIANG AN JING MAO [CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM AND
CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC RELATIONS] 199 (2008) (Taiwan).
318 Hou & Zhang, supra note 202, at 200-01. See also Chang & Goldstein, supra note 190, at 21-22.
319 Hou & Zhang, supra note 202, at 197.
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1.2 The Transitions of the Capital Controls
1.2.1 Before the Imposition of the Capital Controls: A Perspective on Changes in the
Macroeconomic Context
As noted above, since the late 1980s, Taiwan’sgovernment has gradually lightened
the regulation of foreign exchanges and FDI outflows so that the mobility of Taiwanese
capital and firms has been increased since then. This is one of the significant reasons
responsible for the fact that TDI were flocking to the other side of the Strait from the
1990s. In effect, changes in the macroeconomic context could be the underlying factor
pushing this phenomenon through, and even presage the gradual collapse of the Capital
Controls. First of all, as Dignam and Galanis discuss,
the traumatic experiences of the Great Depression and WWII gave rise to a
consensus for the establishment of a stable international macroeconomic system,
along Keynesian interventionist lines, which would provide the foundations for the
reconstruction of devastated economies worldwide. In 1944, a conference at Bretton
Woods in the United States, gave rise to a global system of currency exchange
whereby all currencies were fixed to the US dollar and restrictions on the movement
of capital across borders were put in place.320
Further, “[a]key element in the stability achieved by the Bretton Woods Agreement was
the restriction on capital mobility across borders, which allowed national authorities
sufficient financial autonomy to pursue full employment and welfare state policies
designed to maintain sufficient levels of effective demand.”321 Put it somewhat
differently, it was not easy for Bretton Woods-style fixed exchange rates to be maintained
320 Dignam & Galanis, supra note 171, at 211.
321 Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added).
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in an open economy, and there should thus be some type of the restrictions on
cross-border capital mobility.
Nonetheless, “changes in key independent elements of the macroeconomy [led] up
to . . . the colapse of the Breton Woods Agreement . . . .”322 It merits quoting
Eichengreen’sexplanation at some length:
Pegged rates were viable for the first quarter-century after World War II, the
argument goes, because of the limited mobility of financial capital, and the
subsequent shift to floating rates was an inevitable consequence of increasing capital
flows. Under the Bretton Woods System that prevailed from 1945 through 1971,
controls loosened the constraints on policy. They allowed policymakers to pursue
domestic goals without destabilizing the exchange rate. They provided the breathing
space needed to organize orderly exchange rate changes. But the effectiveness of
controls was eroded by the postwar reconstruction of the international economy and
the development of new markets and trading technologies. The growth of highly
liquid international financial markets in which the scale of transactions dwarfed
official international reserves made it all but impossible to carry out orderly
adjustments of currency pegs. Not only could discussion before the fact excite the
markets and provoke unmanageable capital flows, but the act of devaluation,
folowing obligatory denials, could damage the authorities’ reputation for defending
the peg. Thus, at the same time that pegged exchange rates became more costly to
maintain, they became more difficult to adjust. The shift to floating was the
inevitable consequence.323
In the Taiwan case, from the end of World War II to July 10, 1978, Taiwan adopted
a fixed exchange rate system. In line with macroeconomic changes as explained above,
322 Id. at 216.
323 BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
1-2 (1998).
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since July 11, 1978, Taiwan has changed to a managed floating exchange rate system.324
As Dignam and Galanis elaborate,
[t]he collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system between 1971 and
1973 signalled the beginning of a new era for the inter-national economic order, in
which currencies floated free and capital controls were removed. As Eatwell noted,
when governments and Bretton Woods agencies stopped bearing the full costs of
currency management with the imposition of capital controls, foreign exchange risk
was privatized. Floating exchange rates not only created vast profit opportunities for
currency speculators, but also made hedging against volatility risks a necessity for
both financial and non-financial corporations. In order to deal with these new private
demands, governments removed exchange controls and financial regulations that
restricted capital flows. Relatively quickly, the majority of transactions in the newly
emerged global financial markets turned from financing trade or production to
capturing gains from speculative predictions about currency movements.325
Accordingly, in order to stay in harmony with the implementation of the floating rates
and to establish foreign exchange markets, Taiwan has progressively relaxed controls on
foreign exchange since 1979. In July 1987, Taiwan took major measures to liberalize
foreign exchange, thus removing most exchange controls and financial regulations that
restricted capital flows.326 Subsequently, Taiwan in 1989 modified laws on outward
investment on a large scale, which may contribute to the considerable upsurge of
investment in foreign areas (including Mainland China) from then on.327 Just as Dignam
and Galanis note,
324 2 CHING-HSI CHANG ET AL., JING JI XUE—LI LUN YU SHI JI [ECONOMICS—THEORY & PRACTICE]
338-39 (3rd ed. 1995) (Taiwan).
325 Dignam & Galanis, supra note 171, at 216-17 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
326 CHANG ET AL., supra note 324, at 340-41.
327 Huilin Wu, Lun Ti Shang Ru He Yin Ying Liang An Jing Mao De Yan Hua [On How Taiwanese
Businesses Respond to the Evolution of Cross-Strait Economic Relations], 34 JIAN HUA JIN RONG JI KAN
[SINOPAC FINANCIAL JOURNAL-QUARTERLY] 1, 6 (2006) (Taiwan).
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with unfettered capital mobility, cost-driven foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
can be directed from the developed world to countries where inputs, mainly labour,
are available at a low comparative cost. Thus, less developed countries with low
labour costs in terms of wages and employment protection enjoy significant
locational advantages over those countries where wages are high and redundancies
are costly.328
Therefore, since the end of 1980s, with the lifting of limits on foreign exchange in the
first instance, Taiwanese firms from the more developed world has been making more
and more investment on the Mainland as China’s low labor costs and potential markets 
held a special attraction for them.329 In other words, the macroeconomic changes lifted
bans on the mobility of Taiwanese capital; with remarkably lowered exit costs, the
aggrandized capital mobility subsequently gave rise to Taiwanese firms’progressively
investing overseas, especially in Mainland China.
In theory, pursuant to the macroeconomic tendency as stated above, Taiwan would
have not laid down more limits on capital mobility so as to let the invisible hand operate
more freely, or to let economic activity in the private sector prosper itself. As Chen and
Chu observe, prior to the imposition of the Capital Controls in 1997, “[f]or most 
Taiwanese investors, it’s only natural . . . to move their sunset industries to mainland 
China where they can rejuvenate their declining competitiveness. But Taiwan
government’s idea is somewhat different.”330 That is, in practice, national security
concerns over the dramatic rise in TDI in the PRC during the China investment boom of
the mid-1990s, coupled with increased cross-Strait tensions in 1995 and 1996 as
328 Dignam & Galanis, supra note 171, at 237 (footnote omitted).
329 Chen-Yuan Tung, Liang An Jing Ji Quan Qiu Fen Gong Yu Hu Lai [Cross-Strait Economic Relations in
View of Global Division of Labor and Interdependence], 7 JING JI QING SHI JI PING LUN [ECON. SITUATION
& COMMENT.] (ISSUE 3) 116, 119 (2001) (Taiwan).
330 Chen & Chu, supra note 182, at 220.
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highlighted in Chapter 3.B.3.3-4, mainly prompted former President Ten-Hui Lee in
September 1996 to announce the NHBP policy.331 Nevertheless, as explicated below in
Chapter 3.B.2, facing up to the non-economic concerns such as national security,
business demands for more intense investment in China put enormous pressures on the
ability of Taiwan’sgovernment to maintain the strictness of the Capital Controls. In
effect, the notable increase of cross-border capital mobility, following changes in the
macroeconomic context, presages the conundrum that the systemic fortress and legitimate
reason for keeping up the Capital Controls would be gradually demolished.
1.2.2The “No Haste, Be Patient” Policy (1997-2001)
Taiwan, in July 1997, amended and implemented related restrictions on investment
in Mainland China. However, as Sutter argues, “[g]overnment restrictions and political
tensions”have significantly hampered business activities.332 According to the Principles
amended on July 15, 1997, Taiwan’sgovernment, until adopting the PLEM policy in
2001, prohibited individual investments in the PRC of more than $50 million and
required a case-by-case review of investments in sensitive sectors such as IT, chemicals,
real estate, and infrastructure, by using a rating system to assess a variety of factors.
MOEA classified potential investments in China as permited, prohibited, and “special 
331 Sutter, supra note 184, at 525. See also Zhen-Yin Jiang, Yin Ying Jing Ji Quan Qiu Hua Zhi Liang An
Jing Mao Guan Xi [Handling Cross-Strait Economic Relations under Globalization], 26 TAIWAN JING JI
YAN JIU YUE KAN [TAIWAN ECON . RES . MONTH LY] ( I SSUE 1) 50, 51 (2003) (Taiwan).
332 Sutter, supra note 200, at 29.
134
case.”Permitted projects were of industries where Taiwan is no longer internationally
competitive, those that were not a critical part of a production chain or labor intensive, or
projects for which the PRC could supply key raw materials for production. Prohibited
investments included projects that involved critical technologies and products related to
national defense, strategic industries, and infrastructure. Special-case investments were
generally supposed to be under $50 million. As shown below in Table 6, Taiwan also
imposeda general system to limit Taiwanese firms’ investments in the PRC according to 
their overall financial exposure and ownership structure.
In sum, the NHBP policy has been driven by two main ideas: “Rapid outflows of
FDI from Taiwan to mainland China might ‘hollow out’Taiwan’s industries,”and
“businessmen putting too many eggs in one basket in Mainland China might render
Taiwan vulnerable to future antagonistic moves by China.”333
1.2.3The “Proactive Liberalization with Effective Management” Policy (2001-2005)
Why was there a regulatory transition from NHBP to PLEM in 2001? Yang and
Hung find:
While past efforts [of the NHBP policy] to restrain investment were designed to
prevent China from gaining an economic or technological advantage over Taiwan,
the following factors have forced the government in Taipei to rethink its strategy: a
333 Chen & Chu, supra note 182, at 220. See also Yang & Hung, supra note 199, at 682 (“There is a fear 
that the Taiwanese manufacturing sector could be swalowed up by China”).
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sagging economy and Taiwan’s January 1, 2002 entry into the [WTO]. With the
economic problems over the last three years, especially in 2001, industry executives
are hoping that the opportunity for Taiwan’s manufacturers to expand and flourish 
more in China will result in a stronger local economy. The WTO entry for both
China and Taiwan is pressuring Taiwanese officials to dismantle trade barriers.334
What’s more, as Chen further notes, “[in] spite of Taiwan’s oficial restrictions on 
bilateral trade and investment, China has become an important trading partner and an
important investment destination for Taiwan. The entry into WTO by China and Taiwan
would eliminate some of these restrictions, returning the bilateral trade relationship to
normalcy.”335 In fact, Taiwan entered into the WTO on January 1, 2002, which date is
not long after the regulatory transition from NHBP to PLEM was carried through. It is
obvious that this transition is considerably relevant to Taiwan’s eforts for accession to 
the WTO.336 Moreover, subsequent to both the PRC’sand Taiwan‘s WTO accession,
Taiwanese firms confronted more intense international competition from other industrial
countries, which forced these firms to inevitably invest more in China so as to further
lower production costs and to expand more market share on the Mainland.337
From the general perspective of international division of labor under economic
globalization, Sutter argues:
Growing cross-Strait investment and trade is also driven in part by changing patterns
in East Asia. The 1990s saw large inflows of foreign investment and cross-border
334 Id.
335 Tain-Jy Chen,The Impact of China’s Accession into the WTO and Taiwan-China Trade and Investment
Relations, in CHINA ENTERS WTO: PURSUING SYMBIOSIS WITH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 153, 168-69 (Ippei
Yamazawa & Kenichi Imai eds., 2001).
336 Qiao-Xuan Li, Wo Guo Dui Da Lu Jing Mao Zheng Ce Yu Gui Fan Zhi Guo Jia An Quan Fen Xi
[Analysis of National Security regardingTaiwan’s Economic and Trade Policyand Regulation] 85 (June
2006) (unpublished master thesis, National Taiwan University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
337 See Xie, supra note 308.
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specialization, especially in intermediate goods. China quickly became a base for
more technology-intensive industries such as machinery and electronics, thanks to
its lower trade bariers and labor costs. Upon China’s WTO entry barriers would fall
even further, allowing for even more cross-border specialization and
interdependence in manufacturing trade in areas such as chemicals, steel, and IT. For
example, as signatories to the Information Technology Agreement, PRC and Taiwan
must lower tariffs on most IT imports to zero over a five-year period.338
In light of comparative advantages plus cultural and linguistic affinity across the Strait as
well as economic complementarities, Taiwanese firms kept voicing their petition for the
liberalization of the NHBP policy in order to maintain their value in the global production
chain.339
To be sure, “[t]here is a concern in some quarters in Taiwan that from a national
security perspective Taiwan is becoming overly dependent on the PRC market. Policy
makers in Taiwan are also worried about the speed and direction of economic integration
with further liberalization following WTO accession [of both Taiwan and China].”340
Despite this concern, “as the PRC liberalizes investment opportunities in the very sectors
that remain regulated by Taipei, many firms are skirting domestic ceilings.”341 In order
not to lose control over dramatic and explosive cross-Strait trade and investment,
Taiwan’sgovernment cannot but try to maintain realistic policies. President Shui-Bian
Chen of DPP, who was sworn in in 2000 and deeply anxious about maintaining
cross-Strait trade and investment in the early period of his first term of presidency,
338 Sutter, supra note 200, at 30.
339 Shu-Cheng Weng, Wo Guo Da Lu Jing Mao Zheng Ce Bian Qian Zhi Yan Jiu—Cong “Ji Ji Kai Fang
You Xiao Guan Li” Dao “Ji Ji Guan Li You Xiao Kai Fang”[Study on the Change of Taiwan’s Economic 
and Trade Policy towards Mainland China—from “Proactive Liberalization with Efective Management”to
“Proactive Management with Efective Liberalization”] 93 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished master thesis, National
Taiwan University) (on file with author) (Taiwan).
340 Sutter, supra note 184, at 534 (alteration in original).
341 Id. at 535.
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“regained some momentum with the formation and meeting of the Economic
Development Advisory Council in [August] 2001.”342 The Economic Development
Advisory Council (“EDAC”) not only “included representatives from Taiwan’s business 
community and major political parties,”but “agreed on a range of economic
recommendations, including the liberalization of direct trade and investment, the creation
of more flexible cross-Strait capital flow mechanisms, and the opening of travel and
tourism.”343 The EDAC statements “offer an important source of support and legitimacy
that alow Chen’s administration to pursue liberalization.”344 This is the first-stage
relaxation of the Capital Controls from 1997 to 2008.
According to the Principles amended on Nov. 20, 2001, Taiwan’sgovernment eased
the NHBP policy towards the PLEM policy. Under the new investment policy of PLEM,
Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (equivalent to U.S. Department of State) simplified the 
classification into a general category that would require case-by-case approval and a
prohibited category. This new policy also included the much-discussed lifting of the $50
million ceiling on individual investments and a simplification of approvals for investment
projects under $20 milion. The general system to limit Taiwanese firms’ investments in 
the PRC according to their overall investment exposure and ownership structure is also
relaxed as exhibited in Table 7.
In sum, as Chang and Goldstein point out,
342 Sutter, supra note 200, at 32 (alteration in original).
343 Id.
344 Sutter, supra note 184, at 532.
138
[i]n 2001, on the eve of accession to the WTO, the administration of [Shui-Bian
Chen] tried to seize the initiative in managing economic relations with the
[M]ainland. It abandoned the [NHBP] policy and replaced it with a policy of
[PLEM], which was both the recognition of the failure of earlier attempts to
regulate and a political concession to the business community on the eve of the
legislative elections. In essence, the rules that followed from the new approach
retained the principle of government regulation of investments and imports, and
[maintained]the “security coeficient of the economy” [(“Effective Management”)],
while simplifying administrative procedures and easing restrictions on the size of
investments (for example, the US$50 million cap on investment size was eliminated)
and on the types of projects that could be initiated [(“Proactive Liberalization”)].345
1.2.4 The “Proactive Management with Effective Liberalization” Policy (2006- Apr.
2008)
On January 1, 2006, President Shui-Bian Chen in the public speech of New Year’s 
Message advocated a “new idea and method” concerning cross-Strait economic and trade
policies. He asserted that the consensus of the PLEM policy reached by EDAC in August
2001 would be replaced by the “Proactive Management with Effective Liberalization”
policy (the “PMEL” policy). According to the Mainland Afairs Council (“MAC”), the 
primary aim of this new policy is to advance “disciplined” liberalization of cross-Strait
economic and trade policies, to alleviate the negative impact incidental to liberalization,
to assure the individuality of Taiwan’s economy, and to cary out the macro-economic
developmentalstrategy of “Richly Cultivating Taiwan while Reaching Out to the World."
Put simply, this new policy is an atempt to decrease Taiwan’s dependence on China’s 
economy.346 Three factors play key roles in this regulatory transition from PLEM to
PMEL. First, as Wang notes,
345 Chang & Goldstein, supra note 190, at 35 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
346 KAO, supra note 317, at 158.
139
Beijing’s new leader, Chairman Hu Jintao . . . clearly defined the policy toward
Taiwan as wel as set up a “Red Line,” using military force to backup [the]
Anti-Secession Law [enacted Mar. 14, 2005]. This was the first time that Beijing
transferred the political issue of using military force toward Chinese unification to a
legal perspective.347
Second, Taiwan’s economy has been increasingly and substantialy dependent on China’s 
market. Encountering China’s military hostility especialy after the enactment of the
Anti-Secession Law, Taiwan’s policymakers intended to maintain Taiwan’s national 
security via the PMEL policy. Third, Taiwan’s government reckoned that the
liberalization dimension of the PLEM policy was over-emphasized whereas the “security 
coefficient of the economy” (“Effective Management”) is not implemented effectively.
Therefore, the transition from PLEM to PMEL is to strengthen the regulatory or
management dimension of the former policy.348
Specifically, the most noticeable policy tool to help enforce the PMEL policy lies in
the Policy Review on significant investments in China. According to the Principles
amended on December 25, 2006, on top of existing case-by-case approval by MOEA,
under each of the following three circumstances a Policy Review should be conducted
towards applications of prior approval for investments in China: First, the amount of an
individual investment made by individuals, legal persons and organizations in Taiwan
exceeds $100 million; second, the amount of accumulated investments exceeds $200
million while the amount of capital-increase for each time exceeds $60 million; third,
investments involve core industrial technology. Under the Policy Review, Taiwanese
347 Wang, supra note 314, at 82 (alteration in original).
348 Weng, supra note 339, at 93-94.
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firms’ CEOs would be interviewed by a panel consisting of the personnel from all
authorities concerned in order to request these firms’ concrete commitment regarding 
financial plans, technology transfers, exported equipment, and mutual investment and
employment in Taiwan. These firms should further commit themselves to assenting to
on-site investigation on factories located in China by professionals delegated by MOEA.
The main difference between the PMEL policy introduced in 2006 and the PLEM
policy launched in 2001 is that the former focuses on enhancement of the “security
coeficient of the economy” (“Effective Management”) of the PLEM policy. Basically,
there are no other crucial differences between these two policies349 as, for instance, the
general system to limit Taiwanese firms’ investments in the PRC according to their
overall investment exposure and ownership structure remains unchanged. But most
people think that the PMEL policy adds another layer of controls over Taiwanese firms’ 
investment in China in comparison with the former PLEM policy. 350 On top of
legislators from KMT (the then opposition and current ruling party which took
anti-regulatory position), many people even including legislators from DPP, the then
ruling and current opposition party which took pro-regulatory stance, also opposed the
re-tightened PMEL policy, arguing that the Policy Review would expedite physical exit
of Taiwanese firms and capital.351 Replying to foreign journalists’ inquiry of whether the
349 See Li, supra note 336, at 143.
350 See, e.g., Weng, supra note 339, at 2, 87 & 89; Tai Dang Ju Zai Du Jin Suo Da Lu Tou Zi Zheng Ce
[Taiwan’s Government Re-tightens the Regulation on Investment in Mainland China], HUA XIA JING WEI
WANG [HUAXIA NETWORK] (P.R.C.), Mar. 28, 2006, http://big5.huaxia.com/tslj/rdgc/2006/03/71460.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2008); Zhe Shi Xing Zheng Qian Zhi Bu Shi Ji Ji Quan Li [This Is Perverse
Administrative Intervention, Not Proactive Management], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL
NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 24, 2006,
http://www.singtaonet.com/op_ed/taiwan_forum/t20060324_173080.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008)
(quoting the editorial of China Times in Taiwan).
351 Tou Zi Da Lu Zeng Zheng Ce Shen Cha Lü Wei Pi: Zhe Yang Gao Xia Qu Si Ding Le [The Policy
Review Is Imposed on Investment in Mainland China; legislator from the Ruling Party: Taiwan’s Economy 
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PMEL policy was against the trend of globalization, then Vice Premier and current DPP
Chairperson Ing-Wen Tsai admitted at that time that Taiwan’s unilateral regulation was 
neither the best nor the only way to resolve the problem of Taiwan’s economical 
over-dependence on China, and that this new policy could merely delay Taiwanese firms’ 
further investment in the PRC but was unable to efectively block up these firms’ paths 
towards Mainland China. 352 In response to this transition towards probable more
regulation, China-based Taiwanese firms not only continued voicing their petition for
more liberalization of cross-Strait economic and trade policies,353 but also kept exiting
from Taiwan’s stock markets by listing shares abroad and transferring their capital
located in Taiwan through “underground” or ilegal routes towards China, in order to 
evade the Capital Controls and Constraints.354
Meets Its Doom], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 24, 2006,
http://www.singtaonet.com/global/taiwan/t20060324_173120.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
352 Ing-Wen Tsai: Liang An Jing Mao“You Xiao Kai Fang”Zheng Ce Shu Yue Nei Xian Pai [Ing-Wen Tsai:
“Efective Liberalization” Policy of Cross-Strait Economic Relations Will Be Announced in Several
Months], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 28, 2006,
http://www.stnn.cc:82/global/taiwan/t20060328_176379.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). Similarly, Tung
argues that the NHBP policy initiated by the Lee administration in 1997 did not effectively impose too
many constraints on Taiwan-invested firms’ actual investment in China, and that these firms even expedited
shifting their production bases towards China, thus successfully strengthening their global competitiveness
by taking good advantage of the edge of linguistic affinities and geographic proximity. CHEN-YUAN TUNG,
DONG YA JING JI ZHENG HE YU TAIWAN DE ZHAN LÜE [THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION REGIME
AND TAIWAN’S STRATEGY] 374 (2009) (Taiwan); also Tung, supra note 266, at 16.
353 Weng, supra note 339, at 75.
354 Ji Ji Guan Li Pei Tao Ji Zhi Chu Tai Da Lu Tai Shang: Wei Shi Yi Wan [Supportive Tools of Proactive
Management Are Ready; Taiwanese Business Community: It’s Too Late], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING
TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 23, 2006,
http://www.singtaonet.com/global/taiwan/t20060323_172185.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008); Zhen-Ling
Peng, Op-Ed., Ji Ji Quan Li Fan Xiao Guo Bi Taiwan Ben Tu Qi Ye Lian Gen Chu Zou [Adverse Effect of
the Policy of Proactive Management with Effective Liberalization: Forcing Taiwanese Local Enterprises to
Totally Exit], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 23, 2006,
http://www.singtaonet.com/global/taiwan/t20060323_172042.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008); Tou Zi Da Lu
Ji Ji Guan Li Ye Jie: Xian Zhi Yue Duo Di Xia Guan Dao Yue Wang [Investments in Mainland China Will be
Proactively Managed; Business Community: The More Restrictions, the More Investments Are Driven
Underground], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar. 24, 2006,
http://www.singtaonet.com/global/taiwan/t20060324_173174.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
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1.2.5 Large-Scale Liberalization since May 2008
As elaborated above in Chapter 3.A.2.2, torrential outflows of Taiwanese capital and
firms pressured Taiwan’sgovernment to deliberate turning to a more laissez-faire
regulation. Such policy direction was then confirmed by promises from both candidates
in Taiwan’s presidential election concluded in March 2008.355 In light of Taiwan’s plight 
of sluggish economy, both presidential candidates from KMT and DPP at that time
maintained prospective relaxation of the Capital Controls. 356 The current KMT
government has been, step by step, introducing a series of deregulation measures since
President Ma, who advocated anti-regulatory and pro-China policies, was inaugurated in
May 2008.
According to the Principles amended on Aug. 29, 2008, Taiwan’sgovernment eased
the PMEL policy to a tremendous degree. Under this new investment policy, the
following measures are taken in order to simplify the review process for investment in
China: First, the Policy Review on significant investments in China is canceled. Second,
355 Bradsher reports:
Mr. Chen is prevented by the Constitution from running for a third four-year term when voters go to
the polls on March 22, 2008 to choose the next president. And both candidates want closer economic
relations with the mainland, including the front-runner, Ma Ying-Jeou of the opposition Nationalist
Party, as wel as Frank Hsieh, from President Chen’s own Democratic Progressive Party.
Bradsher, supra note 2.
356 Mr. Ma, the candidate from the current ruling party KMT and the new president-elect, supported the
relaxation of the Capital Controls by a wide margin. See, e.g., Taiwan International Securities Investment
Consulting Corp., A Breakout Bull Market for Taiwan’s Bourse(May 2007),
http//www.tisc.com.tw/new/newreport/special/upload/special20070525-1.pdf (last visited Sep. 22, 2007)
(Taiwan). On the other hand, Mr. Hsieh, the candidate from the former ruling and current opposition party
DPP, also turned to the partially loosening of the Capital Controls under specific circumstances. See, e.g.,
Hsieh Chang-Ting Zhu Zhang Kai Fang Zhong Guo Da Lu Zi Jin Lai Tai [Frank Hsieh Claims Allowing the
Entry of Mainland Capital into Taiwan], ZHONG GUANG XIN WEN WANG [BCC NEWS NETWORK] (Taiwan),
Oct. 18, 2007, http://news.pchome.com.tw/crossstraits/bcc/20071018/fpt-20071018183607210145.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
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investments in China less than $1 million may be reported ex post within six months of
the carrying out of these investments. Third, only when the accumulated amount of an
individual investment exceeds $50 million will a special-case review be conducted.
Fourth, a review system of key technology, that substantialy afects Taiwan’s domestic 
economy and is required for domestic industrial development, is established to ensure
that the key technology will not flow out and thus to maintain the competitiveness of
Taiwanese industries. Moreover, the general system to limit Taiwanese firms’ 
investments in the PRC according to their overall investment exposure and ownership
structure is appreciably liberalized as shown in Table 8.
1.3 The Paradox between the Surge of Investment in China and the Relaxation of
the Capital Controls
As Figure 1 displays, we can see that TDI in China has been increasing significantly
over time (from $1.61454 billion in 1997 to $9.97055 billion in 2007). In effect, the
Capital Controls had been designed to stem the tide of TDI in China, so that Taiwan’s
government should have maintained or lowered caps of TDI in China while enforcing the
Capital Controls more and more stringently, like the transition from the PLEM policy in
2001 to the PMEL policy in 2006, which in my definition indicates that “Investment 
Alowance” should have been at least maintained or further decreased over time.
Nonetheless, if using caps on Taiwanese individuals’ accumulated amount of investments 
in China from the NHBP policy (NT$60 million), to the PLEM policy (NT$80 million),
to the PMEL (NT$80 million), and to large-scale liberalization in 2008 ($5 million or
around NT$168 million) as a proxy for Investment Allowance, we can find a paradox that
the Capital Controls are relaxed in 2001 and the range of relaxation in 2008 after
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President Ma took power is distinctly wide especially in the cases that the investment
upper limit of a Taiwanese corporation establishing its headquarter in Taiwan or of a
multinational enterprise’s Taiwanese subsidiary is wholy lifted. 
Therefore, questions arise: Why did both TDI in China and Investment Allowance
move in a rising way as shown in Figure 2? What would be the causation between these
two curves? In my opinion, the regulatory transition of the Capital Controls from 1997 to
2008 could appropriately illustrate how international jurisdictional competition provoked
by business demands of Taiwanese firms and their attending firm or capital mobility
under globalization shaped the easing trend of China-investment regulation by Taiwan’s
government. To be concrete, I would tentatively argue that business demands, via exit
and voice rights (or law market forces underlying international jurisdictional competition),
spurred stage-by-stage relaxation of Taiwan’s Capital Controls. The international
jurisdictional competition, which were stimulated by these business demands and fuelled
by accompanying firm mobility, pushed such a democratically constrained onshore
jurisdiction as Taiwan to relieve its excessive regulation to a more flexible regime, even
though Taiwan’sgovernment struggled to regulate investment in Mainland China as
effectively as possible but failed after all due to the impacts of globalization in general
and the“denationalization of financial capital”in particular.357 In another word, both the
notable increase of TDI in China under economic globalization and the fact that the
international jurisdictional competition (primarily provoked by the denationalization of
357 See Dignam & Galanis, supra note 171, at 217 (discussing that “with the denationalization of financial
capital, significant constraints have been imposed on national authorities’ discretion to formulate 
macroeconomic policies,” and that “global financial integration has led to a loss of national autonomy, at
least in the sphere of macroeconomic policy making”).
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financial capital) turns the Capital Controls ineffective, as explained below, contribute to
the stage-by-stage liberalization.
2. Law Market Forces Also at Work: The Stage-by-Stage Relaxation Nudged by
International Jurisdictional Competition
2.1 Onshore Jurisdictions’ Regulatory Capacity Impaired by Globalization
2.1.1 Circumvention via Offshore Financial Centers
In the light of China’s statistics, from mid-1990s TDI remains the second largest
FDI in the PRC. But from 1999 TDI falls to the fourth largest while OFCs in British
Central America such as BVI become the second largest FDI inflows in China. As shown
in Table 4 and the attending discussion in Part A.1.2.2.2 of this chapter, at least since
1994 OFCs in British Central America have been priorities for destinations of Taiwan’s 
outward investment aside from Mainland China. A study displays that Taiwanese firms
transit their funds to these OFCs for later investments in China whereas these funds are
not exhibited in China’s statistics of TDI.358 In other words, China’s statistics 
358 David Ming Wei, Tai Shang Yu Tai Shang Zheng Ce: Da Zao Liang An Guan Xi De Suo Yue [Taiwanese
Businessmen in China: Key to Cross-Strait Relationship], 460 DONG YA LUN TAN JI KAN [E. ASIA REV.] 37,
42-43 (2008) (Taiwan). See also Shao-Yun Fang, Jing Wai Gong Si Ji Tuan Chong Zu De Yun Zuo [How the
Restructuring of Offshore Corporate Groups Works], SHI YONG YUE KAN [TAXE S & B US . MONT HLY
SERVICE S] , Apr. 2002, at 54 (Taiwan); Shao-Yun Fang, Xuan Yong Wei Jing Dao Gong Si Zuo Da Lu
Tou Zi Kong Gu Gong Si De Zai Kao Liang [Reconsidering Whether to Adopt BVI Corporations as
Holding Corporations for Investment in Mainland China], SHI YONG YUE KAN [TAXE S & BUS .
MONT HLY SE RVI CE S] , June 2002, at 57 (Taiwan) (arguing that Taiwanese firms indirectly invest in
China by incorporating investment-holding corporations in BVI in order to evade the Capital Controls);
Zi-Ping Huang, Cong Guan Xi Ren Jiao Yi Ji Cai Wu Bao Biao Xiang Mu Deng Gong Kai Zi Xun Tan Tao
Tai Shang Jin Xing Da Lu Tou Zi Zhi Cai Wu Zi Xun [Research on Financial Information on Taiwanese
Businesses’ Investment in Mainland Chinain Light of Public Information such as Related Party
Transactions and Items on Financial Statements], at I (June 2002) (unpublished master thesis, National
Cheng Kung University) (on file with author) (arguing that Taiwanese firms indirectly invest in the PRC by
incorporating holding companies in a third area such as BVI, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Cayman
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underestimate the real amount of TDI in China. From mid-1990s, due to the imposition of
the NHBP policy, many Taiwanese firms remitted capital to holding corporations
incorporated in OFCs for later indirect investment in Mainland China. As exhibited in
Table 9, there is a coincidence between the increase of Taiwan’s investment in BVI and 
that of BVI’s investment in Chinain the second halfof the 1990s. Taiwan’s investment in 
OFCs in British Central America increased from 15% of Taiwan’s total outward 
investment in 1995 to 30% in 1999; this doubling made British Central America the
second largest destination for Taiwan’s outward investment. From China’s perspective, 
BVI’s outward investment in China increased from 0.8% of China’s total FDI inflows in
1995 to 6.6% in 1999; this growing rendered BVI surpass Japan in terms of FDI inflows
to China, thus turning into the third largest FDI source only second to Hong Kong and the
United States.359 Further, some might wonder why the differences of numbers of cases in
Taiwan’s and China’s statistics in Table 2 fals over time from a factor approximately 10
to less. The above evidence, to a degree, could account for this change. To be concrete,
since the imposition of the Capital Controls in 1997, more and more Taiwanese firms
have transformed their channel of investment in China: from direct investment approved
by MOEA and identified by Chinese officials as TDI to indirect investment through
Islands); Wang, supra note 314, at 266 (arguing that in spite of the government’s restrictions trade and
investment between Taiwan and Mainland China have existed by flowing through Hong Kong and other
avenues); JUNG-PAO KANG ET AL., WO QUO QI YE FU HAI WAI MU JI ZI JIN AN JIAN ZHI FA XING TIAO JIAN
JI QI FA XING JIA GE HE LI XING ZHI YAN JIU [RESEARCH ON THE REASONABILITY REGARDING IPO
CONDITIONS AND PRICE OF TAIWANESE FIRMS RAISING CAPITAL OVERSEAS] 2 (2004) (on file with author)
(Taiwan) (arguing that restrictions on capital flow and caps on investment in Mainland China are among the
reasons why Taiwanese firms invest in the PRC, usually through a third country); Te-Shen Chen, Jing Ji
Quan Qiu Hua Yu Tai Shang Da Lu Tou Zi: Ce Lüe Yu Bu Ju [Economic Globalization and Taiwan’s 
Investment Strategies in China], in JING JI QUAN QIU HUAYU TAI SHANG DA LU TOU ZI: CE LÜE BU JU YU
BI JIAO [ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND TAIWAN’S INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN CHINA] 127, 139
(Te-Sheng Chen ed., 2008) (Taiwan) (explaining that as demonstrated in Table 4 most of Taiwan’s 
investments in British Central America and Hong Kong are transited for investments in China).
359 CHEN-YUAN TUNG, QUAN QIU HUA XIA DE LIANG AN JING JI GUAN XI [CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC
RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION] 25-26 (2003) (Taiwan).
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OFCs to successfully avoid the Capital Controls but indentified by Chinese Officials as
FDI from British Central America. As the number of projects identified by China as TDI
decreases, the factor turns out to be less.
According to a couple of reports, from 1992 to 2001 many famous Taiwanese
conglomerates, including Taiwan Ting Hsing Group (the largest food and drinks
manufacturer in the Greater Chinese Economy), invested in China through their
subsidiaries incorporated in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and BVI as holding
companies.360 In accordance with another study by Chen-Yuan Tung who surveyed
several China-based Taiwanese firms, a former chairman of Taiwan’s chamber of 
commerce in Shanghai expressed that most of the funds transferred from BVI to
Mainland China were Taiwanese capital and that outside of Taiwanese firms there was
relatively little need for Japanese, European, or American firms to transfer funds to BVI
first and then employ these funds for investment in China. Other Taiwanese firms
surveyed also indicated that many Taiwanese firms including themselves invested in
Mainland China via holding companies incorporated in BVI, the Cayman Islands, or
Bermuda.361 The above result of Tung’s study is further coroborated by the following
evidence. In the light of statistics colected by PRC’s Ministry of Commerce in 2002, 
78% of FDI inflows to China from BVI and the Cayman Islands were funds indirectly
invested by Taiwanese firms; Chinese estimation in 2004 demonstrated that around 70%
of FDI inflows to China from the above two OFCs were Taiwanese capital. Dan-Yang
Shen, a senior research felow and official in PRC’s Ministry of Commerce, also asserted
that about two-thirds of funds invested in China from OFCs like BVI were originally
360 Id. at 26.
361 Tung, supra note 329, at 120-21.
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derived from Taiwanese businesspeople.362
2.1.2 The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in International Jurisdictional
Competition
As discussed above, Taiwanese entrepreneurs have increasingly been incorporating
in Hong Kong or other OFCs like the Cayman Islands and BVI in order to bypass the
Capital Controls. In other words, Taiwanese firms have tackled the Capital Controls by
structuring abroad in OFCs such as BVI.363 Obviously, OFCs play an important role here.
As we know, with increasing globalization, many firms are directly registering in OFCs
such as Bermuda, BVI or the Cayman Islands; more and more multinationals are setting
up their affiliates in OFCs, while other firms are transferring their headquarters to OFCs.
One of the significant reasons is that secrecy policies are a specific feature of most
362 Hung & Tung, supra note 293, at 6. Sutter presented a similar report:
By the end of 2000 . . . [TDI in China] is likely to be as high as $70 billion - 100 billion, in view of
investments by Taiwanese firms via offshore companies in Hong Kong and [other OFCs], which is
not typically calculated as [TDI in China] in either PRC or Taiwan statistics. When these indirect
investments are included, an estimated 50% of Taiwan’s outbound FDI is now invested in the PRC.
According to Taiwan’s MOEA, by the end of 2000 almost three-quarters of Taiwanese firms that had
invested overseas had investments in the PRC.
Sutter, supra note 184, at 528-29(alteration in original) (footnote omited). Specificaly, “[w]hen one
calculates for[Taiwan’s] indirect investment in China, a large percentage of the 20.86% that MOEA
indicated went to‘tax havens in British Central America’and [of] the 2.55% that went to Hong Kong in
fact went [altogether] onward towards PRC investments [as the final destination].”Id. at 529 (alteration in
original). As Sutter adds, in around 2002,
as investment has shifted to electronics and IT production, [Taiwanese] investment has increased
dramatically in and around Shanghai. According to the MOEA, between 1997 and 2000 electronics
jumped from 20% to 60% of all approved [Taiwanese] investment in the PRC. The real figure is
likely even higher considering the many IT investments that were structured offshore during this
period.
Id.at 530 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
363 Id. at 527.
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OFCs,364 particularly in relation to both the beneficial ownership of offshore companies
and to offshore bank accounts. For instance, “the Cayman Islands adopted a statute
providing exceptionally strong financial privacy protections, expanding on what was
available under the applicable English common law by adding criminal sanctions for
violations.”365 Also, “financial entities in the Cayman Islands are well-protected against
leaks of confidential information accumulated in the course of investigations by the
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law.”366 On BVI, the secrecy of BVI
International Business Companies is highly preserved. Information regarding
shareholders and directors in these companies is not made public. The beneficial
ownership of these companies cannot be disclosed either. Only owners of registered
shares and persons designated by BVI’s courtsare allowed to review stock ledgers.
Therefore, in general, the public cannot know which companies have something to do
with investment in Mainland China.367 When it comes to how Taiwanese firms have their
offshore subsidiaries or affiliates list shares overseas to evade the Restrictions, “four
jurisdictions of incorporation are prescribed [by HKSE] for the purpose of eligibility for
listing by the Listing Rules, namely Hong Kong, the [PRC], Bermuda and the Cayman
Islands. The Listing Committee of HKSE in October 2006 also approved Australia and
Canada (British Columbia) as acceptable jurisdictions.”368 According to HKSE’s 
364 Art Durnev et al., The Governance of Offshore Firms: Implications for Financial Reporting 2-3, 8-9
(Apr. 18, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325895.
365 Andrew P. Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition 48 (University
of Illinois Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE07-032, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275390.
366 Id. at 50.
367 Shao-Yun Fang, Hang Wai Ren Shi Dui Jing Wai Gong Si De Wu Jie Yu Zheng Jie [Layperson’s 
Misunderstanding over Offshore Companies and the Clearing Up], SHI YONG YUE KAN [TAXE S & BUS .
MONT HLY SE RVI CE S] , Oct. 2003, at 54-55 (Taiwan).
368 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, Joint Policy Statement Regarding the Listing of Overseas
Companies (Mar. 2007), http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/070307news.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2009) (H.K.) (alteration in original).
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statistics by Mar. 2, 2006, among 48 Taiwan-invested firms once or then listing shares on
HKSE, 14 of them are incorporated on Bermuda, one in Hong Kong, and 35 on the
Cayman Islands.369 Now that HKSE also permits firms incorporated in the PRC for
listing, why are most of the listed Taiwan-invested firms, which make large investment in
China, incorporated in OFCs, rather than Mainland China? We can clearly find that given
the secrecy of companies incorporated in OFCs not only most of the Taiwanese
conglomerates would by incorporating holding companies in OFCs break through the
blockade of the Capital Controls, but also those which need to raise funds on HKSE
would also first incorporate a company in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda and then have
that offshore company list shares on HKSE, so as to successfully circumvent the
Restrictions.370 Since Hong Kong neither imposes any restraint on listedfirms’ operation 
areas and uses of funds raised, nor agrees with Taiwan’sgovernment to help enforce the
Restrictions, HKSE, as a supplier for a listing product of legal flexibility in dealing with
the Capital Controls and Constraints, progressively becomes a favorite fund-raising venue
for Taiwanese firms in need of investing in China.
Apart from Hong Kong, in the jurisdictional competition for Taiwanese firms among
global legal centers, other OFCs are crucial suppliers for regulatory products of legal
flexibility in dealing with the Capital Controls. Taiwan’s Capital Controls are laws that
seek to change Taiwanese firms’ behavior by altering incentives (through imposing an 
exit tax on China-based Taiwanese firms or on capital flows from Taiwan to China).
Taiwanese firms, after turning into MNCs which create multinational production and
distribution networks, may therefore be inclined to minimize the more costly operation of
369 Xu, supra note 257, at 140.
370 See Lin, supra note 225, at 85, 89.
151
headquarters and listing activities in Taiwan, and favor their economic transactions
conducted in Hong Kong and other OFCs not least located in British Central America.
These OFCs not only operate company registries and similar activities, but also “secure
high value added transactional work creating and managing business entities.”371 Since
many of them“today have evolved . . . to a mix of financial center activities that include
legal, accounting, and other services in an attempt to expand the portion of the economic
activity occurring within their borders,”they can yield greater benefits to the local
economy.372 For example, “[b]y being prepared, Cayman profited from the flight of
capital from the Bahamas after independence. Cayman developed new products,
expanding beyond a company registry and banking to hedge funds and captive
insurance.”373 Likewise, by attracting more and more prosperous China-based Taiwanese
firms to list shares, Hong Kong secures more financial center activities to its local
economy as well.
Therefore, these OFCs are incentivized to compete on these margins by supplying
not simply the secrecy of investment in Mainland China but also the flexibility of capital
movement, which increases “the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory package.”374
Competition on this margin would tend to force Taiwan to produce less costly forms of
the Capital Controls, as the stage-by-stage relaxation from 1997 to 2008 demonstrates.
Specifically, these OFCs are able to undercut the price charged by Taiwan’sgovernment
through exit taxes as well as to facilitate TDI in China which the Taiwanese government
dislikes. Hence these OFCs offering legal flexibility for TDI in China enables avoidance
371 Morriss, supra note 365, at 8-9.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
374 Id. at 22.
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of exit taxes if operations of headquarters and listing activities can be moved to the
offshore jurisdiction. In doing so, these OFCs impose a limit on the ability of Taiwan’s
government to impose exit taxes on TDI in China. International jurisdictional competition
thus both limits the Taiwanese government’s “freedom of action in specific areas”and
“changes the mix of government policies by changing the relative costs of various
policies in terms ofeconomic activity forgone”such as IPOs which could have stayed in
Taiwan. 375 Over and above limiting regulatory efforts, international jurisdictional
competition can lead to positive changes in onshore law by creating an incentive for
onshore jurisdictions like Taiwan to respond to legal flexibility supplied by these OFCs.
Moreover, these OFCs must be concerned with their commitment to supply the
secrecy and legal flexibility of TDI in China. Indeed, compared with other large onshore
economies like the United States, these OFCs have much more reason to be concerned
with their credibility, as New Jersey did until it “suffered an important blow to its
once-dominant position in corporate charters within the United States to Delaware when
New Jersey damaged its reputation for consistency and reliability [of respecting business
demands] by passing the ‘seven sisters’corporate law changes in 1913. . . .”376 As Prof.
Morriss adds,
[j]ust as China’s market is suficiently large that foreign investors are wiling to 
tolerate levels of corruption and uncertainty that they would not accept in a much
smaller jurisdiction, so too are investors willing to accept regulatory costs or poorly
designed regulatory schemes in giant economies like the United States or European
Union.377
375 Id. at 34.
376 Id. at 23-24 (alteration in original).
377 Id. at 61-62.
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In fact, both Delaware and these OFCs rely upon their regulatory competitive position to
“sel” their laws to consumers across borders. They are smal jurisdictions to which the 
benefits derived from international jurisdictional competition make a big difference if
compared with other bigger and more powerful jurisdictions. This fact acts as a bond to
their respective customers that they will not change their policies towards them and that
they will continue to be receptive to new convenient regulations.
More important, these OFCs play a significant positive role in the international legal
system that is rarely recognized by providing a different type of competitor in the market
for law. Democratically-constrained onshore governments learn that more vigorous
international jurisdictional competition will raise the cost of over-burdensome regulations,
which leads them to engage in less of it.378 Prof. Morriss points out:
Democratically-constrained governments are those that are subject to significant
degrees of constraint as a result of their need to win relatively open and fair elections,
although the degree of constraint will obviously vary with the competitiveness and
fairness of the political system. . . . With respect to democratically-constrained
regimes, the primary danger of a lack of regulatory competition is increased
rent-seeking by interest groups. If restrictions on trade, capital flows, and activity by
foreign entities can be used to insulate an area of economic activity from
international competition, the business entities involved in that area will be able to
generate rents. Those rents can then be partially captured by politicians.379
In the Taiwan case, international jurisdictional competition is likely to have a
significant impact on Taiwan’s Capital Controlswhich seeks to change private behavior
by altering incentives. Because of these OFCs’ focus on maximizing their revenue from 
378 Id. at 71-73.
379 Id. at 26.
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the sum total of transactions occurring within their jurisdictions, they are less likely to
help Taiwan’sgovernment enforce the Restrictions which seek to change regulated
entities’ behavior in ways unrelated to that goal, not to mention that Taiwan has no
bargaining chips for regulatory cooperation. Competition from these OFCs is thus likely
to exert greater pressure on regulatory efforts of the Capital Controls, thus forcing
Taiwan’sgovernment to gradually reduce them.
In sum, these OFCs such as Hong Kong and those located in British Central
America, in non-cooperating with Taiwan’sgovernment, exercise an important discipline
on Taiwan’sgovernment by allowing Taiwanese firms and capital to route around
excessive law and regulations to lower transaction costs of TDI in China. Meanwhile, the
above discussion to an extent demonstrates why Taiwan’s Capital Controls are relaxed
stage by stage over time, as more and more capital are invested in China and evasion via
OFCs becomes more and more rampant in the meantime.
2.1.3 Home Regulation Invalidated by Internationally Oriented Taiwanese Firms
with the Denationalization of Financial Capital
Changing into “autonomous business communities that have integrated their
operations into a global division of labor,"380 Taiwanese“[i]nternationally oriented firms
have presented a major challenge to Taiwanese government’s constraining economic 
policies toward mainland China, as such regulations do not have substantial binding
effects on these firms.”381 As Leng further explains,
380 Tse-Kang Leng, State and Business in the Era of Globalization: the Case of Cross-Strait Linkages in the
Computer Industry, 53 CHINA J. 63, 63 (2005).
381 Leng, supra note 204, at 508.
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National security is the government’s main concern, but Taiwan’s active business 
community has blurred the line between economic and political concerns. . . . [T]he
internationalization of market and enterprise operations has made it more difficult
for the state to control capital flows and investment activities. It is the international
market that has created the gap between governmental policies and investment
behavior.382
In concrete terms, Leng argues,
research on economic statecraft shows that such coercive tactics as sanctions do not
work well after such new actors as . . . [MNCs] have appeared. A home country
government cannot easily influence corporations that acquire their capital,
technology, and sales through the international market. As overseas affiliations
become more important to these firms, it is host country laws rather than home
country policies that realy influence MNCs’ daily operations. The net result of
market internationalization is that there is greatly intensified competition among
states for world market share, and that competition forces states to bargain with
MNCs to locate operations within the territory of the state and with national firms
not to leave home. . . . As internationally orientated firms occupy strategic positions
vis-à-vis bargaining with home and host countries, states have to adjust their roles
with respect to promoting or constraining economic transactions.383
Given increasingly intense international competition, the key for a firm to survive,
develop and improve competitiveness is to be integrated into the global system of
specialization. MNCs, by bargaining in a global setting, can obtain the lowest tax rate and
the most advantageous infrastructure and other public goods. In this regard, traditional
state boundaries will gradually be disappearing. The global capital mobility and the
development of international markets push laws within the territory of the state to be
adjusted. Thanks to the advancement of IT and telecommunication technology, MNCs no
382 Id.
383 Id. at 494-95 (alteration in original).
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longer largely retain their national identities while their headquarter activities no more
mostly remained bundled in their home countries. Desai argues:
National identities can mutate with remarkable ease and [MNCs] are unbundling
their headquarters functions and reallocating worldwide. The defining characteristics
of what made a firm belong to a country—where it was incorporated, where it was
listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location of its headquarters
functions—are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country.384
Meanwhile, MNCs will invest in a jurisdiction with the most proper mix of tax rates, laws,
labor resources, basic infrastructure and so forth. By the commitment of FDI and the
threat of exit from markets, MNCs eficaciously control regulatory jurisdictions’ decision 
making.385 In Taiwan’s case, “Taiwanese businesspersons have escaped governmental
restrictions and launched new investment projects on Mainland China based on their own
calculations of economic profits. The real parties with whom they must bargain are the
local authorities in host countries. Taiwan’s regulative policies have not proven to be so 
successful.”386 The above analysis of how the Taiwanese business community has dealt
with their home country’s restrictive policies when they invest in Mainland China thus
leads to a re-examination of the effectiveness of Taiwan’s economic statecraft in the era
of market internationalization and the changing role of the state. In a word, it is
internationalized markets, rather than laws, that “regulate” economic activity.387
384 Desai, supra note 301, at 1271-72 (alteration in original).
385 Chung-Yuang Jan, Quan Qiu Hua Zhi Guo Jia Zhu Quan Yu Jing Ji—Liang An Jia Ru WTO Zhi Fen Xi
[A Nation State’s Sovereignty and Economy—Analysis of China’s and Taiwan’s Accession to WTO], 1 GUO
JIA ZHENG CE LUN TAN [NAT’L POL’Y F.] (ISSUE 9) 157, 162 (2001) (Taiwan).
386 Leng, supra note 204, at 495.
387 See Leng, supra note 180, at 35.
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In particular, another factor that may cause difficulties of Taiwan’sgovernment in
controlling these Taiwanese MNCs’activities is that channels through which capital can
be acquired turn more. As Leng notes as early as 1998,
[a]ccording to various surveys, small- and medium-sized Taiwanese businesses in
mainland China acquire about 56% - 59% of their capital from Taiwan, 25% from
Mainland China, and 13% from a third country. . . . Furthermore, the PRC is
considering allowing Taiwanese banks to set up branch offices in the mainland,
opening the stock markets to Taiwanese businesses, and ending other financial
restrictions on the Taiwanese business community.388
Moreover, as Taiwanese enterprises have turned into internationalized MNCs,
it has become harder for the government to control capital flows to mainland China.
The most recent trend is for Taiwanese enterprises to obtain capital in the
international capital market to support their Mainland projects. The favorite places
for Taiwanese business communities are Singapore and Hong Kong. For example,
[Want Want China], the biggest Taiwanese company of its kind in mainland China,
has accumulated more than US$63 million from the Singaporean stock market
[before delisting from Singapore and then relisted its shares on HKSE to this day].
Even though Hong Kong has been an integral part of China since July 1, 1997, many
Taiwanese companies are optimistic and utilizing Hong Kong as a base of financial
management. Other [Taiwanese MNCs] such as Formosa Plastics undertake their
projects in mainland China through branch companies or subsidiaries in a third
country.389
Put differently, they raise the capital overseas—“a process long underway through
finance companies established in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.”390
388 Leng, supra note 204, at 502.
389 Id. at 501 (alteration in original).
390 Sutter, supra note 184, at 536.
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For instance, Formosa Plastics once embarked on the Formosa power plant project on the
Mainland, which, as Leng adds,
is a typical example of how [MNCs] can evade a home country’s control. Of the
US$3 billion invested, the parent company located in Taiwan has contributed only
US$400 milion, or approximately 14% of the total. It is Formosa’s overseas 
subsidiaries that will play the major investor role. International banks, including
Japan’s Mitsubishi and Sumitomo and several German institutions, have expressed 
their interest in loaning more than US$2 billion. In other words, major financial
support has come from international, rather than domestic, sources.391
In sum, after Taiwanese firms are equipped with the ability of international planning
and management, Taiwan’sgovernment often fails to effectively control every MNC
everywhere with the enhancement of their exit right to evade the Capital Controls. In
other words, “the increasing globalization of business would be rendering local
lawmaking authority obsolete.”392 The impacts of globalization in general and the
denationalization of financial capital in particular have profoundly undermined the
territorial basis of the Capital Controls.
2.1.4 Economic Sovereignty of Nation States Eroded by Economic Globalization and
International Jurisdictional Competition
The economic and political entanglement between Taiwan and China provides rich
materials for examining the interaction between the state and business in the era of
globalization. Leng argues: “Cross-Taiwan Straits economic interaction is a political as
well as an economic issue. General trends of economic interdependence and globalization
391 Leng, supra note 204, at 503 (alteration in original).
392 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, at 222.
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that are weakening the role of the nation state should promote a focus of shared ‘civilian
governance’between Taiwan and mainland China.”393 As Leng adds,
[f]rom the political perspective, however, rivalry across the Taiwan Straits in the
past decades forces the Taiwanese state to intervene in economic transactions.
Attempts to guarantee“economic security”and a web of national security have been
in great debate since Taiwan opened trade links with mainland China in 1987.
However, experiences in the past decade show that economic globalization has made
traditional methods of economic regulation and constraint policies invalid. . . .
National security considerations have always been of serious concern for Taiwan in
managing cross-Straits economic relations. As Taiwan’s economic development 
becomes more dependent on the mainland market, the Taiwanese state perceives
rising pressures to accommodate business interest and political quests of autonomy.
On the other hand, recent trends of economic globalization further weaken the
regulatory capacities of national states and introduce external factors such as World
Trade Organization (WTO) to institutionalize normal economic relations with
Mainland China.394
To tentatively summarize, the removal of trade barriersfor Taiwan’s and China’s joining 
the WTO (“the institutionalized force of globalization”)395 combined with the capital
mobility enhanced by the denationalization of financial capital could exert transformative
pressures on Taiwan’sgovernment to seek progressive deregulation of the Capital
Controls to meet business demands created under the power of economic globalization.
Further, “[t]raditional wisdom regarding economic security focuses on how
economic statecraft influences economic transactions. Spurts of economic globalization
since the last decade of the twentieth century have forced nation states to readjust their
393 Leng, supra note 181, at 261.
394 Id. at 261-62 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
395 Id. at 262.
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roles in economic life.”396 Under globalization, as Ulrich Beck argues, “[c]orporations
with the advantages of mobility and a global network are able to weaken individual states
by playing them against one another.”397 Ronen Palan argues that the state, faced with
this challenge, should not retreat but instead restructure capacities to cope, especially to
meet rising demand from the business community, that countries in principle respond
similarly to the forces of globalization, and that they are therefore compelled to compete
by offering attractive legislative packages to corporations.398 For instance, Leng’scase
study of talent flows between Taiwan and China spurred by economic globalization also
delves into what motivates Taiwan’sgovernment to intervene in cross-Strait talent
interaction while illuminating what limits its regulatory efforts:
Due to many non-economic concerns such as national security, Taiwan’s policies to 
attract advanced talent from China are more cautious. The Taiwanese state tries to
limit capital and personnel outflows to China but falls short of operational
instruments in the era of economic globalization. Facing the multiple challenges of
promoting international competitiveness, reconstructing the global networking of
production, and attracting top talent around the world, the state is compelled to
readjust its role and adopt the strategy of selective intervention and selective
withdrawal in the era of globalization.399
Let’s return to the conundrum confronted by MOEA. Why does MOEA run into
such high difficulties in enforcing the Capital Controls? We might find the answer from
international jurisdictional competition prompted by globalization. In theory, as regards
396 Id. at 278.
397 Ulrich Beck, Redefining Power in the Global Age: Eight Theses, 48 DISSENT 83, 86 (2001).
398 Ronen Palan, Recasting Political Authority: Globalization and the State, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
CRITICS 139, 158 (Randall D. Germain ed., 2000).
399 Leng, supra note 188, at 231.
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underlying factors spurring jurisdictional competition in a global setting, as Macey
argues,
increased competition, specifically increased global competition among private
sector actors, makes it difficult or impossible for administrative agencies [in
regulatory jurisdictions] unilaterally to regulate national firms. . . . This increased
competition is caused by a number of factors. Technological change and greater
efficiencies in transportation networks have increased global competition by making
it easier for distant companies to compete with local businesses. Similar market
advances have made it easier for local manufacturers and service providers to
engage in regulatory arbitrage [especially via OFCs] by moving their operations
overseas. These developments [regarding the evolvement for firms to become MNCs]
have had a direct effect on regulators, because they have made it easier for firms
[with the capability of international planning and management] to mitigate the
effects of unwanted regulation or to avoid such regulation altogether by moving
their activities beyond the jurisdiction of the regulator that has promulgated the
unwanted regulation.400
In short, under globalization, the increase of international production factor mobility and
technological improvement lowers firms’ exit cost, arms firms with the ability of
international operation, and then intensifies the international jurisdictional competition
for mobile factors. Out-flowing capital and firms as well as emigrating labor would thus
compel regulatory jurisdictions to improve on the quality of their regulations.
In the Taiwan case, as explicated in more detail below, the changes in the Capital
Controls reveal the dynamics of international jurisdictional competition among global
legal centers, or the demand and supply forces underlying the international law market at
work. The Capital Controls promulgated by the executive branch of the government,
400 Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L. J.
1353, 1355 (2003) (alteration in original).
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specifically MOEA, are evidently excessive and against business demands, so that
China-based Taiwanese firms turn to other regulatory jurisdictions to satisfy their
demands for legal flexibility. The international jurisdictional competition among global
legal centers for corporate charters, listings, and other local economic activity emerges
under the influence of globalization and firm or capital mobility bettered by technological
and transportation advances. Since there are a variety of suppliers, e.g. the Cayman
Islands (for corporate charters and relevant financial services) or Hong Kong (for listings),
of alternative regulatory products without being subject to the Capital Controls, these
Taiwanese MNCs could atempt regulatory arbitrage. At this time although Taiwan’s 
government agencies, knowing futility of acting unilaterally, intend to look for regulatory
cooperation, or “regulatory globalization,”401 to enforce the Capital Controls, those
competingjurisdictions have no reasons to help Taiwan’s agencies to enforce the Capital
Controls, given their own markets for those prosperous China-based Taiwanese firms and
that Taiwan has no bargaining chips for coordination. In consequence, economic
globalization resulting from technological change, market processes, and other exogenous
variables deprives Taiwan’sgovernment of the power to act alone. Discovering these
firms’ continuous “exits” from local markets, Taiwan, under the interest group
401 As Macey argues,
regulatory globalization is a competitive response employed by administrative agencies when they
perceive a threat to their power. Where exogenous technological forces threaten to make an agency
acting alone obsolete or irrelevant, a natural response is regulatory globalization. In short, when
regulated firms atempt a “divide and conquer” strategy of isolating regulators and engaging in 
regulatory arbitrage, regulators have little choice but to band together and offer a coordinated
response.
Id. at 1377. See also Leng, supra note 180, at 35, 38; John Whalley, Globalisation and Values, 31 WORLD
ECON. 1503, 1513 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288887(arguing that “[t]o political
scientists, globalisation suggests global political processes in which there are challenges to national
authority structures as mobility across nations accelerates and transfer of nation state functions to
supra-national authorities occurs. It leads to evaluation of transnational political processes, assessments of
constraints on the autonomy of national authorities. . . .”).
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competition to “voice”the petition for liberalization, experiences a radical change of
political power in 2008 particularly as President Ma of KMT, advocating anti-regulatory
and pro-China policies, wins the presidential election. Large-scale relaxation of the
Capital Controls is subsequently launched in a timely manner.
2.2 Business Demands Nudge the Capital Controls towards the Relaxation
2.2.1 The Relaxation from NHBP in 1997 to PLEM in 2001
How do business demands push for the relaxation from NHBP in 1997 to PLEM in
2001? First, President Lee in 1996 persuaded the business community to diminish its
investments on the Mainland and tightened administrative regulations. What followed
was that the government threatened to enforce the Capital Controls more diligently while
inflicting severe punishment for violations. Nevertheless, the influential business
community kept resisting the government policy by “voicing”demands for a less
restrictive trade and investment regime as well as by “exiting” via OFCs to simply 
circumvent the Capital Controls.402 Based on interviews carried out by Tse-Kang Leng in
Shenzhen and Guangzhou, Guangdong, PRC in 1997, “the [NHBP] policy has not had
significant impact on small- and medium-size businesses from Taiwan; they are many
steps ahead of government policies and will continue to be so in the foreseeable
future.”403 This fact points out that official policies are lagging behind those of business
entrepreneurs. In addition, Leng finds:
402 See Chang & Goldstein, supra note 190, at 34-35.
403 Leng, supra note 204, at 502 (alteration in original).
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Medium-sized enterprises have extended their reach in the anticipation that
prohibitions would be lifted. For example, although the government still bans
investment in the cement industry in mainland China, major Taiwanese cement
companies have begun to establish factories and other related industries, e.g.,
aggregate materials, in preparation for a relaxation of the ban. Cement companies
have also used the bargaining power of trade unions to press the Taiwanese
government to lift restrictions.404
Moreover, given that the business community advocated that the enlargement of their
investments in China would contribute to a better local economy in Taiwan, and that
Taiwan’sgovernment was in urgent need of these Taiwanese firms to help resolve the
conundrum of sagging economy not least in 2001, Taiwan’sgovernment had no other
option but to appropriately respond to business demands for the liberalization of the
NHBP policy.405 As the pressure was building up in Taiwan for the government to
abandon the NHBP regulation, feedbacks of voice and exit from the Taiwanese business
community were delivered into the regulatory evolution from the NHBP policy to the
PLEM policy.
Second, the WTO factor also matters in bringing the transition from NHBP to
PLEM. It is worth quoting Leng’s account at some length:
The real chalenge and opportunity to Taiwanese firms and Taiwan’s economic 
security comes from the WTO. Many issues of cross-Strait economic interaction will
be governed under the WTO framework [after] Taiwan and China succeed in
entering this multilateral trade regime. From a more positive perspective, WTO
regulations lower tariffs and increase economic transparency across the Taiwan
Straits. WTO also leads to the perfection of a legal environment which facilitates
Taiwanese commodity exports and investment to mainland China. . . . Big [MNCs
404 Leng, supra note 204, at 502-03.
405 See also Weng, supra note 339, at 46.
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from other industrial countries] may also replace the [then] existing Taiwanese
enterprises as better technology and service providers in mainland China. . . . All in
all, the Taiwanese government can no longer maintain the [strict NHBP] unilateral
policies that restrict cross-Strait economic transition. The real challenges of
economic dependence are not from potential economic statecraft from mainland
China, but rather due to the structural [WTO] factor of institutionalized economic
globalization. Facing direct challenges from MNCs [from other countries], the
Taiwanese business community may also increasingly [voice] to push the [Chen]
administration to adjust the [NHBP] restraint policies toward mainland China.406
From the viewpoint of the law market forces, the WTO factor increased business
demands of Taiwanese firms to more actively invest in China and to meanwhile seek
more legal flexibility of the Capital Controls—otherwise they would just leave with their
exit rights reinforced by outside globalizing forces. As this demand force sparked the
supply force, it was their voice rights in Taiwan’s political market strengthened by their
physical exit and threats of exit that put enormous pressures on Taiwan’sgovernment to
substitute the more liberal PLEM policy for the antiquated NHBP policy.
Third, under the trends of economic globalization, international division of labor
drives Taiwanese firms to substantially invest in Mainland China to lower production
costs and capture Chinese domestic markets. The business community thus continues
voicing their petition for liberalization of the NHBP policy,407 which culminates in
EDAC held in August 2001, determining the regulatory transition from the NHBP policy
to the PLEM policy.408 In this arena for interest group competition, KMT, turning to
embrace an anti-regulatory and pro-China position after the defeat in the presidential
election in 2000, actively voices its support for relaxation of the Capital Controls that
406 Leng, supra note 181, at 267-68 (alteration in original).
407 See Qiu, supra note 192.
408 See Jiang, supra note 331, at 51-52.
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Taiwan’sgovernment should help firms operate globally with the strategy of international
planning and management in order to follow the trends of economic globalization.409
Moreover, during the period of EDAC, the following six major local chambers of
commerce, as anti-regulatory interest groups, push for this transition as well:410 CNFI,
ROCCOC, the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, Taiwan
(“CNAIC”)411, National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises Republic Of
China (“NASME R.O.C.”)412, Taiwan Federation of Industry (“TFI”)413, and Taiwan
Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association (“TEEMA”).414 Therefore, EDAC,
on the one hand, acts as a sort of feedback mechanisms to turn small- and medium-sized
Taiwanese firms’ exit from Taiwan into voice, filing gaps in the political or “voice” 
mechanism for these less influential enterprises which lacks effective choice in the
political process. On the other hand, it provides those ruling anti-regulatory groups with
an efficient arena where they together with big business groups could exercise voice
rights, or exert pressure on the government to moderate the NHBP regulation.415
409 Ru He Tu Po Dang Qian Jing Ji Kun Jing Xi Lie Zuo Tan Hui Ju Ti Jian Yi [Concrete Recommendations
from Serial Symposia on How to Get Over the Current Economic Distress], 1 GUO JIA ZHENG CE LUN TAN
[NAT’L POL’Y F.] (ISSUE 7) 1 (2001) (Taiwan).
410 Jin-Yu Tan, Cong Liu Da Gong Shang Tuan Ti Jian Yan Tan Jing Fa Hui [On EDAC, Considering
Advice from Six Major Industrial and Commercial Organizations], 1 GUO JIA ZHENG CE LUN TAN [NAT’L
POL’Y F.] (ISSUE 8) 118, 118 (2001) (Taiwan).
411 CNAIC“is a private, independent and non-profit organization composed of commercial and industrial
groups, financial institutions, business associations, industrialists, and businessmen in the Republic of
China (R.O.C.) in Taiwan,”and “was founded on February 17, 1952 mainly representing the interests of
business community in Taiwan, promoting industrial developments in line with government policies, as
well as enhancing international trade and industrial cooperation with other countries.” CNAIC, 
http://www.cnaic.org/web/index.asp?lang=2 (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
412 NASME R.O.C. was founded in 1972 with a primary objective to help Taiwanese small- and medium-
sized enterprises improve on their operation. NASME R.O.C.,
http://www.nasme.org.tw/front/bin/home.phtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
413 TFI was founded on May 23, 2001 mainly to reflect petitions from the basic level of industries. TFI,
http://www.tfoi.org.tw/html/index.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
414 TEEMA, http://www.teema.org.tw/index.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (“TEEMA was established in
1948 to serve the interests of Taiwanese electrical and electronics industries and to provide a point of
liaison between the industry, its customers and the government”).
415 As Leng notes with respect to the exercise of the voice rights by the Taiwanese business community in
this regulatory transition,
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In sum, in the face of the business community’s increasingdemands for more legal
flexibility of the Capital Controls, “[President Chen] released his strategic design to
balance economic globalization and national security during the Presidential election
campaign [in 2000]. Chen argued that instead of maintaining the [NHBP] policy, national
security and economic benefit are not necessarily mutually exclusive.”416 Put it another
way, “Chen’s policy design represented his atemptto accommodate business interests
and attract more support on the domestic front from the business community. In his 2001
New Year’s Remarks, Chen emphasized on the new perspective of [PLEM] on
cross-Straits economic relations.”417 Through this first stage of the regulatory transitions
of the Capital Controls from 1997 to 2008, business demands, via exit and voice, push for
the relaxation from NHBP to PLEM.
2.2.2 The Relaxation from PMEL in 2006 to Large-Scale Liberalization in 2008
big business groups in Taiwan are also in the transitional period of enhancing their collective
bargaining capacities on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. In Taiwan, the defeat of KMT in the
presidential election [in 2000]also signifies KMT’s loss of control over the major trade and industrial 
unions. In order to create new connections with the business community, the new [Shui-Bian Chen]
government is expected to provide more preferential treatment on the issue of mainland trade [and
investment]. Furthermore, endorsement from many business groups for Chen’s bid for presidency 
was based on the expectation that Chen will reverse the mainland investment restraint policy adopted
during the Lee Teng-hui presidency. Most of these supports from the business community to Chen
have potential business interests if Taiwan releases investment restrictions [of the NHBP policy]. For
example, within Chen’s ‘National Affairs Advisory Committee’, the Evergreen Group will take the
initiative if Taiwan realizes direct sea and air connections with mainland China, while the Continental
Engineer Group will benefit from new investment projects in mainland’s huge infrastructure market.
Leng, supra note 181, at 267 (alteration in original). See also Ching-Wen Tzou, Taiwan Ge Zheng Dang Da
Lu Zheng Ce Yan Bian Yu Ying Xiang [The Evolution and Effect of the Mainland China Policies of Both
Major Political Parties in Taiwan], in LIANG AN KAI FANG ER SHI NIAN HUI GU YU ZHAN WANG [THE
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT OF THE 20 YEARS FROM THE OPENING OF CROSS-STRAIT EXCHANGE] 7, 24-25
(Chung-Cheng Chen et al. eds., 2007) (Taiwan).
416 Id. at 264 (alteration in original).
417 Id. at 265(alteration in original).
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The Lee administrations in the 1990s remained highly suspicious of cross-Strait
economic relations and eventually embraced the pro-security policy of NHBP. This
policy, however, was replaced by the PLEM policy during the first term of Chen’s 
presidency. In fact, Leng notes that whereas“[d]irect investment in China with a value of
less than $50 million is allowed . . . the Taiwanese state still attempts to impose hurdles
in the high tech sectors, out of security concerns.”418 The re-tightening of regulation can
be observed from the transition from the PLEM policy to the pro-security policy of
PMEL in 2006. Nonetheless, business demands, once again, push the government to
liberalize the Capital Controls, as demonstrated in the relaxation from the PMEL policy
in 2006 to large-scale liberalization in 2008. In effect, the re-tightening of the Capital
Controls in 2006 is unilaterally decided by the Chen administration, not as the
liberalization towards PLEM in 2001 is determined in EDAC, an operant arena for
collective policy making, or formal interest group competition. Therefore, the stricter
PMEL policy not simply ignores business demands for aggressive investment in
Mainland China419 and for concomitant legal flexibility, but also undermines the Chen
administration’s reputation established during EDAC in 2001 to cater for market demand.
As discussed above, in response to this transition towards more regulation in 2006,
Taiwanese firms, on the one hand, continued voicing their petition to liberalize the
Capital Controls in a variety of ways.420 On the other hand, they exited from Taiwan’s 
stock markets to list shares overseas or further substantially transfer their funds abroad
418 Leng, supra note 380, at 75.
419 See also Weng, supra note 339, at 95.
420 See, e.g., Editorial, Zi Xun Jie Lu Ying Zhong Zhi Bu Zhong Liang [Quality Is More Important than
Quantity in Terms of Information Disclosure], JING JI RI BAO [ECONOMICS DAILY] (Taiwan), Dec. 3, 2007,
at A2 (reporting that TWSE held 13 forums with executives from nearly 700 TWSE-listed corporations and
these executives from the perspective of business practice made clear their heartfelt wishes that the Capital
Controls could be loosened).
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for investments in China through underground channels, so as to avoid the more severe
regulation.
As expounded above, though there might be other reasons for Taiwanese companies
to list shares overseas, the primary cause is that the re-tightened Capital Controls in 2006
compel Taiwanese companies to do so. This argument can be reconfirmed by the
prediction made by the two investment banks prior to the relaxation in 2008 when
interviewed by I-Ru Liu Team:
The Capital Controls have compelled Taiwanese companies to go public in Hong
Kong or even Singapore. This also discouraged many China-based Taiwanese
businesses from listing back in Taiwanese stock markets. If we don’t take any 
aggressive action to change the policy, as soon as some leading large conglomerates
in Taiwan decide to wholly exit from Taiwan’s markets, their physical exit wil 
substantially negatively impact Taiwan. And then their exit will further stimulate
foreign capital to depart from Taiwan. What happened at that time probably
collapses defense of the Capital Controls. 421
The conclusion made by the above interviewees can be lively illustrated by the
sensational plan of an attempted delisting from TWSE by Advanced Semiconductor
Engineering Inc. (“ASE”), so as to circumvent the re-tightened Capital Controls (the
“ASE case”). Its threat of exit not only triggered a formal interest group competition
which earlier broke out in the legislature in November 2006, but also strengthened the
business community’s voice for legal flexibility, which might eventually galvanize
liberalization of the Capital Controls and Constraints in 2008. To begin with, ASE,
founded in 1984 in Taiwan and later listed on TWSE, is one of the world’s leading 
421 Internationalization, supra note 237, at 69.
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providers of semiconductor manufacturing services and the globally largest supplier of a
comprehensive range of advanced IC packaging with a market value of up to NT$150
billion. Frustrated with the application to MOEA for prior approval of its investment on
the Mainland, ASE allegedly considered collaborating with the Carlyle Group(“Carlyle”),
an American private equity firm, to be bought out first, and turned into an actual foreign
corporation. Through this management buy-out (“MBO”) it planned to be delisted from
TWSE and then list shares overseas. This deal was disclosed by the press in November
24, 2006. In April 17, 2007, this MBO finally failed in part because both parties cannot
agree over the purchase price.422 As commentators emphasized, however, if this deal had
been successfully closed, Taiwan would have lost the control over more than NT$100
billion of output value in the global semiconductor industries. In fact, since this deal was
an MBO, even if Carlyle in form acquired ASE, this company’s original owners and
management could in substance indirectly keep holdinga majority of ASE’s shares. More 
importantly, even though the acquired ASE would still be based in Taiwan in the short
term, the Taiwanese government would have less say over whether or how the new ASE
would invest in Mainland China.423 The attempt that ASE would become a foreign
company, be delisted from TWSE, and re-list shares overseas means that by changing its
nationality, or looking for somewhere to reincorporate, ASE would maximize its exit
right to raise funds elsewhere without being subject to the Capital Controls and
Constraints.424
422 Wen-Chieh Wang, Kai-Lin Faung & Jerry G. Fong, Taiwan Guan Li Ceng Shou Gou Zhi Fa Lü Wen Ti
[Legal Issues of Management Buyouts in Taiwan: The Cases of ASE Group and Fu Sheng Group], 15 YUE
DAN CAI JING FA ZA ZHI [FIN. & ECON. L. REV.] 1, 2, 5 (2008) (Taiwan).
423 Jung-Pao Kang, Tai zi Qi Ye De Liang An Bei Qing Fen Xi—You Ri Yue Guang Bing Gou An Tan Qi
[Strategies to Avoid Restrictions on Investment in China: Examples Starting from ASE Group], 4 ZHAN
WANG YU TAN SUO [PROSPECT & EXP LORAT ION] ( ISSUE 12) 1, 2-3 (2006) (Taiwan) .
424 See Fong, supra note 232, at 100; Zhen-Wen Hu, Cong Ri Yue Guang An Kan Si Mu Ji Jin [On Private
Equity Funds in Light of the Case of the ASE Group], QIAN ZA ZHI [MONEY] (Taiwan), Dec. 2006, at 77, 77;
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The Taiwanese business community was then in an uproar over ASE’s voting with
feet; it was said that many China-based Taiwanese companies chained with the regulation
took into account following its lead. ECCT, AmCHam, and many local chambers of
commerce started eagerly requesting the government to loosen the Restrictions, and even
through the legislature made such a request.425 Hence economic signals of physical exit
(e.g., Taiwanese firms’listing shares overseas) or threats of exit (e.g., ASE’s atempt to 
avoid the Capital Controls by a delisting in the first place and reincorporating overseas)
were then sent to the political marketplace within Taiwan where the voice rights of the
anti-regulatory business community, reinforced by exit, were exercised to begin
vehement pressures for the relaxation of the Capital Controls via the legislature among
Ri Yue Guang Bei Bing Gou An Xiao Ying Dui Taiwan Ke Ji Chan Ye You Ti Sheng Jia Zhi Xiao Guo [The
Impact of the ASE Case Advances the Value of Taiwanese Technology Industries], DIAN GONG XI XUN YUE
KAN [TEEMADATA] (Taiwan), Mar. 2007, at 18, available at
http://www.teema.org.tw/publish/moreinfo.asp?autono=3229. This case might also be examined from a
general perspective of economic globalization. For instance, Dignam and Galanis argue:
All this indicates that the intensification of economic globalization since the mid-1980s is gradually
giving rise to a particularly active global market for corporate control. Significantly, this global
market for corporate control demonstrates how capital mobility at the macroeconomic level can
interact with organizational restructuring at the micro level. Such transactions, especially when large
corporations are involved, require enormous amounts of capital that often exceed not only the funds
available within the company, but also the capacity of national financial markets. For large companies,
however, this is not a significant constraint because in a world without capital controls they have the
capacity to tap global capital markets in order to obtain the funds they may need. Although the
globalization of equity markets is still at an early stage, large corporations can effectively finance
their activities through multiple-equity offerings, tapping most major stock markets simultaneously.
Dignam & Galanis, supra note 171, at 238 (footnote omitted).
425 Tai Min Sheng Bao:“Ri Yue Guang”Shi Bian Wu Neng Wu Du Suo Hai [Minsheng Daily (Taiwan): The
ASE Case Is Caused by the Chen Administration’s Erroneous Policy], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE] (P.R.C.), Nov. 30, 2006, http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14811/14869/5106417.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2007); Feng Xing Suo Tai Zheng Ce De Tai Dang Ju Xing Xing Ba! [United Daily News:Taiwan’s 
Government Needs to Wake Up from the Insistence on Mainland-Investment Restrictions], REN MIN WANG
[PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (P.R.C.), Dec. 3, 2006,
http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14811/14872/5118020.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); Tai Qi Ri Yue Guang
Bing Gou An Yin Fa Dao Nei Jian Tao Liang An Zheng Ce Tao Lun [The ASE Case Triggers an Intense
Debate within Taiwan over Mainland-Investment Restrictions], REN MIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE]
(P.R.C.), http://tw.people.com.cn/BIG5/14812/14875/5096784.html (last visited May 27, 2009).
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other things.426 The ASE case obviously sparked the formal interest group competition in
the legislature over the relaxation of the Capital Controls,427 which might arguably lead
to the regulatory transition from the PMEL policy to large-scale liberalization in 2008.
This interest group competition occurred in November 2006. I-Ru Liu, as a
then-legislator in Taiwan, acted as an agent mainly for anti-regulatory interest groups
combined with exit-affected interest groups,428 and made two proposals to modify the
Act with different scope of relaxing the Capital Controls, in order to solve the
predicament into which Taiwanese companies with much investment in China get. Even
though more than 100 legislators429 signed their support for these two proposals, the
legislature was not then able to pass the proposals of relaxation due to rejection by
legislators of the former ruling party, DPP, and its allies. They were the majority at that
time and took the anti-China and pro-regulatory stance.430
During the regulatory transition of the Capital Controls for this time, the debate
over whether to further liberalize the Capital Controls after the attempt of ASE’s MBO
broke out is but one case, albeit a highly critical one presaging large-scale ease in 2008,
of the interest group competition where voice rights boosted by exit rights are exerted to
push for the relaxation of the Capital Controls. Although the relaxation initiative
426 See Editorial, Zai Lun Fu Da Lu Tou Zi She Ding Shang Xian De Bu Shi Dang Xing [The Illegitimacy of
the Imposition of Upper Limits on Investment in Mainland China Revisited], GONG SHANG SHI BAO
[INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Dec. 3, 2006, at A2 (reporting that under the impacts or pressures of
the ASE case, it was said these days that the Executive Yuan tended to ease the Capital Controls while the
then-legislator I-Ru Liu formally proposed amendments to the Act with a view to forcing the executive
branch to loosen the Capital Controls).
427 Weng, supra note 339, at 115.
428 O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 270, at 2152 (“Politicians can be viewed as acting as brokers among
interest groups, where politicians provide these groups with political favors and the interest groups return
those favors with enhanced reelection prospects, in the form of campaign contributions and votes”).
429 There were, in total,225 seats in Taiwan’s legislature at that time.
430 Internationalization, supra note 237, at 87.
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provoked by the ASE case failed then, it was a dry run of the later successful exertion of
voice rights in the first half of 2008. Just as the two investment banks interviewed by
I-Ru Liu Team predicted above, the Restrictions forced Taiwanese companies with
substantial investment in China to list their shares overseas, HKSE among others, to raise
capital that can be used for investments in China. The mobility, or rather the physical exit
and threats of exit as exemplified by the ASE case, fed the demand side of the
international law market among global legal centers. This subsequently sparked the
supply side within Taiwan to voice the demands for legal flexibility which had already
been made available by jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and other OFCs in British
Central America. The pressure for relaxation has greatly been building up on the
Taiwanese government. For instance, in a newsletter in November 2007, encountering
continuous voice for the liberalization of the Restrictions, MAC, the brains of Taiwan’s
government concerning cross-Strait affairs, was forced to confess the investment caps
according to the unitary proportional design comforted neither to economic principles nor
to the initial intent of the security element of the Capital Controls (Effective
Management).431
As a result, both phenomena that the former DPP government maintained and even
re-tightened the Restrictions in 2006 and that Taiwan-invested firms thus flocked to list
shares overseas to avoid the Capital Controls and Constraints might arguably drive
exit-affected interest groups mainly represented by local retail investors to join
anti-regulatory interest groups; they dominated the political arena not least in the
431 Liang An Zheng Ce Xu Yao Shan Yi Gou Tong Pan Wai Jie Wu Yi Wei Pi Ping [Cross-Strait Policy
Requires Amicable Discussion; Mainland Affairs Council Wishes Less Malicious Criticism], FAYUAN FA
LÜ XIN WEN [LAWBANK’S L. NEWS] (Taiwan), Nov. 22, 2007
http://www.lawbank.com.tw/fnews/pnews.php?nid=53743.00 (last visited Nov. 22, 2007).
174
presidential election in March 2008. This domination in the political marketplace can be
substantiated by the almost identical promises from both candidates in this presidential
election to embrace the future liberalization of the Capital Controls. In other words, given
the torrential exodus of Taiwanese firms, both presidential candidates of different parties
were in favor of prospective relaxation of the Capital Controls; the trifling difference
merely lay in the scope of liberalization. Where the regulation might be excessive, the
resulting competition of interest groups moderated the substantive content of Taiwan’s 
regulation by forcing the Taiwanese government to take account of the costs imposed.
Then President Ma, advocating anti-regulatory and pro-China policies, won the
presidential election. As discussed above, the Ma administration swiftly liberalized the
Capital Controls and Constraints on a large scale. Once again, business demands, through
the exercise of Taiwanese firms’ exit and voice rights, advance the transition of release
from PMEL in 2006 to large-scale liberalization in 2008.
2.2.3 Legal Flexibility Enabled by International Jurisdictional Competition under
Globalization
As Leng notes, “Taiwan’s oficial economic policies concerning investment in
China today have changed considerably. [Their past transitional trajectories] reflect an
on-going tug-of-war in Taiwan between national security issues, the various political
parties’ stances on policy, and market forces.”432 As Figure 2 shows, why did both TDI
in China and Investment Allowance move in a rising way? In face of the surge of TDI in
China, why is the regulatory transition of the Capital Controls from 1997 to 2008 nudged
in the direction of liberalization? We might give this paradox a causal interpretation:
432 Leng, supra note 380, at 75 (alteration in original).
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under economic globalization business demands of Taiwan-invested firms, for which TDI
in China acts as a proxy, galvanize the relaxation of the Capital Controls, for which the
increase of Investment Allowance is used as a proxy. As Ho and Leng argue, “[d]espite
the institutional distortion and political intervention, economic interaction between
Taiwan and China continued to boom in the past decade. Cross-Straits economic relations
are characterized by ‘civilian governance’.The private sector takes the lead.”433 This is
because trends of economic globalization weakened the role of the nation state, thereby
promoting cross-Strait“civilian governance.”Specifically, Leng elaborates:
Taiwan’s state power is constrained by globalization and the localization strategies
of individual Taiwanese firms. These firms have developed various networks with
Chinese local governments, regardless of the policies of Taiwan’s central 
government to discourage this. Taiwan’s decision to lift the ban on “China 
initiative” had been pushed through by corporations under pressure [generated by
economic globalization] to reduce costs, even though the Taiwanese state had been
hesitating to promote the creation of a division of labor across the Taiwan Strait due
to political concerns.434
Just as Sutter puts it in another way in 2002 subsequent to the transition from NHBP to
PLEM, “to remain globally competitive and to capitalize on commercial opportunities in
the PRC, Taiwanese firms will likely continue to pull government policy along while
433 Ho & Leng, supra note 198, at 738 (footnote omitted).
434 Leng, supra note 380, at 78 (alteration in original). In addition, when it comes to the historic changes in
voice rights of the Taiwanese business community, as Leng discusses,
[d]uring Taiwan’s authoritarian past under Chiang Kai-shek, business interests were channelled by the
patron-client framework of the one-party political system. By developing an accommodation with
local KMT political factions and state-owned enterprises, the Taiwanese business community learned
to co-exist with the authoritarian state. After Taiwan’s democratization, the larger enterprises formed 
strategic alliances with both the ruling and opposition parties to enhance their political influence,
mostly through campaign donations and by helping to finance policy think tanks for the politicians.
For small- and medium-sized firms, the most common way to enhance their access to power was to
establish various business associations and to engage in informal group consultations and lobbying.
Id. at 75.
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testing and skirting the existing restrictions.”435 This argument foretells how the
feedback mechanisms of voice and exit could once more push the transition to a more
flexible policy of the Capital Controls, which just took place in 2008.
Furthermore, regarding how the feedback mechanisms of voice and exit might bring
about a change in the Capital Controls, Sutter puts it in a more detailed way:
Burgeoning people-to-people and commercial ties across the Strait have been
challenging policies[of Taiwan’s government] to keep pace since the opening of the
PRC to foreign goods, capital, and people in the early 1980s. But it is important to
consider not only policy changes but also the commercial fundamentals that pushed
for these shifts. While the lifting of restrictions has significantly boosted cross-Strait
interactions, fundamentally it has been a combination of the pressure to ease
restrictions with the successful circumvention of regulations that has led [Taiwan’s
government] to seek ways to manage growing contacts across the Strait. Business
pressure and government policy have together formed a mutually reinforcing
dynamic. The Taiwanese business community has effectively lobbied for
liberalization of government restrictions both directly by expressing its concerns
[(what Hirschman has referred to as “voice”)] and, perhaps more important,
indirectly by bypassing regulations to satisfy commercial demand in the PRC [(what
Hirschman caled “exit”)].436
This argument lends support for the causal mechanism that Taiwanese firms’ business
demands, via exit and voice rights, have been nudging the Capital Controls in the
direction of relaxation stage by stage as the power of Taiwan’sgovernment was so
constrained by international jurisdictional competition prompted by economic
globalization that the Capital Controls were rendered ineffective.
435 Sutter, supra note 332, at 28-29.
436 Sutter, supra note 331, at 523 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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In summary, we could account for this stage-by-stage relaxation of the Capital
Controls from an integral perspective of law market forces underlying international
jurisdictional competition among global legal centers. Since globalization lowers exit
costs across borders and enhances firm or capital mobility, the intensification of
globalization is gradually giving rise to a particularly active international jurisdictional
competition for mobile production factors by providing cost-justified and flexible legal
regimes. Furthermore, under economic globalization, changes in global business practices
force Taiwanese firms to inevitably invest more and more in Mainland China in order to
be devoted to global division of labor. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s Capital Controls, the
excessive regulation favored by local pro-regulatory interest groups, ignores business
demands not simply for surely increasing investments in Mainland China but also for
accompanying legal flexibility. As a result, when technologies and economic
globalization increased the effectiveness and benefits ofTaiwanese firms’ evasive tactics 
through international operation and created incentives for these firms to avoid regulatory
impediments, Taiwanese firms have a choice either to engage in costly lobbying to
remove the Capital Controls (by way of voice rights) or to move to other OFCs not in the
shadow of the Capital Controls in order to transit funds for investment in Mainland China
(by way of exit rights). Although Taiwan’sgovernment does struggle to stem the
outflows of firms and capital, in the age of globalization it is limited in its ability to
control the flow of capital, goods, and knowhow across the Strait, and therefore can
merely slow but not efectively contain these firms’ physical exit. In the international
economic process, the demand force of the law market, through the exercise of exit rights
of Taiwanese firms avoiding the Capital Controls (as economic agents), first brings about
OFCs’ participationin the competition for these fugitive firms (by supplying regulatory
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products of legal flexibility) on the supply side in the international context, thereby
effectively giving Taiwanese firms an exit route. Then the international supply force of
the law market activates interest group competition on the domestic supply side within
the island. In another word, such economic exits send out signals to those in Taiwan’s
political marketplace. As a result, in the domestic political process, anti-regulatory groups
in Taiwan (which are directly burdened by the Capital Controls) might exercise their
voice rights strengthened by physical exit and threats or exit to promote legal flexibility
together with exit-affected interest groups. These economic signals in turn pressure
politicians or policymakers in Taiwan (as political agents) to acknowledge the
significance of the exit signals, and to enable more legal flexibility of the Capital
Controls. In other words, the feedback mechanisms of exit and voice are translated into
the regulatory evolution, or the stage-by-stage liberalization, of the Capital Controls from
1997 to 2008. The structure discussed above is concisely exhibited as in Figure 3.
3. Competing Explanations for the Taiwan Case
To be sure, some might suspect that there could be alternative theories to account for
the above Taiwan case. Any effort to employ the jurisdictional competition theory to
elaborate the Taiwan case thus needs to address the following competing explanations.
3.1 What Are Politicians’ Incentives?
Some theorists might argue that it is possible that the Taiwanese government, by
pushing through the Capital Controls which is very strict at face value, actually allowed
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most firms most of the time to avoid this regulation (e.g., by creating loopholes in it). For
example, Prof. Aviram’s bias arbitrage theoryasserts:
Bias arbitrage is the extraction of private benefits through actions that identify and
mitigate discrepancies between actual risks and the public’s perception of the same 
risks. Politicians arbitrage these discrepancies by enacting laws that address the
misperceived risk and contain a “placebo effect”—a counter-bias that attempts to
offset the pre-existing misperception. If successful, politicians are able to take credit
for the change in perceived risk, while social welfare is enhanced by the elimination
of deadweight loss caused by risk misperception.437
Accordingly, it was possible that Taiwan’sgovernment might have complex
incentives to regulate outward investment in Mainland China, and that Taiwanese
politicians in power might try to maximize their positions at once by manipulating the
perceptions of the enforcement of the Capital Controls while reaping a private profit from
this action that mitigate the discrepancy between the actual and the perceived risk of
outward investment in China. In other words, even though the Capital Controls are
imposed, Taiwan’sgovernment might not do their best to implement this regulation
entirely.
As a matter of fact, the following evidence could demonstrate the efforts of
Taiwan’sgovernment to enforce the laws thoroughly, thus helping rule out the above
explanation. Firstly, according to Taiwan HsinChu Difang Fayuan [Taiwan HsinChu Dist.
Ct.], 95 Zhu Su Zi No. 1 (2006) (Taiwan), as mentioned in Part A.1.2.2.2 of this chapter,
the three defendants who were the executive management of UMC were indicted for
relevant acts involving investment in Mainland China without prior approval of MOEA,
437 Amitai Aviram, Bias Arbitrage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 789 (2007).
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even though they were afterwards held not guilty by the district court in 2007, which was
later confirmed by the court of appeals in the end of 2008. These UMC executives
actually maintained good political liaison with the former ruling party, DPP. For instance,
when UMC was suddenly searched by prosecutors and agents from Taiwan’s 
Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice in mid-February 2005, Chien-Min Ker (DPP’s 
former acting chairman and a heavyweight party leader) came out in favor for UMC
while angrily accusing these prosecutors and agents of their acts as eliminating UMC.438
More importantly, as Mr. Ker noted, as soon as President Shui-Bian Chen won the
presidential election in 2000, the first company President Chen visited was UMC, and
that Robert H. C. Tsao (UMC’s former chairman of the board) had been President Chen’s 
Presidential National Policy Adviser.439 This prosecution folowed by MOEA’s NT$5
million administrative fine was a leading case from the time Taiwan’sgovernment
announced its intention to re-tighten the Capital Controls in 2006, and illustrated the
government’s continuous efforts to thoroughly enforce the Capital Controls by all
available administrative or judicial means.440
Secondly, Taiwan’s Supreme Administrative Court, the highest judicial authority in
administrative cases in Taiwan, held that one should define the term “investment in the 
Mainland Area” from a perspective of substance. That is, that Taiwan government
438 Ren-Wen Zheng, Sou Lian Dian Jian Zhi Chao Jia Mie Zu Ker Chien-ming Po Kou Ma [Chien-Min Ker
Condemned the Search for UMC as Exterminating It], ZHONG SHI WAN BAO [CHINA TIMES EXPRESS]
(Taiwan), Feb. 7, 2005, at 1.
439 Hui-Zhen Cai, Jia-Hong Chen, Feng-Qin Lui & Shu-Ling Lin, Lian Dian Zao Sou Suo Cao Xing-Cheng
Bao Liao Zhong Xin Wo Di Gao Mi; Fu Yuan Cheng Shi Xian Bu Zhi Jian Diao Dong Zuo Zheng Tan Da
Xian Yin Mou Lun Gao Ceng Ji Shang Jiang Di Fu Mian Chong Ji [Robert Tsao Reveals that UMC Was
Searched Because A Stool Pigeon from SMIC Snitched; DPP Leaders Say that They Did Not Know in
Advance that Prosecutors and Agents Would Take Action; Rumor Has It in Political Circles that There Is
Machinations Such that DPP Leaders Urgently Discuss How to Cushion Negative Impacts], ZHONG GUO
SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Feb. 18, 2005, at A1.
440 See Li, supra note 336, at 129; UMC, supra note 278.
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broadened the scope of the violation of the Capital Controls, or its intention to expand its
local regulation extra-territorially against corporations incorporated in a foreign area, was
confirmed by the judiciary. For example, according to Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan [Sup.
Admin. Ct.], 92 Pan Zi No. 1463 (2005) (Taiwan), the defendant MOEA argued that the
plaintiff Long Chen Paper Co., Ltd. (“LCPC”)through YUMA, a corporation registered
in Singapore, incorporated MAIDI, a company registered in Guangzhou, PRC, and that in
LCPC’s annual report of 1999 delivered to shareholders LCPC regarded YUMA’s 
investment in MAIDI as its own. MOEA thus deemed that without its prior approval
LCPC’s above conductwas in violation of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Regulations,
which stipulates: “For the purposes of these Regulations, the term “investment in the 
Mainland Area” shal denote any of the following activities by any nationals, legal entity,
organization or other institution in Taiwan Area: 1. Establishing a company or business
entity . . . .” Consequently, MOEA punished LCPC with an administrative fine of NT$1
million. LCPC appealed ultimately to the Supreme Administrative Court. This court held
in favor of MOEA that although the investment in MAIDI was made in YUMA’s name,
it was LCPC that actually invested in establishing MAIDI and received the profit and loss
generated from the investment of MAIDI, and that LCPC’sdelegating investment in
MAIDI to YUMA should therefore be deemed “investment in the Mainland Area,” thus
violating Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Regulations. In efect, were it not for LCPC’s 
voluntarily disclosing its investment in Mainland China, which is merely required for a
publicly-held company under Taiwan’s securities and company laws, it would be difficult 
for MOEA to meet its burden of proving the violation.
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In addition, according to Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan [Sup. Admin. Ct.], 95 Pan Zi
No. 1065 (2006) (Taiwan), the defendant MOEA argued that the plaintiff Chen-yu
Venture Capital Co., Ltd (“Chen-yu”) invested $2 million in Semiconductor
Manufacturing International Corporation incorporated in Cayman Islands (“SMIC,
Cayman Islands”), which held 100% of share capital of another company, Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corporation incorporated in Shanghai, PRC (“SMIC, 
Shanghai”), and that the plaintif’s investment should be regarded in a general sense as an
“investment in the Mainland Area” forbidden by Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the 
Regulations, which stipulates: “For the purposes of these Regulations, the term
“investment in the Mainland Area” shal denote any of the folowing activities by any 
nationals, legal entity, organization or other institution in Taiwan Area . . . 3. Acquiring
the equity of, and operating, an existing local company or business entity, but excluding
the purchase of stock of a listed company . . . .” In consequence MOEA punished the
plaintiff with an administrative fine of NT$1 million. Chen-yu ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Administrative Court. This court held that one should define the term
“investment in the Mainland Area” from a perspective of substance, and that SMIC,
Cayman Islands should therefore be deemed the alter ego of Chenyu; that is, Chenyu,
rather than SMIC, Cayman Islands, was the very legal entity investing in SMIC,
Shanghai.
Based on the last two judgments made by the Supreme Administrative Court, this
court held that the term “investment in the Mainland Area” should be interpreted from a 
perspective of substance, not of form. In other words, even though Taiwanese parent
companies, as explained above, establish corporations in a third area such as an OFC or
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delegate investment in Mainland China to a company in that third area, those companies
established or delegated are not only still regarded as the alter ego of parent companies
and as of Taiwanese nationality, but also deemed to have their main center of activity in
Taiwan and therefore subject to restrictions on investment imposed by Taiwan’sstatutes
as well as regulations promulgated by MOEA. In a word, these administrative regulations
combined with the judicial interpretation of the Capital Controls further demonstrated the
Taiwanese government’s eforts to enforce the laws thoroughly.441
3.2 Does a Macroeconomic Policy Shift from Bretton Woods-Style Fixed Exchange
Rates to Floating Exchange Rates More Matter?
Some might think that the movement to relax the Capital Controls has little to do
with Taiwan-China trade and investment specifically, and more to do with a
macroeconomic policy shift from Bretton Woods-style fixed exchange rates (which are
difficult to sustain in an open economy, and therefore require some kind of capital
controls) to floating exchange rates coupled with the removal of exchange controls and
financial regulations that limit capital flows. In fact, both factors equally have much to do
with the relaxation of the Capital Controls. The difference rests on the fact that
Taiwanese firms’ business demands for cross-Strait trade and investment are the
proximate cause to drive the government to lighten the Capital Controls stage by stage
441 As discussed in Part A.2.3 of this chapter, after the Capital Controls and Constraints were substantially
lightened in 2008, China-based Taiwan-invested firms can first incorporate an overseas holding company in,
say, the Cayman Islands,and list this overseas company’s shares in Taiwan stock markets. That way, the
funds raised bythis “foreign”issuer can all be used for investments in Mainland China. Hence, we can find
that the Ma administration to an extent invalidated the “perspective of substance” judicial interpretation by 
modifying the relevant administrative regulations. In this case,“investment in the Mainland Area”would
be identified from a perspective of form, thus suggesting the scope of the violation of the Capital Controls
has been narrowed.
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from 2001, whereas the above macroeconomic policy shift is the remote cause to strike a
transformative blow at the heart of the Capital Controls. As discussed above in Chapter
3.B.1.2.1, this is because the macroeconomic shift lifted the limits on Taiwanese capital
mobility in the first place; the heightened capital mobility in turn led Taiwanese firms to
invest increasingly in foreign areas (including Mainland China) as exit costs decreased
substantially.
In other words, the shift from fixed to floating exchange rates considerably promotes
the mobility of Taiwanese capital and firms in the first instance. This mobility then leads
to the increasing business demands for trade with and investment in Mainland China,
which serve as an immediate cause for the relaxation at issue. The Capital Controls were
initially imposed mainly in response to Chinese military and political intimidation
between 1995 and 1996. In a word, as displayed in Figure 3, spurts of economic
globalization (including not simply the inevitability of Taiwan’s removal of cross-Strait
trade and investment barriers with a view to acceding to WTO in 2002, but also the
capital mobility advanced by the macroeconomic policy shift mentioned above as a
remote cause) brought about international jurisdictional competition, thus applying even
greater transformative pressures on Taiwan’sgovernment to seek more legal flexibility of
the Capital Controls. Hence, the stage-by-stage relaxation in question took place from
2001.
3.3 Does Mere Exercise of Political and Military Power Cause the Relaxation?
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Some might argue that it might be mere exercise of Chinese political and military
power that caused the relaxation of Capital Controls. They might add that most countries
that are currently civil law or common law did not adjust their legal systems due to
jurisdictional competition but merely because the colonial power imposed such change.
So why is the Taiwan case closer to a jurisdictional competition explanation and less
similar to a mere “colonization”?
To refute this alternative theory, we may need to review the two cross-Strait tensions
between 1995 and 2000. Tung reports:
The 1995-1996 tensions were triggered by a combination of President Lee
Teng-hui's visit [in June 1995] to his alma mater, Cornell University, and the speech
he made at Cornell University during the trip. In addition, when interviewed by
Deutsche Welle Radio on July 9, 1999, President Lee said that since 1991, when the
Republic of China [(a.k.a. Taiwan)] Constitution was amended, cross-Strait relations
became "state-to-state," or at least "a special state-to-state relationship." These two
incidents were taken by Beijing as deliberate attempts to strengthen both domestic
and international acceptance of Taiwan as a sovereign nation. . . . [Accordingly,]
[t]he 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Taiwan Strait incidents created significant strain
between Taiwan and China. Beijing attempted both to coerce Taipei to return to the
previous status quo by accepting the "one-China principle" and to deter Taipei from
declaring (or marching toward) Taiwan independence. The [PRC] threatened the use
of force against Taiwan through moderate military mobilization and an expansion in
the scope of the intended military exercises near Taiwan from July 1995 to March
1996 and from July to September 1999.442
In response to especially the 1995-1996 tensions, President Lee in the “Nationwide
Business Owner Assembly” held in September 1996 announced the NHBP policy, which
442 Chen-Yuan Tung, Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability, 39
ISSUES & STUD. (NO. 3) 137, 140-41 (2003) (Taiwan) (alteration in original).
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unveiled the prospective imposition of the Capital Controls in a year. President Lee is
quoted as then saying:
[Mainland China intentionaly adopts] the statecraft of “yi shang wei zheng” and “yi
min bi guan” to press our government by intensifying anxiety in our society. 
Regarding this situation, we must folow the major principle of “jie ji yong ren”[no
haste, be patient] to tackle current cross-Strait relations.443
Specifically, “China’s political strategies toward Taiwan, yi min bi guan (utilizing the
public to urge the official) and yi shang wei zheng (exploiting business to press politics),”
are based on the expectations that some particular groups in Taiwan hurt by Chinese
sanctions would petition Taiwan’sgovernment to comply with China’s demands, that the
more the sanction hurts Taiwan’sgovernment directly, the greater the chance to influence
its policy, that core support groups of Taiwanese regime negatively affected by sanctions
would put pressure on Taiwan’sgovernment, and that Taiwan’sgovernment with
domestic political and economic instability would tend to concede to China’s demands.444
Nonetheless, according to Chen-Yuan Tung’s study on how the Taiwanese public,
the political elite, interest groups and Taiwan’sdecision-makers reacted to Chinese
military and political intimidation during the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 Taiwan Strait
tensions, China’s escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 2000 did not
efectively push the above parties to influence Taiwan government’s policy or to press 
Taiwan’sgovernment to concede to Chinese political goals.445 In particular, there is very
443 Chen-Yuan Tung, China’s Economic Leverage and Taiwan’s Security Concerns with Respect to 
Cross-Strait Economic Relations 2 (May. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University)
(on file with author).
444 Id. at 191-92.
445 TUNG, supra note 359, at 387-420.
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little evidence that China’s political strategy of "yi shang wei zheng" (exploiting business
to press politics) was working against Taiwan in these two incidents. In general, most
China-based Taiwan-invested firms asked for caution and no further provocation from
Taiwan’sgovernment. Furthermore, most of these Taiwan-invested firms supported
Taiwan’s position. The majority of these firms strongly opposed Chinese military 
threats.446 Also, “Beijing has actually proven reluctant and generally ineffective . . . in
exploiting its economic leverage through economic sanctions [as well as political
leverage through cross-Strait economic relations] against Taiwan, even during the
1995-1996 and 1999-2000 cross-Strait tensions.”447 Since the relaxation of the Capital
Controls is less likely attributable to mere exercise of Chinese political and military
power, jurisdictional competition might be a more adequate model to think about the
Taiwan case than other competing theories.
3.4 Are There Other Pro-Regulatory Forces?
Some might suspect that maybe there are a few untold pro-regulatory forces that
benefit from the Capital Controls, especially some groups of Taiwanese firms which
benefit from hindering others in making PRC investments by raising costs by requiring
doing it via, say, BVI or the Cayman Islands.
In fact, the main reasons behind Taiwan’s tough economic regulationsare concerns
over national security as emphasized above. This nationality security concern was made
salient not least between 1995 and 1996 when China employed military and political
446 Id. at 418-19.
447 Tung, supra note 442, at 141 (alteration in original).
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intimidation to influence the Taiwanese government’s policy for seeking international
recognition. Exactly owing to this intimidation, President Teng-Hui Lee in December
1996 convened the “National Development Conference” to form thepolitical consensus
on the Capital Controls among the ruling and opposition parties as well as almost all
relevant interest groups;448 then the Lee administration formally imposed the NHBP
policy and implemented the Capital Controls from July 1997.449 At that time, China’s 
activity was so hostile to Taiwan that the pro-regulatory interest groups successfully
dominated the political arena and urged the government to impose the Capital
Controls.450 When it comes to some pro-regulatory considerations other than pure
national security concerns, some political critiques, at most, argued: as the Capital
Controls were initially imposed in 1997 pro-regulatory groups might involve politicians
who cared more about Taiwan’s sovereigntyas well as national security and identity than
economic development;451 as the Capital Controls were re-tightened in 2006, they could
allegedly include those who would be concerned only about political ideologies452 and
even manipulate the enforcement of the Capital Controls to enhance re-election
prospects.453 Actually, there is very little evidence regarding such an unstated goal that
448 KAO, supra note 317, at 148.
449 Tung, supra note 266, at 15-16.
450 See id. at 151.
451 Chao-Chang Chou, Quan Qiu Hua Dui Liang An Guan Xi Zhi Ying Xiang [Research on How the
Globalization Affects the Relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China], 21 ZHENG XIU XUE BAO [J.
CHENG SHIU UNIV.] 201, 219 (2008) (Taiwan).
452 See, e.g., Chao Guo Liang Qian Wan Min Gan Ke Ji Lei Qi Ye Deng Lu Zeng She Zheng Ce Mian Shen
Cha [The Policy Review Will Be Conducted towards Investment in the Mainland Exceeding $20 Million or
Involving Sensitive Technology], XING DAO HUAN QIU WANG [SING TAO GLOBAL NETWORK] (Sing.), Mar.
23, 2006, http://www.singtaonet.com/global/taiwan/t20060323_172257.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2009)
(pointing out that the re-tightening of the Capital Controls in 2006 might display the political character of
the then-ruling party DPP—political ideologies took command).
453 See, e.g., Mo-Yun Wang, Op-Ed., Zhong Da Tou Zi An Qi Dong Zheng Ce Xing Shen Cha [The Policy
Review Is Undertaken towards Significant Investments in China], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES]
(Taiwan), Dec. 15, 2006, at A17(arguing that the Policy Review introduced in the 2006 PMEL policy might
be taken advantage of to affect elections).
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some groups of Taiwanese firms would benefit from hindering others in making PRC
investments by raising costs by requiring doing it via OFCs.
3.5 Are the Capital Controls Loosened Due to the Popular Support for Less
National Security Concern and for More Economic Integration?
Some might propose that the Capital Controls were loosened because the popular
support on national security grounds faded while the support for more economic
integration with China grew. The following poll evidence might largely rule out this
explanation.
After the pro-China KMT was at the helm in 2008 and the Capital Controls were
later relaxed on a large scale, Taiwanese government agencies and the press respectively
conducted several public opinion polls in April and May 2009. First, the results of these
polls generally showed that the support for Taiwanese national identity and independence
did not decline whereas that for Chinese national identity and unification with China had
an inclination to go down, which, as Chen-Yuan Tung argued, indicated the failure of
Chinese two political strategies,“fan dui tai du”(opposing Taiwanese independence) and
“yi tong cu tong” (exploiting cross-Strait exchange to promote unification). Second, they
also told that a majority of Taiwanese people, unwilling to concede to China in terms of
politics and sovereignty in exchange for economic benefits, required the Ma
administration to fulfill its duty to protect Taiwanese sovereignty and individuality. Still,
they expressed that more than 60% of Taiwanese stood for the open-door policy
concerning cross-Strait economic integration through institutionalized negotiation.454 In
454 Chen-Yuan Tung, Op-Ed., Liang An Zheng Ce Yao Zhu Ti Yao Kai Fang [Both Taiwanese Sovereignty
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other words, popular support on national security ground is still maintained even though
further economic integration is widely supported. Therefore, the fact that the politics
changed in 2008 whereas the popular support for national security concern remained
suggests that the jurisdictional competition, and not just underlying politics, had more to
do with the shift of the Capital Controls. In another word, the Capital Controls were
loosened not because the popular support on national security grounds decreased, but
instead the lightening had much to do with the jurisdictional competition.
Some might further ask whether Taiwan can credibly commit to not reenact the
Capital Controls if KMT loses next election. The following evidence might facilitate
addressing this question.
First of all, according to the results of the polls discussed above, the mainstream of
Taiwanese public opinion suggests that Taiwan’sgovernment should safeguard Taiwan’s 
sovereignty and de facto independence while promoting cross-Strait open exchange.
Moreover, as Clough describes, since 1987,
and Open Exchange between Taiwan and China Matter in Cross-Strait Policies], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO
[CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), June 3, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,11051401+1120090603
00350,00.html. See also Yin-Ji Xu, Yu Liu Cheng Min Zhong Zan Cheng Liang An Xie Shang Ru Qi Ju Xing
[More than 60% of People Uphold that the Negotiation between Taiwan and China Should Be Held as
Scheduled], GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), Oct. 1, 2009, available at
http://news.chinatimes.com/CMoney/News/News-Page-content/0,4993,11050701+122009100100463,00.ht
ml(describing that the result of a MAC’s pol announced on September 30, 2009 also demonstrated that as
high as 87% of Taiwanese supported the maintenance of the separate status quo of Taiwan from China in a
broad sense; among others, the support for the permanent maintenance of this de facto political
independence showed an inclination to go up); Editorial, Fen Lan De Qi Shi [Implications from Finland]
GONG SHANG SHI BAO [INDUSTRY & BUS. TIMES] (Taiwan), May 22, 2009, at A2 (reporting that a poll in
April 2009 sponsored by Council for Industrial and Commercial Development R.O.C., a.k.a. CICD,
showed that 56% of Taiwanese were “very worried” or “woried” about the high dependence on China of 
Taiwan’s economy).
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Taiwan has evolved from authoritarian rule to a fully democratic system, with a
popularly elected president and legislature. The [KMT], which governed China on
the mainland and has governed Taiwan since its withdrawal from the mainland in
1949, finds its position as ruling party threatened by the rise of a popular opposition,
the [DPP].455
As for Taiwan’s prospective status and the political relationship with China, “[t]he KMT
advocates the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China in the presumably distant
future when the political system there has become democratic, but the DPP wants an
independent Republic of Taiwan, which the PRC is determined to prevent, by the use of
military force if necessary.”456
Nevertheless, in regard to the economic relationship with China, both parties appear
to keep changing their positions to cater to the mainstream of Taiwanese public opinion
in different periods. In concrete terms, when President Lee of KMT ruled over Taiwan, as
Tung notes,
Taiwan’sgovernment felt ill at ease having such a close economic relationship with
its powerful political rival, in part because the island feared that the flood of
investment and trade from Taiwan will make the island economically dependent on
China, undermining Taiwan's de facto political independence. In fact, Taiwan's fear
has been triggered and reinforced by the fact that Beijing explicitly considers
cross-Strait economic relations to be an important source of political leverage
against Taiwan. Beijing conducts cross-Strait economic exchange with two political
strategies in mind: "yi min bi guan" [(utilizing the public to urge the official)] and
"yi shang wei zheng" [(exploiting business to press politics)]. Taipei worries that, if
asymmetric interdependence in China's favor emerges across the Strait, Beijing




might exploit China's economic leverage through the use of economic sanctions in
order to achieve political goals.457
The above factor accounts for one of the important reasons for the Lee administration to
impose the Capital Controls in 1997.
Although DPP explicitly favors “de jure” political independence, DPP leaders have
moderated their rhetoric on Taiwan independence as prospects for DPP rule brightened in
the presidential election in 2000. It is said that one of the significant reasons why
President Chen of DPP won the presidential election in 2000 is that DPP, then taking
seriously the contradiction created by the NHBP policy made by KMT and the imperative
for Taiwan’s accession to WTO, kept its political views pragmatic and catered to the then
mainstream of Taiwanese public opinion by advocating the reconsideration of the NHBP
policy, which was indeed relaxed and replaced by the Chen administration with the more
liberal PLEM policy in 2001.458 In 2008, one of the important reasons why President Ma
of KMT won the presidential election was also to cater to the current mainstream of
Taiwanese public opinion by advocating the substitution of the large-scale liberalization
of the Capital Controls for the inflexible PMEL policy. Along this line, regardless of
disparate positions on the political relationship with China, both DPP and KMT would be
forced to be politically realistic about the economic relationship with China under the
potential discipline of votes. Hence, even though the possibility that Taiwan might
reenact the Capital Controls if KMT loses next election cannot be completely ruled out, it
457 Tung, supra note 442, at 138 (alteration in original).
458 Jeng-Liang Kuo, Op-Ed., Tian Chuang Liang Hua—Ying Zao Xin Zhu Liu Min Jin Dang Yao Zheng Shi
Zhong Guo [Jeng-Liang Kuo: To Mould A New Mainstream, DPP Must Face Up to China], ZHONG GUO




seems more unlikely given the happening progress of cross-Strait economic integration.
Specifically, the political views of the party which would in the future defeat KMT in the
next election would more likely be consistent with the above mainstream public opinion
of cross-Strait economic relations. The Capital Controls, which would impede
cross-Strait economic integration, would less likely be reenacted. That is, there is a higher
likelihood that the party advocating the resurrection of the Capital Controls would be
voted out.
3.6 Why Does the Jurisdictional Competition Story Not Apply to Hong Kong?
Some might suppose that since Hong Kong is also located in the Greater Chinese
Economy459, why did Taiwan and Hong Kong (as a competitor against Taiwan in the
jurisdictional competition) take different paths when faced with Mainland China? What
relevant differences could account for why Hong Kong did not impose restrictions on
outward investment in Mainland China similar to the Capital Controls?
First, from a historic perspective, Wu reports:
As the People’s Republic of Chinaresumed its exercise of sovereignty over Hong
Kong in 1997, and subsequently over Macau in 1999, the idea of “One Country, 
Two Systems” advocated by Deng Xiao-ping has been applied to these two areas.
China amended its constitution to provide the legal basis for the establishment of the
Special Administrative Region (SAR) and thus made the Hong Kong Special
459 Macau is also located in the Greater Chinese Economy; it is labeled as “Las Vegas in Asia” with its 
economy mainly based on the gambling industry. Bo Yi Fa Zhan Ao Men Zheng Fu Cai Sha Che [Macau
Government Brakes the Development of the Gambling Industry], JIN RI XIN WEN [NOWNEWS] (Taiwan),
Oct. 13, 2009, http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/091013/17/1sw15.html(last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
As Macau is not a comparable competitor to Hong Kong and other OFCs with the institutional and
regulatory architecture which is indispensible in the international jurisdictional competition, the discussion
here is focused on Hong Kong.
194
Administrative Region (HKSAR) and the Macau Special Administrative Region
(Macau SAR) possible. Hong Kong Basic Law and Macau Basic Law were
promulgated by National People’s Congress in order to ensure the high degree of
autonomy of these two SARs to remain unchanged in fifty years. These two Basic
Laws are not only national laws of China, but they are also mini-constitutions of
these two SARs.460
On the other hand, “the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan . . . has
[been resisting] political linkage to the mainland in the form of PRC proposals to make
Taiwan a special administrative region of the PRC, similar to Hong Kong but with a
higher degree of autonomy.”461 Hence, Hong Kong, after all, is part of the Chinese
regime; however, Taiwan is outside Chinese jurisdiction.
Second, as Clough puts it in terms of the cross-Strait political antagonism,
[t]he two governments [(the ROC and the PRC)] have battled each other fiercely in
the international arena, with the PRC insisting on the exclusive right to represent
China, including Taiwan, in the world community and the ROC maintaining, as a
sovereign political entity, that has never been a part of or been controlled by the
PRC, it has the right to its own diplomatic and official relations with other countries.
A trip made by President Lee Teng-hui to the United States, in an effort to enhance
the ROC’s international image, triggered the PRC’s military reaction—a serious
warning to the United States and Taiwan that it would not tolerate an independent
state of Taiwan.462
The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait tensions illustrate that China did not recognize Taiwan as
an independent sovereign political entity and has been intimidating it with political and
460 Chien-Huei Wu, One Country, Two Systems, and Three Memberships: Legal and Economic Integration
between China and its Two SARs, GLOBAL JURIST Vol. 7, Issue 3 (Advances), Art. 7., 1 (2007), available at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss3/art7.
461 CLOUGH, supra note 455, at ix (alteration in original).
462 Id. at ix-x (alteration in original).
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military forces. This political antagonism accentuated between 1995 and 1996
contributed to the imposition of the Capital Controls especially as a response to Chinese
military intimidation. On the contrary, Hong Kong is subordinate to Chinese authority
after re-integrated back to China in 1997. Therefore Hong Kong and China have been one
country since then. It is impossible that Hong Kong would impose some restrictions
similar to the Capital Controls (which is surely not allowed by China).
Third, China elected to preserve the Hong Kong law by promoting “one country, 
two systems” policy, and then opened its door wide open to Hong Kong corporations 
through the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA, which can be seen as a Free
Trade Agreement) signed in 2003.463 The signing of CEPA is proved a catalyst for the
recent economic upspring in Hong Kong. In essence, CEPA virtually eliminates all
barriers between China and Hong Kong in import/export, business incorporation, and
physical movement. Thus for an FDI, they can enjoy the protection and convenience of
the Hong Kong laws simply by incorporation in Hong Kong, while not losing any access
to the Chinese Market. As a result, CEPA dramaticaly enhanced Hong Kong’s ability to 
attract FDIs, because only qualified Hong Kong companies can enjoy these benefits.
Through CEPA, Hong Kong wholy embraced Mainland China’s market surely without 
any national security concern, not to mention the imposition of the investment restrictions
like the Capital Controls on national security grounds.
463 Wu, supra note 460, at 1.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The Taiwanese government has encountered a dilemma of relaxing the Capital
Controls while avoiding boosting the Mainland economy at Taiwan’s own expense. 
While Taiwan’s past eforts to restrain investment were designed to prevent China from 
gaining an economic or technological advantage over Taiwan, “a review of cross-Strait
developments shows dynamics of business interests pulling government policy along as
policy makers struggle to keep apace with commercial reality.”464 As Sutter foretold in
2002, “enticed by an economic upswing in China, the opening of new markets in both the
PRC and Taiwan as a consequence of WTO accession and Taiwan’s ongoing goal to 
become a regional operations center, business interests are likely to continue to nudge
policy makers along a course of further liberalization and integration.”465 While TDI in
China is surging, why is the regulatory evolution of the Capital Controls from 1997 to
2008 directed generally towards liberalization stage by stage? We could give this paradox
a causal interpretation.
To begin with, Rafael La Porta et al. also note:
Globalization leads to a much faster exchange of ideas, including ideas about laws
and regulations, and therefore encourages the transfer of legal knowledge.
Globalization also encourages competition among countries for foreign direct
investment, for capital, and for business in general, which must as well put some
pressure toward the adoption of good legal rules and regulations.466
464 Sutter, supra note 331, at 522.
465 Id. at 523.
466 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 327 (2008).
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Accordingly, globalization leads to international jurisdictional competition, or
competition through changes in the provision of laws and institutions among regulatory
jurisdictions. Amid this jurisdictional competition there are interactions of economic and
political processes to push local governments to improve their regulation. In the
international economic process firms can exercise exit rights in response to a
jurisdiction’s excessive regulation while voice rights are taken advantage of in the
domestic political process. In the Taiwan case, under economic globalization business
demands, via economic and political agents, respond to excessiveness of Taiwan’s 
Capital Controls; or rather these alert feedbacks of exit and voice are delivered into the
evolution of Taiwan’s regulations, or the relaxation of the Capital Controls. Put
somewhat differently, the general demand and supply forces underlying international
jurisdictional competition stimulated by Taiwan-invested firms’ business demands for
global division of labor as well as for concomitant legal flexibility galvanize the gradual
liberalization of the Capital Controls as international jurisdictional competition
underlying globalization impairs regulatory capacity of Taiwan’sgovernment.
When the ASE’s delisting attempt possibly spurred a tendency that Taiwanese
companies listed in TWSE followed suit, Chun-Chi Shih, the then FSC chairman, at that
time expressed that the ASE case gave rise to a crucial implication that even though many
restrictions are imposed on economic transactions and capital markets, these restrictions
might eventually be bypassed in a country with unfettered capital mobility, and that when
it comes to restrictions on capital markets, we should rethink which restrictions are
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justified.467 Furthermore, Joseph Jaushieh Wu, a former Chairperson of MAC (the
primary regulatory agency of Taiwan’sgovernment regarding cross-Strait affairs) during
President Chen’s second term of presidency,helped the Chen administration make the
regulatory transition from the more liberal PLEM policy to the severer PMEL policy in
2006. However, in the commendatory praise for Cheng-Yuan Tung’s The East Asian
Economic Integration Regime and Taiwan’s Strategy, he conceded that Taiwan’s 
economy has already been so open and liberalized that the government played a very
limited role in dealing with the cross-Strait economic relations, that although the
regulation seemingly prevented some industries from investing in China in instances of
the initial imposition of NHBP by President Ten-Hui Lee’s administration in 1997 as well
as the re-tightening of regulation when President Shui-Bian Chen’s government replaced 
PLEM with PMEL in 2006, many enterprises kept breaking through the blockade as they
were directed in line with market forces to seek profits by various evasive ways, that is,
circuitously transferring Taiwanese funds to China for investments, and that it was often
found from the perspective of governmental regulation that the effect of regulation was
really restrained.468
Moreover, the UMC criminal case of prosecution folowed by MOEA’s 
administrative fine in 2006 but later acquittal, plus the fact that the judiciary let UMC off
with MOEA’s fine as discussed in Chapter 3.A.1.2.2.2, could exemplify that the
denationalization of financial capital under globalization might first galvanize
467 Yi-Xian Chen, Shih Chun-Chi: Gang Gua Pai Tai Shang Ke Wang Hui Tai Fa TDR [Chun-Chi Shih: It’s 
Expected That Taiwanese Firms Listed in Hong Kong Will Be Allowed to Issue TDRs Home], ZHONG GUO
SHI BAO [CHINA TIMES] (Taiwan), Dec. 5, 2006, available at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/
newslist/newslist-content-forprint/0,4066,110507=11 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
468 TUNG, supra note 352, at xv.
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international jurisdictional competition, which rendered barely effective the
“management”(or regulatory) element of the Capital Controls, that the regulation could
hardly impede market forces as people may vote with their feet, and that “the market
decides al the things.”469 Just as Prof. Morriss points out, “[t]here is widespread 
agreement with Eichengreen’s assessment of the impact of global capital flows as a
disciplinary force . . . .”470 That is, as Hampton and Abbott note, “[t]he sheer amount of 
capital residing in or passing through OFCs and tax havens is now so great that it is
beyond the ability of any single government to—in Mrs. Thatcher’s famous
words—‘buck the market.’”471
469 UMC, supra note 278. Eventually, it might be market forces, or rather business demands, that all the
same pushed Taiwan’s government to legalize UMC’s investment in Hejian to an extent. Kwong reports:
Taipei on Wednesday [February 10, 2010] unveiled a raft of rules that will relax investment into
China by Taiwanese companies, particularly those in the flat panel and semiconductor industries. . . .
The change makes legal long-delayed acquisitions in China by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company and United Microelectronics Corporation, the world’s top two contract chipmakers. After a
long and tumultuous saga that saw UMC fined T$ 5m (US$155,000m) for illegal investments in
China in 2006, UMC said last April that it planned to buy the 85 per cent of Chinese chipmaker
Hejian it does not already own. . . .Neither company had been able to complete their transactions
because they were forbidden by Taiwan law until Wednesday. Shih Yen-Shiang, minister of
economics affairs, said the new rules were aimed,“to put it bluntly, at the acquisition plans of TSMC
and UMC.”It has been three years since Taiwan last reviewed its rules on China investment, he said,
and“in those three years the world has changed a lot… we cannot remain still amid all the changes”.
Robin Kwong, Taiwan Eases Law on China Investments, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a3cd540-169c-11df-aa09-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1 (alteration in
original) (emphasis added). From the perspective of jurisdictional competition among global legal centers,
Shih’s quotation“in those three years the world has changed a lot… we cannot remain still amid all the
changes”resonates, once again, with the positive or descriptive angle of Romano’s argument on
jurisdictional competition in the U.S. corporate case:
Regulatory competition offers an advantage over a single regulator because it provides regulators
with incentives and the necessary information to be accountable and responsive to the demands of the
regulated. That is because there is a feedback mechanism in a competitive system that indicates to
decisionmakers when a regime need to be adapted and penalized them when they fail to respond: the
flows of firms out of regimes that are antiquated and into regimes that are not. This is an important
regulatory characteristic in the corporate context, because firms operate in a changing business
environment, and their regulatory needs concomitantly change over time.
Romano, supra note 102, at 1598-99 (emphasis added).
470 Morriss, supra note 365, at 51.
471 Mark P. Hampton & Jason P. Abbott, The Rise (and Fall?) of Offshore Finance in the Global Economy:
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Hence, as far as how to regulate firms is concerned, as Prof. Romano notes in
recognizing the effect of jurisdictional competition,
[a] more useful way to characterize the connection between politics and economic
organizational form, particularly in the contractual context of business organization,
is to recognize that private parties are persistent in devising institutions that
circumvent or minimize the effect of political constraints on economic development.
The genius of American corporate law in this regard is that the dynamics of state
competition reduces the number of extraneous regulations that must be bypassed.472
Further, adjusting the focus from jurisdictional competition within federal systems to that
on the national level, Prof. Ribstein explains how to regulate firms not least under
globalization:
The analysis of the international implications of Sarbanes-Oxley illustrates the
extent to which international securities markets force regulators to think beyond
national boundaries. . . . The mobility of capital means that any regulation is subject
to being tested as firms reject bad or unsuitable laws and seek to be subject to good
ones. This gives regulators both valuable information about which laws work, and
incentives to meet market demand.473
The transitional trajectories of Taiwan’s Capital Controls illustrate that international
jurisdictional competition constrains such a democratically-constrained onshore
jurisdiction as Taiwan from disregarding business demands and from imposing excessive
regulation, in the sense that it is globalized markets, rather than parochial laws, that do
Editor’s Introduction, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND TAX HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL
1, 13 (Mark P. Hampton & Jason P. Abbott ed., 1999).
472 ROMANO, supra note 71, at 147. See also RICHARD TILLY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE RHINELAND, 1815-1870 (1966).
473 Ribstein, supra note 115, at 327.
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“regulate” economic activity across borders.474 Through this dissertation, regulatory
jurisdictions similar to Taiwan could, to an extent, understand the true costs and benefits
of regulation in the international dimension among others, and regulate in light of that
understanding. Exactly as Butler and Ribstein emphasize in the SOX case, this
understanding “would involve regulators appreciating the significant limitations on
government’s ability. . . to anticipate the full consequences of regulation.”475 This,
meanwhile, reminds Taiwan’sgovernment in the future that if regulating jurisdictions
refuse to recognize business demands backed by economic globalization, firms have
incentives and ability to seek out more cost-justified and flexible laws worldwide.
474 Tung, supra note 359, at 10 (arguing that it is the market forces sourcing from cross-Strait dynamics of
business interests, rather than Beijing’s politicalstrategies, that compelled Taipei to adopt a more open
cross-Strait economic policy).
475 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 109, at 96.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 1 Characteristics of ADR Programs476












U.S. GAAP U.S. GAAP Home Country
Standards
SEC registration Exempt Full Registration Full Registration Exempt










10 weeks 10 weeks 14 weeks 16 days
Costs ≤ $25,000 $200,000-700,000 $500,000-2,000,000 $250,000-5000,000
Source: THE BANK OF NEW YORK, GLOBAL OFFERINGS OF DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS, A
TRANSACTION GUIDE (1995).
476 Darius P. Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-listings: Evidence from Depositary
Receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 107 (1999) (Table 1 is herefrom cited).
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Table 2 TDI in China (Comparison between the Statistics of Taiwan and China)







237 174 3,446 2,783
1992 264 247 6,430 5,543
1993 1,262
(8,067)477
1,140 (2,028) 10,948 9,965
1994 934 962 6,247 5,395
1995 490 1,093 4,778 5,777
1996 383 1,229 3,184 5,141
1997 728 (7,997) 1,615 (2,720) 3,014 2,814
1998 641 (643) 1,519 (515) 2,970 2,982
1999 488 1,253 2,499 3,374
2000 341 1,102 1,399 1,984
Total 22,475 15,598 44,915 45,758
Source: Chen & Chu, supra note 182, at 219.
Note: Statistics are up to June 2000 only.
477 Numbers in parentheses are investment projects recorded through make-up registration, as discussed in
Cahpter 3.A.1.2.2.2; they were not approved by MOEA in advance.
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Table 3 TDI in China(Taiwan’s Statistics)
Year Taiwan’s Statistics
Cases Amount ($ million)
1991 237 174
1992 264 247




1997 728 (7,997) 1,615 (2,720)




2002 1490 (1,626) 3,859 (2,864)









Source: INVESTMENT COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, MONTHLY
STATISTIC REPORT ON OVERSEAS CHINESE & FOREIGN INVESTMENT, OUTWARD
INVESTMENT, MAINLAND CHINA INVESTMENT (Feb. 2009), http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
Note: Statistics are up to December 2008.
478 Numbers in parentheses are investment projects recorded through make-up registration rather than prior
approval.
479 The number of cases and amount in this row include those of previously unregistered investments
which are recorded through make-up registration.
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Table 4 Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area)





















1,881 20,028.35 17.10 28 577.67 12.05 1,909 20,606.02 16.91
USA 4,583 8,975.51 7.67 19 135.34 2.82 4,602 9,110.85 7.47
Singapore 400 4,671.50 3.99 4 629.73 13.13 404 5,301.24 4.35
Hong Kong 912 2,672.93 2.28 13 35.33 0.74 925 2.708.26 2.22
Vietnam 348 1.462.36 1.25 8 96.86 2.02 356 1,559.22 1.28
Panama 58 1,178.66 1.01 0 0.00 0.00 58 1,178.66 0.97
Japan 427 1,120.99 0.96 11 23.99 0.50 438 1,144.98 0.94
Thailand 274 1,703.98 1.46 1 3.61 0.08 275 1,707.58 1.40
Philippines 123 512.29 0.44 1 1.36 0.03 124 513,65 0.42
Korea 129 250.73 0.21 2 229.01 4.78 131 479.74 0.39
Germany 130 140.86 0.12 3 7.01 0.15 133 147.88 0.12
Others 1,827 9,506.49 8.11 34 109.36 2.26 1,861 9,615.85 7.89
Total 47,630 ######### 100.00 381 4,795.54 100.00 48,011 121,889.25 100.00
Source: MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC STATISTICS MONTHLY
NO.185, at 31 (May 2008), available at
http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/185/13.pdf.
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Table 5 Comparison and Evaluation regarding Listing Advantages among TWSE,
HKSE and the U.S. Stock Exchanges480
Evaluation Indices Taiwan Hong Kong The U.S.
Stock Exchange TWSE HKSE NYSE and
NASDAQ











































Source: JP MORGAN, EQUITY MARKETS OVERVIEW 21 (2005).
480 Internationalization, supra note 237, at 28 (Table 5 is herefrom cited).
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Table 6 The Capital Controls on Investment in Mainland China under the NHBP
Policy
Type Net worth or capital
(whichever is higher)
Cap on accumulated
amount of investments in
China or on the percentage
1. Individuals and small-
and medium-sized firms
The limit is NT$60 million.
2. Private firms Private firms’ investment 
may not exceed 40% of net
worth or capital (whichever
is higher), or NT$60
million, whichever is
higher.
3. Listed firms Firms with under NT$5
billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of their capital
or net worth, whichever is
higher.
Firms with between NT$5
billion and NT$10 billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of NT$5
billion plus 30% of the
portion of their net worth
or capital (whichever is
higher) over NT$5 billion.
Firms with over NT$10
billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of NT$5
billion plus 30% of the part
over NT$5 billion plus
20% of their net worth or
capital (whichever is
higher) over NT$10 billion.
Source: Investment Commission, MOEA
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Table 7 The Capital Controls on Investment in Mainland China under the PLEM
Policy
Type Net worth Cap on accumulated
amount of investments in
China or on the percentage
1. Individuals and small-
and medium-sized firms
The limit is NT$80 million.
2. Firms with over NT$80
million in their paid-in
capital
Firms with under NT$5
billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of their net
worth or NT$80 million,
whichever is higher.
Firms with between NT$5
billion and NT$10 billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of NT$5
billion plus 30% of the
portion of their net worth
over NT$5 billion.
Firms with over NT$10
billion
Their investments may not
exceed 40% of NT$5
billion plus 30% of the part
over NT$5 billion plus
20% of their net worth over
NT$10 billion.
Source: Investment Commission, MOEA
249
Table 8 The Capital Controls on Investment in Mainland China since May 2008
Type Cap on accumulated amount of investments in China or
on the percentage
1. Individuals The limit is relaxed to $5 million for investments per year.
2. Small- and
medium-sized firms
The limit is NT$80 million, or 60% of their net worth or
the consolidated net worth of the affiliated enterprises
involved, whichever is higher.
3. Firms that are not
classified into small- and
medium-sized firms
The limit is all relaxed to 60% of their net worth or the
consolidated net worth of the affiliated enterprises
involved, whichever is higher. But if a firm is qualified by
MOEA to be a subsidiary of a Multi-National Enterprise
or to establish its headquarter in Taiwan, there will be no
upper limit for such a firm.
Source: Investment Commission, MOEA
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Table 9 Taiwan’s Investment in British Central America and BVI’s Investment in 
China (1995-99)
Year Taiwan’s Approved Outward 
Investment in British Central
America (BVI and the Cayman
Islands)












1995 370 15.1% 304 0.8%
1996 809 23.8% 538 1.3%
1997 1,051 23.3% 1,717 3.8%
1998 1,838 38.2% 4,031 8.9%
1999 1,360 30.1% 2,659 6.6%














































Figure 1 Taiwanese Direct Investment in Mainland China
Amount of TDI in China
(approved by MOEA, $ million)
Source: INVESTMENT COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, MONTHLY
STATISTIC REPORT ON OVERSEAS CHINESE & FOREIGN INVESTMENT, OUTWARD
INVESTMENT, MAINLAND CHINA INVESTMENT (Jan. 2009), http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/











































Figure 2 Comparison between the Surge of TDI in China and
the Increase of Investment Allowance
Amount of TDI in China
(approved by MOEA, $
million)
Investment Allowance
(proxy: caps on individuals’ 
accumulated amount of




Figure 3 The Function of the Jurisdictional Competition to Cause the Relaxation of
Taiwan’s Capital Controls
Source: This Author
(1) Business demands for China-Investment and
more legal flexibility of the Capital Controls
(2) Higher mobility (lower exit costs)
The Demand side of the law market:
Exit rights in theinternational economic
process
International jurisdictional competition
The Supply side of the law market (1):
The supply of regulatory products of
legal flexibility by OFCs
The Supply side of the law market (2):
Voice rights in the domestic political
process
Economic Globalization:
(1) Removal of trade and investment barriers
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